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T a b l e  o f  C o n T e n T s
InTroducTIon
the body of evidence collected over the last two decades by policy-makers, institutions, non-state actors and 
academics, demonstrates that corruption serves as a major impediment to development. Strong evidence suggests 
that resources intended to address the basic development needs of millions of poor people around the world are diverted 
and misallocated through various forms of corrupt practices. tentative estimates suggest bribery alone costs the global 
economy US $1 trillion every year1, and it is widely believed that if corruption is not reduced, most developing countries 
will not achieve the Millennium development Goals (MdGs). 
donors are, however, becoming increasingly aware of the complex relationship between corruption and development. Not 
only can the efforts of donors to tackle poverty in partner countries be undermined by corruption, but the subversion of 
official development assistance (Oda) represents a reputational risk for donor countries. With an increasing appreciation 
of the risks to both developmental progress and donor reputation, donors are taking measures to more carefully assess 
the problem before incorporating the analyses into their activities at both the programmatic and sectoral level.
the scale of the costs associated with corruption is also of particular relevance considering the current global financial 
crisis. With concerns over the imposition of painful fiscal reforms and an ‘age of austerity’ in many Western societies, 
Western governments are likely to face considerable pressure from their citizens to also reduce aid expenditure. More 
pointedly, the dual pressures of fiscal discipline and public pressure are likely to result in increased scrutiny of the ways 
in which development aid is used and, importantly, where it has been misappropriated or subverted. However, such 
increased attention on the problems caused by corruption also offers donors an opportunity—and a willing global 
constituency—to re-focus efforts on a phenomenon that represents a major challenge to realising the MdGs.
Corruption is understood as a symptom of dysfunctional governance. a great deal of the work undertaken by the European 
Commission through its external aid programmes in partner countries has focused on increasing the capacity of the state, but 
also NGOs and other non-state actors, in order to ensure improved levels of accountability and transparency, while also taking 
into consideration specific local conditions in the partner countries. Specifically, these efforts have centred upon supporting 
the rule of law, democratisation, public administration reform, public finance management, decentralisation and building the 
capacity of non-state actors.
While donors clearly have a role to play, this concept paper emphasises that, in line with the 2005 Paris declaration2, 
the fight against corruption cannot rely solely on donor initiative. a shared consensus between partner countries, policy-
makers and academics suggests that such a unilateral approach would be doomed to failure. In short, rather than trying 
to reinforce local anti-corruption efforts at the same time as supporting international anti-corruption initiatives, donors 
should instead be aiming to situate themselves in a position from which they are able to provide the necessary analysis 
and support required by partner countries in their own anti-corruption efforts. 
the main objective of this paper is to provide relevant insights on the current thinking on and around anti-corruption in 
developing countries in order to enable the EU staff (relevant staff at the Commission, EEaS and in EU delegations) to 
achieve the following:
•	acquire useful tools to analyse corruption in a given local setting;
•	Become better equipped to support the implementation of anti-corruption strategies and policies; and
•	Better identify relevant anti-corruption measures so as to better mainstreaming anti-corruption issues in EU 
development assistance.
1 World Bank Institute, 2004. ‘The Costs of Corruption’, available at http://go.worldbank.org/LJA29GHA80.
2 The Paris Declaration commited countries to work towards enhanced aid effectiveness by improving ownership, alignment, harmonisation, results 
and mutual accountability. See http://www.oecd.org/document/18/0,3343,en_2649_3236398_35401554_1_1_1_1,00.html for more detail.
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this concept paper therefore aims to help EU staff understand the complexities of corruption and the various approaches 
most often taken in fi ghting it. Given the signifi cant concern over corruption within various sectors of the EU development 
assistance, it has been developed to better inform all EU staff—but most particularly those working on governance— 
of the current issues, thinking and research concerning corruption and anti-corruption. It has been designed in a way 
that enables readers to dip in and out as needed, but it is strongly recommended that it is read in order if possible. as 
Chapter One makes clear, for example, it is impossible to analyse the country context using political economy analysis 
(PEa) if a basic understanding of what constitutes corruption in different contexts is not shared.
this concept note does not attempt to provide a general or broad-spectrum remedy for corruption; rather it is intended 
to enhance the understanding of EU staff, providing them with the analytical and assessment frameworks that will help 
them implement context-specifi c anti-corruption activities. there is indeed no ‘one size fi ts all’ process for dealing with 
corruption; appropriate solutions must always be grounded in local, context-specifi c understanding. 
This concept paper focuses upon three main sections:
•	  chapter one introduces the main concepts relating to corruption; namely, an overview of the various 
defi nitions, forms and typologies of corruption; the causes and consequences of corruption; and the importance 
of the specifi c country context. this is intended to provide the EU staff and other interested stakeholders with 
an introductory tool to assist in the appreciation of current understandings of corruption.
•	  chapter two seeks to situate corruption within a global context. this section examines the global drivers of 
corruption and anti-corruption, including conventions and other international instruments. It also provides a 
case study looking at the fi eld of natural resources management to demonstrate how corruption can be fought 
indirectly as well as directly.
•	  chapter three is more operational in its approach than the fi rst two chapters. It seeks to introduce EU staff 
to the frameworks and tools available to analyse and assess levels and perceptions of corruption and the 
challenges posed by this process. It also includes suggested steps for undertaking corruption analysis using 
cutting edge analysis tools. In keeping with the aims of the Concept Note overall, its main purpose is to provide 
readers with a deeper understanding of relevant issues related to measuring corruption and assessing anti-
corruption in order to help improve the policy-making process.
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i n T R o d u C T i o n
cHapTer one: MaIn concepTs
Section 1: Defi nitions, typologies and forms of corruption
defi nitions of corruption vary according to the approaches, aims and needs of policy-makers. the legal approach, for 
example, requires accurate, explicit and defi nitive recognition of corrupt offences in order to construct legal frameworks 
that inform individuals, states and the international community of what constitutes prohibited acts. Socio-economic ap-
proaches tend to focus on the behaviour and economic interactions of the individual and their decision-making, while 
anthropological approaches are more analytical, nuanced and focus upon social systems. 
an understanding of the central tenets of each of these approaches by policy-makers will further develop understandings 
of corruption. the following sections aim to make EU staff aware of the different approaches to defi ning corruption and 
to better understand the different types of defi nitions used. When jointly applied, the following legal, socio-economic and 
anthropological approaches will provide EU staff with the necessary tools with which to develop a nuanced understand-
ing of corruption. thus, it is of vital importance that these approaches be recognised as complementary and useful in 
understanding and analysing the phenomenon, rather than used for comparison and judgements. 
1.1 Defi ning corruption
defi ning corruption is a complex task. Even if corruption is a worldwide phenomenon and presents common features 
in all countries, corruption also remains well entrenched in national contexts and local cultures, fundamentally depend-
ent on the context-specifi c interaction between local actors. Far from a question of semantics or academic posturing, 
how corruption is defi ned affects how it is viewed, which policy approaches are adopted and which approaches are 
deemed to be legitimate.
1.1.1 Main features of the legal approach to defi ning corruption 
defi ning corruption from a legal point of view is complex due to the complexity of the notion of corruption itself, which 
is dependent on time and place and may vary in different societies.
Respectively, the scope and content of national legislation and international conventions3 on corruption vary. In general, 
they contain a defi nition of the various forms of corruption, sanctions, specifi c provisions for the investigation and pros-
ecution as well as enforcing provisions. 
traditionally, corruption is defi ned in legal terms in criminal law Criminal law penalises acts or omissions which a given 
state or community considers as particularly harmful to personal rights or societal interests. In accordance with the fun-
damental principles of criminal law, namely that criminal liability is personal liability and that criminal law provisions shall 
be suffi ciently clear and precise to dictate the sanctions (nullum crimen nulla poena sine lege), the respective defi nition 
of corruption under criminal laws are relatively detailed and focused on individual behaviour. Such defi nitions address 
in particular active and passive bribery, but also a range of other criminal practices related to corruption, such as the 
abuse of public position and favouritism.
3  For a presentation on relevant international conventions, see chapter 2, section 1.
Key points:
•	 Socio-economic defi nitions/incidental defi nitions emphasise an individual pursuing corrupt practices for personal gain.
•	 anthropological defi nitions/systemic defi nitions emphasise a context-specifi c understanding of corruption.
•	 Corruption is not exclusive to any one defi nition or typology—understanding corruption requires a multi-disciplinary approach.
box 1: nigerian defi nitions of corruption
‘In Nigeria when Nigerians talk about corruption, they refer not only to the abuse of state offi ces for some kind of private gain but 
also to a whole range of social behaviour in which various forms of morally questionable deception that enable the achievement 
of wealth, power or prestige as well as more mundane ambitions. Nigerian notions of corruption encompass everything from 
government bribery and graft, rigged elections, and fraudulent business deals, to the diabolical abuse of occult powers, medical 
quackery, cheating in school, and even deceiving a lover’. 
Source: D.J. Smith, 2007. A Culture of Corruption: 
Everyday Deception & Popular Discontent in Nigeria, Princeton University, p.5 
R e f e R e n C e  d o C u m e n T  n ° 1 0  -  s u p p o R T i n g  a n T i - C o R R u p T i o n  R e f o R m  i n  p a R T n e R  C o u n T R i e s :  C o n C e p T s ,  T o o l s  a n d  a R e a s  f o R  a C T i o n
4
Further, criminal law was considered as the exclusive realm of national sovereignty. due to the diversity of social and 
cultural norms, as well as historical and legal traditions, the legal definitions for corruption-related offences in the re-
spective national criminal codes were also diverse, which in turn resulted in a lack of effective and equivalent protection 
against international corruption and organised crime. Furthermore, the international judicial cooperation against cor-
ruption, regarding for instance mutual legal assistance or extradition, was often compromised by the principle of ‘dual 
criminality’, whereby inter-state legal cooperation will be refused for acts alleged as crimes if they are not also defined 
as crimes in the jurisdiction receiving the request for assistance
this led to the negotiation and adoption of international conventions against corruption, aiming in particular to ensure 
that acts that are regarded as amounting to corruption are defined as such in a more harmonised and effective manner, 
as well as facilitating international judicial cooperation. In essence, States Parties to such conventions must transpose 
the acts defined as corruption into their national criminal legislation. For instance, as to the bribery of national public 
officials, the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCaC) provides that:
“Each State Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as criminal offences, 
when committed intentionally:
(a) the promise, offering or giving, to a public official, directly or indirectly, of an undue advantage, for the official himself 
or herself or another person or entity, in order that the official act or refrain from acting in the exercise of his or her 
official duties;
(b) the solicitation or acceptance by a public official, directly or indirectly, of an undue advantage, for the official himself 
or herself or another person or entity, in order that the official act or refrain from acting in the exercise of his or her 
official duties.” 4
International anti-corruption conventions were often also at the origin of national anti-corruption legislation developed 
in recent years which goes beyond provisions criminalising active and passive forms of bribery, notably as to cover 
issues such as access to information, conflict of interests, whistleblower protection, procurement, anti-money launder-
ing regulations and freedom of expression. Such legislation also provides a framework for a broad range of prevention 
measures5 and enforcement aspects, and in some cases, for the establishment of special anti-corruption agencies. 
the main features of defining corruption in legal terms are the following:
The act of corruption 
•	 is illegal and illegitimate; acts considered as «corruption» are sanctioned by law. they are illegitimate in the sense that 
there is a violation of the prevailing values in a democratic society, thus constituting the basis for sanctions;
•	 is an act of power, which implies abuse of power in favour of particular interests in exchange of a reward, promise or 
an abuse of public functions; 
•	 covers both action and omission; 
•	 involves a conflict of interest. Corruption violates the public/general interest or a private entity’s interest and implies 
an advantage (economic gain, status, honours, awards, reward or favours) to oneself or others (family, friends, group 
or organisation); 
•	 implies the violation of fundamental principles, values and rights in a democratic society, such as the principle of 
legality, good faith, transparency, accountability and human rights.
the types of sanctions range from civil to criminal, including also administrative, disciplinary rules, in various legal instru-
ments.
1.1.2 Main features of socio-economic approaches to defining corruption
Socio-economic definitions came to the fore during a period popularly termed the ‘corruption eruption’ (Naim, 1995), 
where increased attention to the subject attempted to transcend the inherent limits of an approach based purely on 
criminal law definitions. In appreciating the role of the individual, and their place within society, socio-economic ap-
proaches, such as that of the widely popular ‘principal-agent’ model (see Box 2 below), consider corruption to be the 
result of individual rational decisions and examine the interplay between motivation, power and opportunity in an attempt 
to understand why individuals choose to engage in corrupt behaviour. 
4 Article 15 of the convention.
5 For example, public officials are required to disclose their income and assets, or are subject to certain incompatibilities.
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In emphasising the potential benefi ts available to an individual operating within public offi ce, the World Bank’s defi nition 
of corruption, ‘the abuse of public offi ce for private gain’6, is the most commonly used and cited.
this defi nition does not limit corruption to illegitimate pecuniary transactions, such as bribery, but also extends it to 
non-monetary advantage, such as nepotism or infl uence peddling. Moreover, it does not strictly refer to corruption but 
also to other abuses of public offi ces. 
the UNdP proposes a more comprehensive and explicit interpretation of corruption, defi ning it as, ‘the misuse of pub-
lic power, offi ce or authority for private benefi t—through bribery, extortion, infl uence peddling, nepotism, fraud, speed 
money or embezzlement’7. the UNdP’s defi nition clearly goes further than the World Bank’s, establishing as it does the 
various acts that are believed to actually constitute corruption.
In applying an institutional context to socio-economic pursuits, academics, such as Klitgaard (1988), have directed 
the corruption vocabulary further towards the economic sphere, entrenching it fi rmly within notions of law and govern-
ment. Such interpretation unsurprisingly sees the workings of government through an ‘economic prism’8, deeming its 
very existence analogous to private sector interests. the impact of such thinking has been clear, and Klitgaard’s now 
famous formula (see Box 3 below) has been considerably infl uential in designing far-reaching public sector reforms to 
address corruption.
a broad consensus among academics and institutions focuses on corruption as limited to the public sector, and these 
defi nitions also enable us to recognise notions of entrusted power, entrusted authority and illicit gain. an appreciation of 
these broader understandings of corruption is important to policy-makers in order to gain a more thorough introduction 
to defi nitions of the phenomenon. 
Since large corrupt transactions may not always involve public offi ce, ‘the misuse of entrusted power for private gain’ 
is an interpretation offered by transparency International9. the focus on ‘entrusted power’ can be seen to refer to any 
form of legitimate formal authority, and therefore no longer limits corruption to the public sector alone. 
In a similar vein, Norad continues the theme of an abuse of ‘trust’ with its defi nition of corruption as, ‘the abuse of 
entrusted authority for illicit gain’10. Norad’s defi nition however shifts focus towards the ‘illicit’ nature of corrupt transac-
tions whether private or otherwise. Some mainstream interpretations, as we have seen, tend to limit their scope to more 
formal manifestations of public authority when defi ning corruption and tend to neglect informal institutions or modes 
of power. Institutions that offer broader defi nitions argue that corruption can also be seen as a deviation from customs 
and social norms, and that defi nitions therefore should encompass informal as well as formal forms of power11. the 
term ‘entrusted authority’ attempts to recognise a spectrum of power ranging from the formal to the informal, thus 
covering the spectrum from individual to systemic corruption in neo-patrimonial states. Norad’s use of the word ‘illicit’, 
offers a greater degree of conceptual freedom here, including, as it does, unlawful acts, but also ones that may be legal 
6 World Bank, 1997. ‘Helping Countries Combat Corruption: The Role of the World Bank, Washington DC’, 
available at http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/anticorrupt/corruptn/corrptn.pdf
7 UNDP, 1998. ‘Fighting Corruption to Improve Governance’.
8 Williams, R., 1999. ‘New Concepts for Old?’, Third World Quarterly, 20(3): 503-513
9 See http://www.transparency.org/news_room/faq/corruption_faq.
10 Norad, 2008. ‘Anti-Corruption Approaches, a Literature Review’. Evaluation Department.
11 Andvig, J., 2006. ‘Corruption and Fast Change’, World Development, 34(2): 328-40.
box 2: principal-agent theory and public sector corruption
the high profi le of principal-agent theory as one of the most popular and most frequently cited theories of the ‘individualist’ 
paradigm means the model requires some further explanation here. Principal-agent theory suggests that public sector corruption 
is the result of a corrupt transaction between three individuals: the principal (either the governing entity or, in some models, the 
state’s citizenry as a whole); the agent (a corruptible individual whose work and duty is in the service of the principal); and a 
third party (the corrupter). the agent is expected to act on behalf of the principal and to advance their interests; however, the 
agent and the principal may in reality be pursuing different, even antagonistic goals, given the asymmetric access to information 
between them.
box 3: Klitgaard’s formula highlights the relationship between the monopoly 
of power/government and the discretion of offi cials and corruption itself:
Corruption = Monopoly + discretion – accountability (C=M+d-a)
Source: R. Klitgaard, 1988. Controlling Corruption, University of California Press.
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yet disapproved of on moral or ethical grounds. this suggests that corruption may also arise when transactions are in 
contradiction with entrenched informal rules and customs.
Perhaps the broadest attempt to define corruption under a socio-economic approach comes from the EU. In addition 
to the specific legal definitions of corruption-related offences provided by the 1995 EU Convention and its protocols 
on the protection of European Communities’ financial interests, as well as by the 1997 EU Convention on anticorrup-
tion, the 2003 European Commission Communication adopts the UN’s interpretation of corruption as ‘the abuse of 
power for private gain’12. In doing so, the Communication both re-emphasised central tenets of previously mentioned 
understandings, while also going further in recognising the ‘supply side’: the role of the private sector and the support 
of necessary efforts to improve integrity and corporate social responsibility. It is important to note that this definition 
arises from European Commission Communication, which is a policy-making tool, and thus is not a definition approved 
at the EU level with a specific legal basis.
What socio-economic approaches to defining corruption do not do is to provide adequate recognition of the cultural, 
moral and behavioural effects on corruption. thus an anthropological understanding of the systems, habits and customs 
underlying corruption in any given society may provide us with greater insight and enriched understanding.
1.1.3 Anthropological approaches to defining corruption
the anthropological approach to defining corruption focuses on the motivations, organization of power and the contexts 
where corruption takes place. It considers corruption as a cultural, moral and legal phenomenon, emphasizing the roles 
played by norms, rules, customs and perceptions of corruption within a given society. Policy documents tend to focus on 
legal or socio-economic approaches to corruption, but there is much to learn from anthropological approaches, in terms of 
programmatic design, policy dialogue and so on.
anthropological studies on corruption emphasise that corruption is both a product of individual interactions and the systems in 
which they interact. Social attitudes, the forms and organisation of power and particular arrangements of formal and informal 
rules, may all participate in the formation of systems (such as neo-patrimonial systems) where corruption and state-capture 
may flourish. Corruption is therefore a phenomenon that changes across time and societies and which needs to be treated 
contextually. this does not automatically mean that corruption can be viewed as a relativistic concept considered as accept-
able within certain cultures but not in others. Indeed, corruption is condemned widely all around the world regardless of the 
culture within which it occurs, but what is actually understood to be corrupt may change depending on context. 
In one highly influential study13, researchers have analysed the ‘real’ rules and procedures that govern informal and formal 
economic and legal behaviour in developing countries. they studied petty and institutional forms of corruption in transport and 
customs, the legal system and in public procurement, arguing that ‘corruption must be understood as a practice embedded 
in everyday forms of sociability that transcend normative concepts of illegality and illegitimacy’. according to their findings, 
corruption was found to be pervasive throughout everyday life in the countries where they carried out their research. they 
hypothesised that the communal complicity of different actors who commit corrupt acts, served as a means of coping with 
an environment where public services are confused and dysfunctional. 
Similarly, in many countries the public tolerates corruption in public administration and pays bribes even when civil serv-
ants do not ask for them. the public sees corruption as a way for poorly paid civil servants to survive14. Furthermore, 
researchers have argued that in some cases, corruption is a matter of professional necessity. Indeed, in an environment 
where corruption is so pervasive, an individual who does not engage in corruption is dismissed as a fool. the behaviour 
of such a person may even be considered selfish since he or she does not take advantage of his or her position to 
collect bribes that could be shared among kin or colleagues15. In many countries people are recruited on condition that 
they actively seek bribes and share the proceeds with the individuals who recruited them16. 
another study analyses everyday perceptions of and attitudes towards the phenomenon in a number of societies. For 
people in the countries they investigated corruption was perceived as just another public service—a public resource that 
anybody can use when they are in a position to do so. they observed an ambivalent attitude toward corruption where, 
instead of being condemned outright, is judged according to a scale of acceptance that operates in the society: ‘while 
a good appetite is normal’, it was opined, ‘gluttony is deplorable’. this ‘moral economy of corruption’, which according 
12 From Communication on Corruption [COM(2003)317]: ‘The Communication adopts the definition of corruption used 
by the United Nations’ Global Programme against Corruption, i.e. «abuse of power for private gain»’, available at 
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/fight_against_fraud/fight_against_corruption/l33301_en.htm 
13 Blundo, G. et al., 2006. Everyday Corruption and the State: Citizens and Public Officials in Africa, London: Zed Books.
14 Kodi, M., 2008. ‘Corruption and Governance in the DRC During the Transition Period (2003-6)’, Pretoria: ISS, 
available at http://www.ipocafrica.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=56&Itemid=86
15 Blundo, et al., 2006
16 Kodi, 2008.
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to researchers governs and regulates the ethical construction of corruption in the countries investigated, is also found 
in other developing countries17. 
In a study of religion and attitudes towards corruption in Nigeria, Marquette et al. show how corruption was seen by 
respondents as being a ‘catch-all’ phrase for all that is considered to be bad or evil in society18. this includes bribery and 
fraud, but – echoing the quote from Smith in Box 1 (above) – it also includes things such as adultery and homosexuality. 
this shows very clearly the need for policymakers to recognise the difference that definitions can make to policy-making. 
Indeed, in the times of Zambia, Vice-President Mumba ‘encouraged the church to stand out against “unbiblical prac-
tices”’; the title of the story is ‘Zambia gets ‘”tough on corruption and gays”‘19. If external actors were to enlist religious 
leaders into the fight against corruption, for example, they could conceivably find themselves embroiled on the wrong 
side of debates about human rights in their own countries if they are not aware of these definitional differences. 
the anthropological approach points out that when defining and combating corruption, ‘one size does not fit all’, and 
it is important for policy-makers and analysts to take into account the issues raised through anthropological analysis 
when approaching corruption. 
1.2 Typologies of corruption
this section explores the forms and typologies of corruption to be addressed throughout this paper before shedding 
some light on the scale of corrupt acts, their context and the motivation of involved parties.
1.2.1 Grand versus petty corruption
 
Grand corruption is largely attributed to poor accountability and transparency and generally pervades the highest levels 
of national government. this permutation is often found in specific sectors where transactions present the following 
characteristics:
•	  Large transactions, where a large margin can be received with minimal risk from a minimum number of transactions;
•	an immediacy of reward, and a prevalence of short time horizons for public sector elites, increases the opportunity 
cost of receiving bribes with lower margins over a longer time period;
•	Complex and sophisticated corrupt transactions are attractive since they lower the probability of getting caught.
When applying these criteria, grand corruption is seen to occur most frequently in areas such as construction, telecom-
munications, the extractive industries, and defence contracts, large infrastructure contracts in health and water sectors 
and in contracting technical expertise. 
While grand corruption tends to monopolise the media, and despite the relatively small proportion of grand corruption 
cases that are ever reported, it is petty corruption that generally translates into a more discrete, lower level, daily obstacle 
that affects the poor directly and disproportionately. although often only involving relatively small amounts of money—
certainly in comparison with grand corruption cases—petty corruption can be just as damaging, since it directly affects 
the welfare of citizens and the business environment. Petty corruption occurs at the citizen-state level of interface, where 
citizens seek to evade restricting regulations or when officials abuse their discretionary power by extorting money from 
them. transparency International’s worldwide survey (2009) suggests that forty per cent of respondents reported having 
spent between one and ten per cent of their annual income on bribes. 
Experiences of petty corruption tend to occur when people interact with the following sectors and public services: 
customs, taxation, police, judiciary, land services, registry and permit services, health, education and utilities (water 
and electricity). these sectors witness a high prevalence as they are regularly solicited by the population, giving officials 
important monopoly and discretionary powers at point of access to public goods and services. 
Petty corruption is also a major factor of economic discrimination since it tends to affect the poorest the most. transpar-
ency International’s 2009 worldwide survey across services most prone to bribery shows that the level of respondents 
reported having bribed a public official in the previous twelve months is far higher in the poorest quintile than in the richest 
twenty-five per cent of the lowest income quintile, while only fifteen per cent of the highest income quintile responded 
that they did.
17 Blundo, G. & Olivier de Sardan, J.P., 2001. ‘Sémiologie populaire de la corruption’,  Politique africaine, 83.
18 Marquette, H. et al., 2012 (forthcoming), ‘Religion and Attitudes Towards Corruption in India and Nigeria’, Development in Practice.
19 Times of Zambia, 2003, Zambia Gets ‘Tough on Corruption and Gays’. Times of Zambia, 17 November.
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1.2.2 Bureaucratic/administrative versus political corruption and state capture 
Bureaucratic/administrative corruption concerns relatively small-scale, petty corruption where the implementation of policies at 
the point of citizen access is altered by non-elected public offi cials, through practices such as bribery to get a licence or evade 
taxation. Corruption between a low-level public agent (the agent) and a third party is facilitated through an information asym-
metry between benevolent politicians or decision-makers (the principal) and their subordinates (also the agent). as a result, 
the principal cannot observe the misbehaviours of agents, providing opportunities to the latter to indulge in corrupt behaviour.
Such a theory, however, is less able to explain political corruption (i.e. the misuse of entrusted power by political leaders 
to manipulate policies, institutions and rules of procedure)20; nor can it explain state capture where ‘the state itself can 
be characterized as largely serving the interests of a narrow group of business people and politicians’21. 
these terms have arisen from a recent stream of literature concerning the economics of crime and appropriation, the 
economics of organised crime and the political economy of dictatorship—approaches that seek to emphasise that cor-
ruption is far from exogenous to the political process. analyses such as these consider the consequences of predatory 
behaviour consisting largely of rent-seeking by both ruler (politician or decision-maker) and outside groups. In this con-
text, political corruption and state capture occur ‘when [high level offi cials and other] groups are able to infl uence/exploit 
the rules and regulations set by the state in ways that allow them to extract undue economic and/or political benefi ts’22. 
State capture tends to occur most frequently in neo-patrimonial systems, which are hybrid systems of governance where 
a patrimonial system of governance co-exists with formal rational-legal institutions. the weak separation of public and 
private spheres favours the use of public resources for personal or collective gains (corruption) and other related prac-
tices. these relationships combined with weak separation of public and private spheres leads to systemic clientelism. 
Since competition for power among political elites amounts to a zero-sum game, and the misappropriation to public 
resources forms the only means of accumulating wealth, political elites fi ght for positions of power, often using state 
resources to maintain their positions in society and redistribute wealth to their clients. For the latter, this relationship is 
essential since it provides access to resources that the state—because of its dysfunctional institutions—is not able to 
deliver.
20 See http://www.transparency.org/news_room/faq/corruption_faq
21 Rose-Ackerman, S., 2004. ‘The Challenge of Poor Governance and Corruption’, available at http://www.
copenhagenconsensus.com/fi les/fi ler/cc/papers/governance_and_corruption_300404_(0.7mb_version).pdf
22 Norad, 2008.
Figure 1: Percentage of people who reported paying bribes in 
the previous 12 months, arranged by service 
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Source: Transparency International, 2009. Global Corruption Barometer, 
available at http://www.transparency.org/news_room/in_focus/2009/gcb2009#dnld.
C h a p T e R  o n e :  m a i n  C o n C e p T s
9
1.2.3 Active versus passive corruption
distinctions between ‘passive’ and ‘active’ forms of corruption occur frequently within various national legislature and 
international conventions and reflect the need under criminal law to precisely define the personal behaviours that are 
prohibited. these terms apply in particular to incidents of corruption that involve a ‘transaction’ (e.g. bribery). In this 
instance, active corruption refers to the individual/organisation that funds the transaction act (i.e. a bribe is offered/paid 
[the ‘supply side’]), while passive corruption refers to the receipt of proceeds from the act by the public official (i.e. ac-
cepting the bribe [the ‘demand side’])23. 
this distinction is of course not to be misunderstood with regards to the briber always being cast as ‘active‘ and the 
bribed person as ’passive‘. It can of course be the case that the person receiving the bribe takes the initiative of re-
questing the bribe.
1.2.4 Corruption driven by need versus corruption driven by greed 
the distinction between ‘need’ and ‘greed’ refers to the motivations underlying corruption (i.e. ‘corruption driven by need’ in 
contrast with ‘corruption driven by greed’). While the distinction is not recognised in the academic literature, it was emphasised 
by the tanzanian ’Presidential Commission of Enquiry into Corruption’, commonly known as the Warioba Commission. the 
Commission deemed that corruption motivated by need refers to petty corruption and is seen as a means for public servants 
to supplement their often meagre incomes. Conversely, grand corruption is usually motivated by ‘greed’ for the accumulation 
of vast wealth rather than survival. 
this distinction has led to a debate regarding the salary levels of public sector officials in developing countries, where higher-
level salaries in the public sector are expected to diminish incentives for corrupt acts. In the same way, political stability is 
supposed to decrease corruption by lengthening the time horizons over which an honest official could expect to enjoy high 
remuneration and an extended career. 
However, the relationship between work environment and corruption is perhaps more nuanced. Indeed, it may also 
be argued that high salaries themselves contribute to intensifying competition for positions in public administration 
and subsequently create favourable conditions for bribery. Similarly, political stability can contribute to reinforcing both 
clandestine relationships between corrupted public and private actors, as well as their reputation for such behaviour, by 
providing conditions conducive to a high frequency of transactions24. thus, high public salaries and political stability may 
in certain situations have an indeterminate and unpredictable impact on preventing or lowering the levels of corruption.
1.2.5 Incidental versus systemic corruption
‘Incidental’ or ‘systemic’ designations do not in any way indicate the scale or degree of corruption in a given society 
but rather provide differing theoretical imperatives as to how corruption may be understood to occur—who is ultimately 
responsible, and what methods may be most appropriate to fight it. 
Incidental corruption does refer to corruption that is an occasional occurrence and which does not seem to imply cor-
ruption that is particularly widespread. However, in a more theoretical sense, it is also used to explore the importance of 
individual agency and the notion that individual acts are determined by ‘rational choice’, and not by a more pervasive, 
‘systematised’ form of corruption. Emphasis on individual responsibility leads to advocating action that focuses on 
monitoring and punishing the individual perpetrator as the ‘source’ of corruption. this does, however, raise questions 
regarding the degree of independence individuals truly have within any given society, and this allows insight into the 
limitations of ‘principal-agent’ models. 
Systemic corruption, conversely, implies corruption that is so widespread that it is almost ‘built into’ the system. again, 
in a more theoretical sense, it is also used to suggest that rather than acting independently, actors actually operate 
as part of a system, co-ordinated to maximise the collection and distribution of rents. Systems of corruption therefore 
involve the sale of jobs, the sharing of rents from bribery or theft and the compromising of systems of integrity that 
could control corruption25. as opposed to emphasising the role of individual agency as fundamental to the causes, 
continuation and remedy of corruption, understanding corruption as a systemic problem results in a greater focus on 
the wider mechanisms that compound it. From a systemic perspective, action that pre-empts corrupt behaviour and 
mitigates its effects is advocated.
23 UNODC, 2004. ‘UN Anti-Corruption Toolkit’, Vienna, available at http://www.unodc.org/documents/corruption/publications_toolkit_sep04.pdf
24 Treisman, D., 2000. ‘The Causes of Corruption: A Cross-National Study’, Journal of Public Economics, 76(3): 399-457.
25 Azfar, O. &  Nelson, W. N., 2007. ‘Transparency Wages and the Separation of Powers: An 
Experimental Analysis of Corruption’, Public Choice, 130: 471-93.
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In light of this, it is suggested that corruption, and consequently anti-corruption reforms, have been mischaracterised as 
a principal-agent phenomenon. this position essentially suggests that in a context where corruption exists as systemic, 
an individual is likely to engage in corruption despite personal moral disapproval of it or its costs for society at large. 
Indeed, the costs to an individual for being honest are in such instances comparatively high compared with being cor-
rupt, and thus people become unwilling or even incapable of bearing the costs alone. From this perspective, corruption 
serves as a ‘typical’ collective action problem26. 
In conclusion, current international thinking about corruption tends to emphasise systemic over incidental explanations 
of corruption, while national anti-corruption agencies tend to focus on incidental acts27. this divergence between inter-
national and national responses has arguably resulted in a dichotomy of approaches, most notable for an absence of 
sequenced reforms and a project, or at best sectoral, oriented anti-corruption response.
1.2.6 Quiet corruption
Since 2010 the World Bank has coined the phrase ‘quiet corruption’ to articulate the sort of corruption that does not 
involve monetary exchange, and may or may not be observable, but still has a massive impact upon the poor28. Quiet 
corruption refers to behaviour on the part of front-line service providers, such as doctors, teachers, tax collectors and 
so on, that includes the ‘deliberate bending of the rules for personal advantage’. this could include activities such as 
absenteeism or even deliberately poor performance of duty. 
Quiet corruption can be just as perfidious as other types of corruption, as these actions (or inactions as the case may 
be) directly impact the well-being of the poor and could contribute significantly to lack of progress on the MdGs, despite 
government and donor investment in services.
1.2.7 Conclusion
It is important to recognise that, despite variances, these typologies of corruption are far from exclusive. Indeed, petty 
corruption coexists with and reinforces grand corruption and vice versa. Likewise, administrative corruption can exist side 
by side with, and feed, political corruption/state capture. For instance, petty corruption at the customs office may con-
tribute to and/or finance large-scale corruption by maintaining the balance and organisation of power within the system. 
this, in turn, may fuel the greed of high-level public officials and ultimately contribute to the financing of political parties.
In short, an appreciation of these inter-related patterns is necessary. In order to effectively target anti-corruption policies 
the various typologies of corruption cannot be addressed in isolation. 
1.3 Forms of public sector corruption
the United Nations Office for drugs and Crime (UNOdC) has developed a simple taxonomy (see Figure 2 below) to 
illustrate and delineate the most commonly agreed forms of public sector corruption. It is worthy of note that many of 
these agreed forms also have commonly accepted definitions within criminal law—definitions enshrined in the United 
Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCaC, see Section 2 below). While some variances to this taxonomy oc-
cur29, the growing harmonisation of anti-corruption frameworks and strategies among the donor community has led to 
widespread acceptance of the model given below in Figure 2.
26 Persson, A., Bo Rothstein & J. Teorell, J., (2010.) ‘The failure of anti-corruption policies: a theoretical mischaracterization of the problem’. 
QoG Working Paper 2010:19, available at: http://www.qog.pol.gu.se/working_papers/2010_19_Persson_Rothstein_Teorell.pdf
27 Larmour, P., 2007. ‘A Short Introduction to Corruption and Anti-Corruption’, CIES Working paper, 27.
28 This concept is new and has yet to find widespread acceptance in the academic and policy communities, but it is interesting to note briefly here.
29 Some of these, for example, are covered by UNCAC, while others are just criminological definitions 
established by UNODC where there is no globally accepted criminal law definition.
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1.3.1 Bribery 
the UNOdC30 defi nes bribery as ‘the bestowing of a benefi t in order to unduly infl uence an action or decision’ and can 
be solicited in either the ‘active’ or passive’ form. For instance, a customs offi cial may accept bribes to ignore import 
duties and levies or to allow dangerous or prohibited goods crossing national borders. Bribery is a widespread corrup-
tion offence that affects the whole population, especially the poorest, in all areas of the public sector. 
1.3.2 Fraud
Fraud is determined by ‘any behaviour designed to trick or fool another person or entity for one’s own or a third party’s 
benefi t’31. For instance, a healthy individual can offer money to a doctor to obtain a false medical report, which can 
be presented to an employer in order to mislead him/her and obtain undue fi nancial remuneration or compensation. 
Practices such as ballot box ‘stuffi ng’ during local or national elections may also be seen to constitute a form of fraud.
1.3.3 Embezzlement 
Embezzlement refers to the stealing of funds or property from an employer, company or government. Embezzlement is 
defi ned as the ‘taking or conversion of money, property or valuable items by an individual who is not entitled to them but, 
by virtue of his or her position or employment, has access to them’32. Examples of embezzlement may include instances 
such as if a public enterprise director were to employ company workers to build his own house or if offi cials in charge of 
distributing food to a local village steal a portion of the food and sell it to other parties. In certain cases, embezzlement 
involves huge amounts of money, feeding networks of corrupt politicians and high-level offi cials.
30 UNODC, 2004.
31 Ibid.
32 Ibid.
Figure 2: Forms of Corruption 
Public sector 
corruption
Bribery
Extortion
EmbezzlementConict of 
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Illegal 
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Fraud
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Source: UNODC (2004)
box 4: article 15 United nations convention against corruption:
bribery of national public offi cials
Each State Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as criminal offences, when 
committed intentionally:
(a) the promise, offering or giving, to a public offi cial, directly or indirectly, of an undue advantage, for the offi cial himself or her-
self or another person or entity, in order that the offi cial act or refrain from acting in the exercise of his or her offi cial duties;
(b) the solicitation or acceptance by a public offi cial, directly or indirectly, of an undue advantage, for the offi cial himself or her-
self or another person or entity, in order that the offi cial act or refrain from acting in the exercise of his or her offi cial duties.
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1.3.4 Favouritism
Forms of corruption such as nepotism and cronyism amount fundamentally to an abuse of the power of discretion 
and arguably constitute ‘personal gain’ despite the fact that the most apparent benefi ciary of the act are individuals 
somehow linked with an offi cial rather than the offi cial him or herself33. Further explanation behind the motives for this 
form of corruption defi ne favouritism as ’the normal human inclination to prefer acquaintances, friends and family over 
strangers. [Corruption occurs] when public offi cials demonstrate favouritism to unfairly distribute positions and resources‘. 
Nepotism occurs where public offi cials offer unfair favours to family members, while cronyism refers to the favourable 
treatment of friends34. 
1.3.5 Extortion
Extortion differs from bribery as it relies on a process of coercion where a person, company or institution forces another 
party ‘to pay money or other valuables in exchange for acting or failing to act’35. For instance, a tax offi cer can threaten 
a citizen with the over-reporting of their income in order to force him or her to pay a bribe. 
1.3.6 Abuse of discretion
abuse of discretion occurs when offi cials utilise their ’vested authority to give undue preferential treatment to any group 
or individuals, or to discriminate against any group or individuals for personal gain’36. For instance, an elected offi cial 
in charge of public service delivery may give preferential service delivery to their constituency while neglecting other 
constituencies. 
1.3.7 Confl ict of interest
a confl ict of interest occurs when the personal interests of a public offi cial confl ict with those of their obligation to act 
in the best interest of the state37. Naturally, such private interests could improperly infl uence decision-making and the 
performance of an offi cial’s duties and responsibilities. For instance, a public offi cial’s membership of a club, group or 
association could be the source of interests that might confl ict with his public duties. 
1.3.8 Illegal contribution
these occur when a political party or government receives bribes in exchange for non-interference—or alternatively 
favouritism—with the affairs of the group or entity making the contribution. Illegal political contributions usually feed 
grand corruption and are channelled through large networks of corrupt politicians and high-level offi cials. However, the 
UNOdC is keen to recognise that distinguishing between legitimate and illegitimate contributions to political organisa-
tions is one of the most challenging issues in the design of anti-corruption measures.
Section 2: Causes and consequences of corruption
the following section provides a perspective of some of the popularly accepted causes and consequences of corruption 
and an introduction as to how and where corruption is understood to prevail. Corruption, it is argued, tends to fl ourish 
in environments where there are strong incentives in public and political spheres of administration to engage in corrup-
tion; where the specifi c structural characteristics of certain countries, such as natural resource endowments, favour 
its prevalence; and fi nally where economic regulations and law enforcement bodies are weak. Following a discussion 
of these variables, a more in-depth analysis of the domestic and external mechanisms underlying the emergence and 
development of corruption is then provided. 
33 Ibid.
34 See http://www.u4.no/helpdesk/faq/faqs1.cfm
35 UNODC, 2004.
36 Ibid.
37 Ibid.
Key points:
•	 Corruption disproportionately affects those from the poorest sectors of society.
•	 Weak institutions, inequality and low levels of democracy foster corruption.
•	 Economic liberalism is not a cure-all for corruption.
•	 International, national and local contexts all factor into the prevalence of corruption.
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Corruption is a complex phenomenon and a systemic feature of many societies; it is also one that is ineluctably inter-
twined with myriad international, national and local contexts. Understanding how and where corruption is most likely 
to occur and gain ground, alongside determining what the key drivers of corruption are and how it affects societies, 
therefore forms a challenging task. 
approaches such as that taken here, which examine corruption and its perceived causes and consequences, have 
proven, for their apparent clarity and actionable nature, understandably popular among policy-makers. It is critical to 
note however that the reality of corruption in the field is, as is so often the case, infinitely more complex. the process of 
determining the actual direction of causality between ‘cause’ and ‘effect’, let alone the problems inherent to universally 
defining them, is no black and white issue, and may form an inherently problematic and occasionally even counterpro-
ductive exercise.
2.1 Causes of corruption
It is important to understand the domestic and external mechanisms underlying the emergence and development of 
corruption. Some key factors, and the way(s) in which they are expected to affect corruption levels, are presented below.
2.1.1 Level of economic development and poverty
according to the U438 anti-corruption centre, ‘there is no fixed, firm correlation between any particular level of economic 
development and the incidence of corruption’. Corruption and economic development appear trapped within a vicious 
circle, where the absence of economic development encourages corruption, and the prevalence of corruption restricts 
development and compounds poverty. Corruption, it may therefore be argued, serves as a cause of poverty, but the 
self-perpetuating nature of systemic poverty also limits economic growth and impedes the fight against corruption. It 
is surely no coincidence that the poorest countries on the planet are also among the worst affected by both structural 
corruption and systemic poverty.
Others39 go further in guarding against ‘rude evolutionism’ in the search for a clear-cut relationship between abject 
poverty and corruption. Put more simply, expectations for levels of honesty and efficiency in the civil service must be 
mediated with a respect for the limitations imposed by abject poverty.
However, while it is important to recognise the need for exercising caution when theorising causal trends, it can never-
theless be argued that levels of economic development do appear to impact the form corruption takes and the sectors 
it tends to affect. For example, petty corruption appears prevalent in developing countries where public services, which 
ought to be supplied free of charge, are only supplied after the payment of a bribe.
2.1.2 Unintended consequences of economic liberalisation
Economic liberalisation is a process intended to expand the role of the private sector in the delivery of goods and services 
and increase competition among private firms in domestic and international markets. Such reforms are believed to offer 
a means by which to tackle corruption and encourage economic growth simultaneously.
advocates of economic liberalism suggest that where the state is the main source of corruption, rolling back the state, 
restricting its activities and redefining its relationship with the economy is fundamental for reducing the opportunities for 
actors to engage in corruption40. Furthermore, analysts contend that this policy is expected to reduce the costs of public 
procurement, which in turn should reduce the bribes procurement officials may require41. In the same manner, competi-
tion from foreign markets, measured by the degree of trade openness, is also supposed to discourage corrupt behaviour. 
However, assumptions that reductions in the size of the public sector brought about by economic liberalisation would 
automatically reduce levels of corruption have been shown to be overly optimistic42. Foreign competition, through market 
liberalisation, has the potential to place pressure on the domestic sector and narrow rents for firms and opportunities 
for bribery43. 
38 See http://www.u4.no/helpdesk/faq/faqs1.cfm#3
39 Doig, A, & Riley, S., 1998. ‘Corruption and Anti-Corruption Strategies: Issues and Case Studies from Developing Countries’, in 
Cheema, G., S., & Bonvin, J. (eds) Corruption and Integrity Improvement Initiatives in Developing Economies. Paris: OECD, Ch. 3.
40 Ibid.
41 Lambsdorff, J. G., 2007. The Institutional Economics of Corruption and Reform: Theory, 
Evidence and Policy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
42 Doig & Riley, 1998.
43 Ades, A. & Di Tella, R., 1999. ‘Rents, Competition, and Corruption,’ American Economic Review, 89(4): 982-993.
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Furthermore, private sector growth and the process of privatisation itself have themselves created new opportunities for 
corruption in instances where state assets have been sold at below market price by elites in a corrupt, non-transparent 
manner44. Such processes frequently occurred without the necessary regulatory systems—an absence of which could 
be argued to have paved the way for grand corruption (e.g. Russia’s privatisation process). 
the expansion of the private sector necessitates more frequent interaction with the public sector and hence may increase 
the number of opportunities for private agents to bribe public officials. at the heart of this, ‘influence overwhelmingly has 
resided in the control of the interface between public and private relationships and mixes’45. this allows public officials 
to continue to control this lucrative interface in many developing countries.
Significantly, corruption may occur within the private sector itself—in purely commercial transactions when a sales agent 
bribes purchasing agents to win business or within an enterprise where labour union leaders are paid off by managers 
to misrepresent workers’ interests. Similarly, international trade may generate new opportunities for corruption, since 
bribes can be paid by foreign companies to obtain domestic contracts or by domestic companies seeking to gain 
privileged access to foreign markets46. 
2.1.3 Unintended consequences of state intervention
the link between state intervention and corruption is far from straightforward and should be considered with care by 
policy-makers and analysts. While economic liberalisation has undoubtedly been the dominant economic model over 
the last three decades, the role of the state—and more specifically state intervention—in generating corruption demands 
recognition. although state intervention and improved governance usually accompany the economic development 
process, larger state interventions in a poor institutional environment may be associated with greater rents under the 
discretion of public officials, leading to an increase in the expected return from corrupt acts47. thus, state intervention 
may in certain contexts foster corruption through excessive red tape, taxation and reduced competition.
•	Red tape: Excessive and/or poorly-designed bureaucratic rules that incur non-pecuniary costs for agents dealing 
with bureaucracy (i.e. time and resources spent by firms and households dealing with public administration). While 
administrative rules and procedures do not necessarily imply higher incentives for corruption, excessive regulation 
may provide public officials with increased opportunities and rents, where bureaucratic barriers encourage agents to 
bribe officials to overcome them.
•	Taxation: In administrations where fiscal control mechanisms are ineffective, higher tax rates may increase the amount 
of bribes required by corrupt officials to enable tax evasion, leading to higher levels of corruption. Moreover, higher 
tax levels may also encourage extortion by inciting tax officers to over-report, or threatening to over-report, taxable 
incomes. Similarly, high tariff and non-tariff barriers may also create opportunities for custom officers to ‘sell’ favour-
able treatment to private companies.
Often occurring alongside economic liberalisation and the rolling back of the state, decentralisation is also expected to 
reduce corruption. decentralisation is thought to decrease the opportunities for corrupt behaviour by devolving policy—
and decision-making powers—closer to citizens, and therefore enabling an increased and improved grassroots scrutiny 
of local political and administrative elites by the general public and non-state actors. 
However, decentralisation, it is argued, can also increase corruption with its transfer of greater power to local govern-
ment, allowing for greater intimacy and frequency of interaction between individuals and corruptible officials48. this raises 
the question of the neutrality and objectivity of public officials towards individuals and, in particular, the private sector, 
that may be reduced at lower levels. a helpful example of the unintended consequences of decentralisation can be 
seen in China where a stagnant economy forced the Chinese government to give greater autonomy to local authorities 
to determine the allocation of resources. In this particular case, greater local autonomy resulted in the revival of old 
patron-client networks and new patterns of corruption49. 
44 See http://www.u4.no/helpdesk/faq/faqs1.cfm#3
45 Sutch, cited in Wedel, J., 2005. ‘Blurring the State-Private Divide: Flex Organisations and the Decline 
of Accountability’, available at http://janinewedel.info/scholarly_Kluwer.pdf
46 Tanzi, V., 1998. ‘Corruption Around the World: Causes, Consequences, Scope and Cures’. IMF Staff Papers, 
45 (4), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/staffp/1998/12-98/pdf/tanzi.pdf
47 Ibid.
48 Ibid.
49 Ibid.
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2.1.4 Weak institutions
the World Bank50 contends that ‘multiple, co-ordinated and reinforced’ institutions are fundamental for the preserva-
tion of effective service delivery and prevention of power abuse by ruling elites as well as low- to mid-level officials. In 
contrast, it seems self-evident that weak institutions do little to hold corrupt politicians and officials to account or to 
prevent systematic corruption. 
the UNOdC51 contends that institution-building represents an important part of national anti-corruption strategies, and 
it is one reflected in and integral to many international anti-corruption conventions and most development projects. In 
short, it seems an accepted truth that the absence of institutionally driven checks and balances are likely to foster a 
climate that is conducive to systemic corruption. 
2.1.5 Lack of accountability and transparency
While lines of causation are far from proven, corruption appears to thrive where accountability and transparency mecha-
nisms, particularly within an institutional context, are minimal. although the ultimate sanction in a democracy is the 
removal of corrupt incumbents by the electorate, it is often the case that where corruption is rife, an orderly, structured 
environment with political competition, accountability and transparency is not. Corruption appears to be both a cause 
and an effect of unaccountable institutions52.
2.1.6 Inequality
Countries experiencing chronic poverty and high levels of inequality form areas of particular concern with regards to 
vulnerability to corruption; furthermore, a positive correlation between levels of corruption and levels of inequality sug-
gest that corruption fosters divisions in society, creating and sustaining ‘fault lines’ between those who benefit from 
corruption and those that do not.53 
the relationship between gender and corruption, for example, has been investigated by sociologists and economists 
alike54. It has been hypothesised that male-dominated structures are set up in societies to promote particularistic interests 
at the expense of those of the society at large. It is, therefore, proposed that improved women’s rights may contribute 
to lowering levels of corruption. a reverse causality has been suggested in this regard. In fact, it is thought that low 
levels of corruption may restrict male-dominated networks and, therefore, improve women’s access to higher positions. 
there is an ongoing debate on whether women are naturally less corrupt than men55. Some researchers have observed 
that a better mix of sexes as opposed to male dominance tends to reduce corruption levels56. However, while there are 
assertions that a gender balance would contribute to the reduction in levels of corruption, al-hassan alolo, an economist 
at the african development Bank, conducted research in Ghana that clearly suggests that it is perhaps the absence of 
wider notions of ‘equality’ acting as a cause of corruption—whether the inequality be gender, income, education and 
so forth—rather than women naturally being less ‘corrupt’57. Her research, which looks at attitudes towards corrup-
tion among men and women in the public sector, show that women are no more or less likely to condemn or condone 
corruption than men, but that they do not have access to the same networks and opportunities for corruption. this 
suggests that if women were to gain more access to power – i.e., if society were to become more equal, opening up 
these networks and opportunities, they are likely to be just as corrupt—or honest—as men.
Interestingly, this suggests that although inequality is believed to be a significant contributor to corruption, reducing 
inequality in itself is unlikely, at least in the short term, to reduce corruption, as previously excluded groups gain access 
to opportunities for corruption.
2.1.7 Democracy or the lack of democracy
transparency International’s (tI) Corruption Perception Index demonstrates a clear negative correlation between corrup-
tion levels and democracy. By enabling increased voter scrutiny of political decisions, freedom of the media, electoral 
50 See the World Bank’s Anti-Corruption website at http://go.worldbank.org/QYRWVXVH40
51 UNODC, 2004.
52 See http://www.u4.no/helpdesk/faq/faqs1.cfm#3
53 Chetwynd, E., Chetwynd, F., & Spector, B., 2003. ‘Corruption and Poverty: A Review of Recent Literature’, 
available at http://www.u4.no/document/literature/corruption-and-poverty.pdf.
54 Swamy et al, 2001. ‘Gender and Corruption’, Journal of Development Economics, 64:25-55; see also GTZ, 2010. ‘Gender & Corruption 
in Development Cooperation’, available at http://www2.gtz.de/dokumente/bib/gtz2010-0441en-gender-corruption.pdf.
55 Sumg, 2003. ‘Fairer Sex or Fairer System ? Gender and Corruption Revisited’, Social Forces, 82(2): 703-23.
56 Lambsdorf, 2007.
57 Al-hassan Alolo, N., (2007). ‘Gender and corruption: testing the new consensus’, Public Administration & Development, 27: 227-37.
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competition and fostering civic engagement, cases of corruption are more likely to be exposed, integrity enforced and 
political accountability improved in democratic systems. 
the link between democracy and corruption is, however, more nuanced than initial inspection might suggest, since 
measurements of the two phenomena may be contested (see Chapter 3 on the use of the CPI as ‘data’, for example). 
Moreover, it has been found that electoral competition may give rise to corruption by increasing the needs of political 
parties to raise funds. It appears that the negative relationship between corruption levels and democracy depends on 
how well institutionally entrenched the democracy is in a given country.
2.1.8 Unintended consequences of international corporations and ‘Foreign Direct Investment’ (FDI)
International corporations and foreign direct investment (FdI) are essential ingredients for economic growth and poverty 
reduction. as such, the 2003 Communication on Corruption recognises the relationship between corruption and the 
private sector as well as its own responsibilities in supporting the private sector, especially through corporate respon-
sibility initiatives and, more specifically, dG trade.
However, international companies and FdI can also undermine local business and financial institutions as well as feed-
ing political and administrative corruption through bribery and state capture. as illustrated by tI’s International Bribe 
Payer Index, FdI may contribute to the supply side of corruption. Indeed, corrupt governments may make agreements 
with foreign companies so that the latter benefit from privileged conditions for doing business and access to domestic 
markets. International corporations can also use their economic power to unduly influence policy-making and legislative 
decisions in their favour and to escape domestic economic regulations.
2.1.9 Offshore banking, tax havens and money laundering
Global financial liberalisation has been accompanied by the development of offshore financial banking facilities and 
tax havens where the proceeds of corruption can be held. these centres are generally located in small, physically and 
legally isolated, independent jurisdictions, opaque in nature with ambiguous constitutional status and are the principal 
outlet for the proceeds of corruption and money laundering. thus, funds resulting from corruption, organised crime, 
drug trafficking or tax fraud are often channelled through offshore companies benefiting from the commercial provision 
of multi-currency accounts and complex asset management services. 
2.1.10  International organised crime
International organised crime inevitably fuels corruption, since administrative corruption, in particular law enforcement 
agencies, can enable organised crime to facilitate and sustain both its illicit and licit activities (dependent of course upon 
the type of criminal organisation). Indeed, international organised crime invests huge amounts of laundered money, 
originating from illegal activities (e.g. trafficking in drugs, human beings, arms, stolen cars and so on), into legal activities 
(e.g. creation of legal companies and investment in legal assets). the illegal activities as well as the proceeds thereof 
need obviously to be secured or protected against loss by the bribery of, for instance, politicians, judicial authorities, 
police and custom officers.
Offshore financial centres also perpetuate organised crime operations and corruption, since these ‘twin’ activities share 
the need to hide and launder their proceeds.
2.2 Consequences of corruption
Corruption is a pervasive phenomenon that negatively affects people’s well-being and limits prospects for economic 
and social development. the consequences of corruption are not limited to economic inefficiencies; it also reduces the 
provision of welfare in society, undermines democracy and political institutions, contributes to social inequalities and 
conflict, can have a potentially devastating impact upon the environment and constitutes a violation of human rights.
2.2.1 Hampering economic growth and development
While certain older studies have suggested that corruption might foster economic development, ‘greasing the wheels’ 
of poorly designed regulations and legal frameworks, there is today a consensus that corruption is strongly detrimental 
to economic development.
Measuring the negative impact of corruption on growth and development remains complicated given the challenges 
of defining and measuring the interdependent relationship between institutional quality and economic development. 
Nonetheless, it is also clear that corruption impedes growth and development through various channels, such as the 
deterioration of the macroeconomic environment and the conduct of business and aid effectiveness. 
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Corruption negatively affects business at both macro and microeconomic levels. at the macroeconomic level, corrup-
tion fundamentally serves to compromise and hinder effective, equitable and effi cient management of public fi nances 
and long-term economic stability. Economic effi ciency in particular is affected, as corruption may serve to narrow the 
tax base, distort market signals and divert resources from their intended purpose. this has disproportionately severe 
consequences for the poor, as the public sector services on which they tend to have greater reliance (such as health 
or education) are highly vulnerable to theft of resources. Further consequences of corruption for the macroeconomic 
environment include negative impacts on fi scal defi cit, levels of debt and infl ation and greater economic instability. at the 
microeconomic level, corruption strongly deters investment, often acting as a barrier to entry for fi rms, and by decreas-
ing the expected returns of foreign and domestic investments due to a risky and uncertain business environment. as a 
result, corruption reduces and diverts resources from productive investment, creates unfair competition, complicates 
and delays business transactions and undermines enterprise creation.
Finally, corruption negatively impinges on aid effectiveness and the willingness of the donor community, and their do-
mestic constituencies, to provide aid and development assistance. Specifi c problems include the leakage of funds, 
the lack of effi ciency and the ineffectiveness of development projects and, perhaps most signifi cantly, the diversion of 
development assistance from its original purpose by corrupt politicians and offi cials.
2.2.2 Jeopardising poverty reduction and welfare
In developing countries, corruption is a widespread phenomenon that affects many aspects of people’s lives on a daily 
basis—disproportionately affecting those from the poorest sectors of society. Indeed, citizens face corruption while 
accessing basic public services and obtaining licences or permits. Individuals can also indirectly confront the effects of 
corruption through defective public infrastructure or when corrupt transactions lead to a degradation of their own living 
environment and/or the environments on which their livelihoods depend.
as noted above, corruption can undermine access to public services, such as education or health, as public spending 
dedicated to such sectors is frequently diverted through embezzlement or fraud so that only a small proportion of public 
expenditure actually reaches its intended benefi ciaries. Such problems are compounded further when households already 
hard-pressed to make ends meet are often forced to make extra payments to ensure that their children get access 
to school or healthcare. Corruption also hampers the access to utilities, such as electricity or water, or public housing 
when individuals are not able to bribe the appropriate public offi cial. In this respect, it directly affects the likelihood of a 
country reaching the Millennium development Goals.
From a moral perspective at least, corruption is also detrimental to wider human rights efforts and is particularly dispro-
portionate with regards to its impact, since it is the poor who are most likely to be seriously affected. the disproportional 
impact of corruption on human rights has been noted by the UNdP who contend that, ‘corruption affects the poor 
disproportionately due to their powerlessness to change the status quo and inability to pay bribes, creating inequalities 
that violate their human rights’58. 
Finally, an issue interrelated with those discussed above, is the concern for corruption’s negative impact on the envi-
ronment. Corruption within the natural resource and environmental sector may have wide-reaching impacts; it may be 
embedded within more complex local, regional and international social, political and economic contexts and manifest in 
various ways. By diverting resources allocated to environmental programs or conservation initiatives to private pockets, 
for instance, corruption may distract from or even drive practices such as wildlife or other natural resource traffi cking. 
In another instance, when levels of corruption allow an agent, be they individual or industry, to escape protocols that 
ensure responsible disposal of waste through bribing the relevant offi cer, for instance, it is clear to see how corruption 
can directly affect issues such as environmental pollution. Such practices are themselves a signifi cant concern for vari-
ous interest groups at a global level, but they may also present problems at a local level where environmental damage 
leads to more immediate concerns for the livelihoods, health and well-being, and—when taking into account the high 
correlation between natural resource exploitation and armed confl ict—the safety of local communities.
58 UNDP, 2004. ‘Anti-Corruption Practice Note’,. New York: UNDP, available at http://www.u4.no/
pdf/?fi le=/document/literature/UNDP-2004-anti-corruption-practice.pdf
box 5: corruption and human rights
Corruption can deprive the poorest individuals of their fundamental rights in various ways: fi rstly, it can hamper the right to benefi t 
from basic and essential services; secondly, corruption undermines political accountability and thus constitutes a serious obstacle 
to the exercise of political rights; fi nally, corruption is a huge factor in discrimination of the poorest and most marginalised groups 
(including women and minorities). this is a serious impediment to the principle of equality and equal treatment of individuals by 
governments, expressed by the Universal declaration of the Human Rights.
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It is clear to note from this how corruption may be found to significantly damage the working environments and health 
of the poor. Indeed, in such instances where private companies evade environmental regulations and damage local en-
vironments, the disproportionate effects of corruption on the poor once more become apparent. Such people are often 
the principal victims of corrupt behaviour, a reality compounded by low levels of political and economic empowerment 
and an inability to hold companies to account or enforce their rights. 
2.2.3 Increasing social costs
Corruption contributes significantly to poverty, social and economic inequalities, and conflict. Firstly, corruption under-
mines economic growth, which is a prerequisite for the eradication of poverty and inequality. Moreover, by fostering 
inflation and macroeconomic instability, corruption hurts the poor—who cannot protect their assets—, while also eroding 
the tax base and affecting the government’s ability to maintain social spending. 
Corruption also weakens the institutional capacity to fight poverty by undermining the ability of a government to design 
and effectively and efficiently implement poverty reduction strategies. Indeed, through undermining the capacity to real-
ise reasonable budget forecasts, diverting resources from sectors with strong poverty reduction potential and through 
lowering project effectiveness and sustainability, corruption weakens public institutions and therefore represents a major 
obstacle to poverty and inequality reduction. 
Corruption is detrimental to social cohesion by separating the rich from the poor and promoting rivalries and jealous-
ies between ethnic groups and communities. It also fosters a climate of suspicion and mistrust, where individuals are 
rewarded for their selfishness and where collective action is perverted. Finally, it deepens the gap between the ruling 
elite and the citizenry, which undermines respect for authority and encourages impunity. Such conditions may ultimately 
force a country into a vicious cycle, where the social and cultural impacts of corruption generate social attitudes and 
institutional weaknesses that further entrench it in society.
2.2.4 Weakening democracy
Corruption has the potential to negatively impact political systems, depending on the level and type of corruption and the nature 
of the political system. Indeed, while precise political costs cannot be generalised due to country context-dependent political 
systems, corruption undoubtedly has detrimental effects on democracy and the quality of political institutions. this can be by:
•	Substituting the public interest with a personal gain ideology, which can damage the way citizens and future genera-
tions of elites regard politics; 
•	Perverting the conduct and results of elections;
•	Politically disempowering the poor and marginalised social groups; 
•	Reducing political competition;
•	Provoking political unrest and public mistrust in political institutions/processes;
•	deterring the quality of public policies and transparency in political decision-making;
•	Contributing to the disaffection of the international community with the government, risking isolation by the interna-
tional community; and
•	Hampering social cohesion, creating social injustice and public mistrust towards politicians, which may foster political 
instability and lead to coup d’état or civil wars.
While the political consequences of corruption are of primary concern for both rulers and donors involved in fighting corrup-
tion, the objectives of these two groups are often far from aligned. Since domestic political elites often stand to gain, in terms 
of rents, from maintaining the status quo, the foundations of political will and domestic leadership for anti-corruption efforts 
are often quickly eroded. However, social unrest and the lack of transparency and accountability in the political arena may 
give rise to a popular demand for better governance, which can be an important driver for changes and grassroots reforms.
2.2.5 Conflict
While the relationship between corruption and conflict is complex, recognition of the linkage is important since it repre-
sents a departure point from more orthodox developmental contexts and understandings of conflict59. 
In both conflict and post-conflict environments, corruption is likely to play an important and dynamic role. Since conflict 
is associated with the breakdown in governmental structures and the entrenchment of corrupt practices, a thorough 
corruption-sensitive analysis of proposed interventions is advisable in order to do no harm and prevent corruption from 
contributing to a return to violence60. 
59 See http://www.u4.no/document/literature.cfm?key=57
60 Le Billon, P., 2005. ‘Buying Peace or Fuelling War: The Role of Corruption in Armed Conflicts’, Journal of 
International Development, 15: 413-26, available at http://www.geog.ubc.ca/~lebillon/corruption.pdf
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the 2011 World development Report draws upon a background report by Michael Johnston: First, do No Harm – 
then, Build trust: anti-Corruption Strategies in Fragile Situations. One of Johnston’s key points is that ‘…direct attacks 
on corruption may be the last thing a fragile situation needs in the early stages of transition. Such attacks may require 
credibility, material resources, expertise and institutional strength that a regime and state do not possess. When society 
is divided, attacks on corruption may only be perceived as more factional or ethnic confl ict’61. as Marquette points out, 
‘after all, fi ghting corruption is inherently destabilising. that is what it means – a fi ght, a battle, a war. It is about taking 
power and resources away from one group to give it to another – ideally to “the public”, but often it ends up being about 
moving from one powerful group to another. In fragile states, further destabilisation might be catastrophic’62. 
Instead, Johnston ‘propose[s] long-term, indirect strategies’63 that look to build essential trust within society and to 
build the state’s capacity. It will be interesting to see what the impact of this is on aid policy in the coming years. the 
underlying themes of being realistic, going for indirect strategies over the long-term, and for building integrity rather than 
fi ghting corruption are likely to apply everywhere, and not just in confl ict-affected states.
2.2.6 The unintended consequences of development assistance
While the overall benefi ts of developmental assistance are clear and well documented, the unintended consequences 
of aid should be recognised. Corruption undermines international donor agencies’ developmental efforts. U4 suggests 
that, while paradoxical, increasing the fl ow of aid can increase the levels and costs of corruption. While more obviously 
increasing the availability of corruptible resources, new aid fl ows can also free up domestic funds for other purposes.
It is important to note that despite the risks, donors have tended to supply more assistance to countries with a high 
prevalence of corruption than higher levels of good governance. this may, of course, be simply a consequence of a 
necessary focus on the poorest countries, which often have signifi cant problems with corruption. 
donors may often be faced with the dilemma that, in spite of all the control mechanisms that they can introduce into 
their assistance programmes, it is generally impossible to guard against all of the risks of corruption. In the end then, 
donors need to balance the risks of engagement with the benefi ts of aid distribution. 
the rising tide of good governance has further focused donors’ attention upon issues of corruption and its relation-
ship with aid effectiveness. In several cases, donors have become more proactive, using budget support and, more 
importantly, the withholding of payments when anti-corruption reforms (e.g. anti-corruption agencies) do not perform 
as predicted.
61 M Johnston, 2010, First, Do No Harm – Then, Build Trust: Anti-Corruption Strategies in Fragile 
Situations, World Development Report 2011 Background Paper, p. 13.
62 Marquette, H, 2011, ‘Donors, State-building and Corruption: Lessons from Afghanistan 
and the Implications for Aid Policy’, Third World Quarterly, 32(10).
63 Johnston, p. 3.
box 6: the culture of per diems and corruption
a recent U4 publication (2009—see http://www.u4.no/helpdesk/helpdesk/query.cfm?id=220) highlighted the unintended conse-
quences of the practice of per diems and sitting allowances for public service employees. While these allowances were clearly 
intended to increase public sector capacity, a number of negative practices were found to have emerged from them. the 
drawbacks of this compensation system focus upon ‘coping strategies’ that public sector employees invoke to ‘top up’ their 
salaries. a signifi cant ‘top up’ income is that obtained from donor allowances which can have the following negative effects: 
‘distortions to the incentive structure for public servants, encouraging specifi c forms of corruption and patronage, creating 
situations favourable to confl icts of interest, competition for time and brain drain’. 
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cHapTer TWo: addressIng corrupTIon 
In a globalIsed World
Following discussions in the previous section concerning the defi nitions of corruption and illustrations of its potential 
causes and consequences, this section seeks to situate corruption within a global context. Examining the evolution 
of international efforts to recognise and prevent corruption, the progress of these efforts is charted via the signifi cant 
geographically and thematically diverse conventions and instruments that attempt to address corruption in an 
increasingly globalised context.
Section 1: International and regional conventions and instruments
1.1 The Historical Context
In order to understand international efforts to address corruption, it is important to situate the subject within a historical 
context. While the ‘legal’ landmark recognition of corruption in Europe goes back to the Napoleonic Code of 1810, which 
introduced penalties to combat corruption in public life, little was done to address the issue internationally until the 1970s. 
through the subsequent presentation of the major international corruption conventions, understandings of corruption, 
and with them the focus of anti-corruption measures, have gradually evolved. International instruments have shifted away 
from the activities of Western (business) actors, towards a more thorough understanding of the ‘demand’ and ‘supply’ 
side of corruption and the anti-corruption measures required for an increasingly international and complex phenomenon.
Following a number of corruption scandals involving Western-owned multinationals abroad in the 1970s, pioneering 
efforts to address corruption were taken by the United States and focused solely upon the behaviour of Western com-
panies. the US was the fi rst nation to criminalise the extraterritorial payment of bribes by domestic companies in the 
form of the US Foreign Corrupt Practices act (FCPa) of 1977. these efforts were aimed at criminalising the bribery of 
foreign offi cials by US companies. Individuals found guilty are subject to incarceration, fi nes or both. this act was to 
prove one of the drivers of an international regime to try and create a level playing fi eld for all international business. 
the end of the Cold War created a new international environment where corruption could no longer be tolerated for 
reasons of national security, among others. Furthermore, with new emphasis on the push for democratisation, transpar-
ency and accountability that symbolised this period, the fi ght against corruption became a major focus for international 
fi nancial and development institutions. 
In seeking to explain the growing corruption phenomenon, experts were divided. Some analysts alleged that privatisation 
and deregulation initiatives created opportunities for corrupt activities. Others argued that increased levels of corruption 
resulted from reductions in trade barriers and an increase in competition between multinationals. It was widely recognised 
by governments and institutions around the world that corruption was a global, trans-boundary problem and therefore 
could only be tackled at the international level.
However, in this respect it was also acknowledged that international police and judicial cooperation in the fi ght against 
international organised crime and corruption was ineffi cient because seriously hampered by the lack of harmonisation 
of national legal systems, as well as the lack of capacities and appropriate cooperation mechanisms of the national law 
enforcement and judicial authorities. 
Key points:
•	 International efforts to curb corruption have expanded extensively since the early 1990s.
•	 Multilateral conventions have been adopted in order to curtail corrupt practices of multinational corporations.
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In the post-Cold War period there was also an increasing international consensus that the corrupt practices of multinational 
companies and other actors had negative effects on developing countries. these negative effects included: 
•	Undermining economic prospects, fostering inequality and exacerbating poverty;
•	Creating disadvantages for foreign domestic firms;
•	Creating greater inequality between poor and rich countries by transferring money that could be used for poverty 
eradication into the hand of the rich;
•	damaging the environment;
•	Undermining democratic institutions; and
•	 Fostering organised crime (illicit trafficking of drugs, arms, human beings, etc.).
Following this international consensus and the benchmark established by the FCPa, attempts were made to level the 
playing field. US-based multinational companies had come to feel disadvantaged in the global market place, since non-
US multinationals were not subject to the same stringent prohibitions on bribery. thus in 1997, OECd member countries 
decided to curb bribe-giving in international business with the creation and ratification of the 1997 OECd Convention 
on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business transactions. 
at the same time, attempts were made to step up the fight against international organised crime and corruption, which 
had become an increasing global threat to the security, governance and economy of all states, by improving international 
police and judicial cooperation through the adoption of international conventions aiming towards legal harmonisation 
and establishing more efficient cooperation mechanisms. 
In this new context, a number of multilateral conventions have been negotiated, adopted and ratified. they represent 
binding agreements at the sub-regional, regional or global levels. While all of these conventions are important and useful, 
the following list will limit itself to the most significant conventions, namely (in chronological order):
•	 the Inter-american Convention against Corruption (adopted in 1996);
•	 the 1st Protocol (adopted in 1996) to the 1995 EU Convention on the Protection of the Financial Interests of the 
European Communities, followed by the EU Convention on anti-Corruption (adopted in 1997);
•	 the OECd Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business transactions (adopted 
in 1997);
•	 the Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention on Corruption (adopted in 1998); 
•	 the Council of Europe Civil Law Convention on Corruption (adopted in 1999);
•	 the african Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption, aUCaC (adopted in 2003); and 
•	 the United Nations Convention against Corruption, UNCaC (adopted in 2003).
In this concept paper, we will start with a discussion of UNCaC, which is the only global and comprehensive anti-
corruption instrument. this will be followed by a presentation of some of the regional anti-corruption conventions.
the summaries of the various conventions provided here highlight the extent to which they vary in their scope and 
geographical coverage. Some conventions cover a limited range of themes and countries while others take a more 
comprehensive approach to corruption in terms of the range of subjects they deal with or in their geographical coverage. 
these conventions set individual standards and requirements for the prevention and detection, as well as the investiga-
tion and sanctioning of corrupt behaviour, and have also sought to establish frameworks for international cooperation in 
the fight against it. Given the needs and specificities of criminal law, these conventions are in general more prescriptive 
with regards to action involving sanctioning (e.g. criminal prosecution) than they are with other more inter-disciplinary 
areas, such as prevention.
through effective review processes, either provided within the conventions or put in place after they have come into 
force, they are intended to establish peer pressure on Member States. Such Conventions are also intended to provide 
civil society with a useful tool with which to hold governments to account. the role of the private sector is also taken 
into account, and pressure is exerted on private sector actors to participate alongside their public sector counterparts 
in efforts to fight corruption.
1.2 The United Nations Convention Against Corruption
the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCaC) represents one of the most recent and extensive Conven-
tions to specifically recognise and tackle corruption. UNCaC comprehensively requires that States Parties put in place 
and implement effective, coordinated anti-corruption policies that promote the participation of non-state actors and set 
forth the principles of the rule of law, proper management of public affairs and public property, integrity, transparency 
and accountability. States Parties are also required to develop and promote effective corruption prevention measures 
centring on public procurement (art. 9), the judiciary (art. 11) and the private sector (art. 12).
R e f e R e n C e  d o C u m e n T  n ° 1 0  -  s u p p o R T i n g  a n T i - C o R R u p T i o n  R e f o R m  i n  p a R T n e R  C o u n T R i e s :  C o n C e p T s ,  T o o l s  a n d  a R e a s  f o R  a C T i o n
22
adopted by the UN General assembly by resolution 58/4 of 31 October 2003, UNCaC represents the most compre-
hensive legal instrument to date in the fight against corruption. While it does not explicitly define corruption, it sets out 
to define and criminalise the actions of corruption to which its provisions apply and establishes four main pillars: Preven-
tion (Chapter 2), Criminalisation (Chapter 3), International Co-operation (Chapter 4) and asset Recovery (Chapter 5). 
Chapter 3 (Criminalisation) defines the following mandatory offences:
•	active and passive bribery of national public officials;
•	active bribery of national and foreign public officials (arts. 15 and 16);
•	Embezzlement, misappropriation or other diversion of property by a public official (art. 17);
•	 Laundering of the proceeds of corruption (art. 23); and
•	Obstruction of Justice (art. 25).
Further acts of corruption are depicted as advisable, but non-mandatory, by the Convention:
•	Passive bribery of foreign and international public officials (art. 16);
•	active and passive bribery in the private sector (art. 21);
•	 trading in influence (art. 18);
•	abuse of Function (art. 19);
•	Embezzlement, misappropriation or other diversion of property in the private sector (art. 21); and
•	 Illicit enrichment (art. 20).
With extensive provisions for the definition of various corrupt practices, Chapter 3 of the UNCaC goes beyond previous 
instruments, not only criminalising basic acts of corruption, but also the acts of trading influence, concealment and the 
laundering of proceeds of corruption. 
the Convention dedicates an entire chapter to the prevention of corruption and legislates for inter-Member State co-
operation. In terms of specifics, Chapter 2 places an emphasis upon effective and co-ordinated anti-corruption policies 
and bodies, public procurement, the judiciary and the private sector for preventative measures intended to improve 
transparency, integrity and accountability.
Chapter 5 recognises asset recovery to be a fundamental principle of the UNCaC and that co-operation and assistance 
shall be assisted to parties where necessary in order to recover funds. the Chapter mainly focuses upon the preven-
tion of the transfer of the proceeds of crime (art.52) and the return of assets (art. 57), with specific provisions to guard 
against the embezzlement and laundering of public funds.
the importance of the international nature of corruption as a phenomenon is recognised in Chapter 4 of the UNCaC 
which seeks to facilitate international co-operation. driving this emphasis upon international cooperation is the recognition 
that worldwide efforts to combat corruption are impeded by the huge variation in national definitions of corruption-related 
offences arising from a diverse range of legal traditions and cultural norms. 
Such international variation represents a fundamental challenge for international judicial co-operation, an example be-
ing the principle of ‘dual criminality’, whereby inter-state legal cooperation will be refused for acts alleged as crimes if 
they are not also defined as crimes in the jurisdiction receiving the request for assistance. thus, an emphasis within 
the Chapter upon extradition, ensuring that all offences under the Convention are extraditable between States Parties, 
and mutual legal assistance are intended to bolster international co-operation among state signatories (see annex 1).
In reflecting upon the scope of the UNCaC, its primary aim appears to be the provision of a comprehensive, universally 
accepted legal instrument to prevent and combat corruption. However, the convention’s extensive mandate goes fur-
ther in establishing an ambitious review mechanism. a self-assessment system has been developed by the UN Office 
on drugs and Crime (UNOdC) to help States Parties and signatories to the convention regularly report on progress. 
Furthermore, the Conference of the States Parties to the Convention, which was intended to oversee its implementation, 
decided in November 2009 to establish a review mechanism in order to complement the self-assessment system. the 
European Commission took an active part in the negotiations leading to the establishment of a review mechanism for 
implementation of the Convention during the Conference of States Parties in doha in November 2009.
the terms of Reference (tOR) of the review mechanism as contained in Resolution 3/1 of the Conference of the States 
Parties specify:
•	 Implementation of UNCaC will be reviewed by way of a peer review process, where each State party shall be reviewed 
by two other States parties, and the State party under review should be actively involved; 
•	Governmental experts will be appointed by States Parties to carry out reviews; 
•	Each review phase shall be composed of two review cycles of five years each and all States parties must undergo 
the review within each cycle; 
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•	 the first review cycle will cover UNCaC Chapters 3 (criminalization and law enforcement) and 4 (international coop-
eration); 
•	 the desk review will be based on the responses to the comprehensive self-assessment checklist. active dialogue 
between the country under review and the Reviewers is a key component of the process; and 
•	a country review report and executive summary of this report will be prepared under the ownership of the country 
under review. 
the EU has advocated a review mechanism of a technical nature, promoting open and constructive collaboration and 
dialogue. the review mechanism is set to facilitate effective implementation of the Convention, identify successes and 
challenges in implementation, promote and strengthen international cooperation and identify technical assistance needs. 
the lessons learned through this process shall then be used to inform and improve the European Commission’s anti-
corruption assistance efforts in partner countries.
In order to achieve effective implementation of the Convention, the EU firmly believes that three non-mandatory ele-
ments of this mechanism are essential for strengthening its implementation: the participation of civil society in the review 
process; country visits by the reviewers; and the publication of full country review reports. 
UNCaC remains the most comprehensive and universally respected anti-corruption convention to date. It seems worth 
it to include some elements on the number of States Parties having ratified the Convention and to mention that in Sep-
tember 2005 the European Community, represented by the European Commission, signed the 2003 United Nations 
Convention against Corruption (UNCaC) and ratified it in November 2008. therefore, the EU as represented by the 
European Commission is now party to the Convention. 
1.3 Regional Conventions
1.3.1 The Inter-American Convention against Corruption of the Organisation of American States (OAS)
In the midst of numerous high profile corruption scandals, the first summit of the americas and the Organisation of ameri-
can States (OaS) undertook and adopted the Inter-american Convention against Corruption in 1996. this Convention 
represents the first regional judicial instrument dedicated to fighting corruption. Others 64 go further, suggesting that the 
Convention was the first to agree to the principles of the US Foreign Corrupt Practices act (FCPa).
the Convention aims to promote the development of the necessary mechanisms to ‘prevent, detect, prosecute, and 
eradicate corruption‘, as well as to ‘promote, facilitate, and regulate cooperation between States Parties on these mat-
ters’65. Its structure consists of two parts: one dedicated to preventing corruption and the other to repressing certain 
corrupt practices.
the Convention criminalises the following acts:
•	active bribery; 
•	Passive bribery; 
•	 transnational bribery; 
•	 Illicit enrichment; 
•	 the improper use of classified or confidential information; 
•	 the improper use of state property; 
•	Using influence on public authorities for illicit personal gain; and
•	 the diversion of property or assets.
Following the criminalising of the above-mentioned acts, signatories are obliged to incorporate them into their own 
judicial systems in order to repress corruption through prosecution66. Furthermore, the Convention obliges parties to 
implement a series of measures related to their judicial systems and public policies. 
the Convention is clearly structured around two key objectives: the development of preventative measures and the 
repression of corrupt practices. In the case of the former, under article III, States Parties are obliged to consider preven-
tative measures applicable to their own institutional systems. Whilst for the latter, the repression of corruption requires 
States Parties to criminalise a series of practices and incorporate them into their own judicial systems for corruption 
offences to be sanctionable under criminal law. 
While the Convention does not contain any specific provision on anti-corruption policies, action plans or bodies, it does 
64 Salbu, S., R., 1997. ‘Bribery in the Global Market: A Critical Analysis of the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act’, Washington and Lee Law Review, 54(1): 229-87.
65 See http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/FightCur.html
66 Ibid.
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call for a number of programmatic, non-binding measures to be established, maintained or strengthened in relation to the 
public sector.. these measures consist of standards of conduct for the proper fulfilment of public functions, instructions 
to government personnel to ensure proper understanding of their responsibilities, systems for registering the income 
of public officials, sound public procurement systems, government revenue collection and control systems that deter 
corruption and mechanisms to ensure the accuracy of public companies’ books and records.
the Convention provides broad criteria for jurisdiction and is applicable whenever an alleged act of corruption is commit-
ted or has an effect on a State Party. It foresees that States Parties establish their jurisdiction over offences committed 
in their territories either by nationals or foreign residents as well as when the alleged criminal is present in one of those 
territories and is not extradited by the State.
With regards to international and regional cooperation, the Convention requires that States Parties provide each other with the 
broadest possible measure of assistance in the identification, tracing, freezing, seizure and forfeiture of property or proceeds 
obtained, derived from or used in the commission of corruption offences. this assistance also encompasses the transfer 
of such property or proceeds from one State Party to another when the latter has provided assistance in the investigations. 
adopted in March 1996, the Convention entered into force June 1997 with all thirty-four OaS signatories endorsing the 
Convention. the follow-up mechanism for its implementation was not initiated until 2002; the sluggish pace was appar-
ently due to non-participation of Member States and problems with the voluntary funding system for the mechanism.
the implementation of the Convention was intended to take place within the framework of purposes established by the 
Charter of the OaS. the OaS established the Mechanism for Follow-up on the Implementation of the Inter-american 
Convention against Corruption (MESICIC) in order to facilitate an effective process of reciprocal evaluation. 
Scheduled within the mechanism are successive ‘rounds’ that evaluate how member parties are implementing the 
relevant provisions of the Convention. this process is followed by the compilation of individual country ‘reports’, that 
are able to provide concrete recommendations for each state in order to better help them redress legal loopholes and 
resolve inadequacies as well as providing a series of indicators against which progress may be more objectively meas-
ured. Civil society organisations are also encouraged to participate in this process and submit information along the 
lines of those provided by the respective state.
However, while MESICIC appears comprehensively structured, comprising of two bodies (Conference of States Parties 
and Committee of Experts) and a monitoring process (involving country self-assessments, civil society written responses 
and an active secretariat), it has suffered from the non-participation of Member States67. the 2008 OaS follow-up to the 
Convention urged Member States to participate in MESICIC and re-emphasised the requirement for its voluntary fund-
ing. the follow-up to the Convention also urged Member States to apply the necessary measures within domestic law 
to comply with their commitments to the Convention, highlighting the weakness of this effectively voluntary Convention 
and the absence of enforcement measures.
thus, implementation appears to have been a major stumbling block for this pioneering Convention. Going further than 
the OaS’s more diplomatic language, external commentators68 suggest that little concrete progress has been made 
in using the IaCaC in the fight against corruption, and additionally that Venezuela’s policy of obstructing the develop-
ment of civil society represents a significant challenge to the OaS. Monitoring the Convention‘s implementation using 
a sample of countries, tI found that countries had made ‘few advances‘, underlining requests for indicators that reflect 
real levels of Convention implementation.
1.3.2 The OECD Convention on Combating Bribery
the 1997 OECd Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business transactions is a 
legally binding international agreement and represents an instrument primarily focused upon the ‘supply side’ of corruption 
transactions. In defining and criminalising the act of bribing foreign officials, the Convention makes bribery a predicate offence. 
Member signatories are obliged to establish the illegality of the bribery of public servants within their national legal frameworks 
in tandem with the means and measures to ‘prevent, detect, investigate, prosecute and sanction foreign bribery’69. 
In terms of the Convention’s scope, signatories are obliged to introduce effective, proportionate and dissuasive criminal 
and non-criminal sanctions70 for both natural and legal persons. Furthermore, a broad interpretation of the territorial 
67 Venezuela appears has presented particular opposition to the Convention’s implementation. On three consecutive 
occasions, the Venezuelan government has vetoed the participation of civil society in the monitoring process.
68 See www.transparency.org/news_room/latest_news/press_releases/2010/2010_03_24_oea_venezuela_english
69 See  http://www.oecd.org/document/13/0,3343,en_2649_34859_39884109_1_1_1_1,00.html
70 Ibid.
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basis for jurisdiction removes the burden of proving an extensive physical connection to the act of bribery and prescribes 
inter-signatory consultation in the event of alleged offences occurring across multiple party states. Further inter-member 
consultation is encouraged via the prescribed provision of legal assistance to other countries investigating bribery al-
legations.
the Convention also emphasises the necessary measures to enable the seizure and confi scation of bribes, proceeds 
of bribes, or other property having equivalent value. With regards to prosecution, the Convention ensures that the rules 
and principles that apply to the bribery of national public offi cials also apply in transnational cases.
In terms of geographical coverage the majority of the thirty-eight signatories are, as perhaps expected, represented 
by OECd members, with the exception of seven non-member countries (argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, Bulgaria, 
Estonia, Slovenia and South africa). 
the OECd appears to continue to enjoy considerable support—an achievement made evident by the fact that all thirty-
eight signatories have recently adopted the 2009 anti-Bribery Recommendation. the recommendation both reaffi rms 
the determination of signatories ‘to enhance the ability of the thirty-eight States Parties to the anti-Bribery Convention 
to prevent, detect and investigate allegations of foreign bribery’ and includes the Good Practice Guidance on Internal 
Controls, Ethics and Compliance’. 
With regards to implementation and monitoring, the OECd Convention establishes a programme of systematic follow-
up to monitor and promote the full implementation of the Convention. this is undertaken within the framework of the 
OECd Working Group on Bribery in International Business transactions71. the Working Group’s follow-up includes 
regular reviews, performed in two phases: Phase One evaluates the adequacy of a country’s legislation to implement 
the Convention, and Phase two assesses whether a country is applying this legislation effectively. Of note is that the 
monitoring mechanism is both open ended and peer-driven; participating delegates are not only subject to evaluation 
but are also expected to act as evaluators. the report and recommendations are then forwarded to the government 
of each participating country for follow-up. While this monitoring mechanism appears robust, a highly critical OECd 
report released this month and summarised below draws attentions to the lack of active enforcement by the majority 
of parties—a defi cit that is endangering the principle of collective engagement.
1.3.3 The Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention on Corruption
the Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention on Corruption came into force in 2002. It aimed to establish a regional 
consensus on Member States’ responsibilities in the spheres of criminalisation and international co-operation with 
specifi c focus on corruption.
the Convention criminalises a wide range of corrupt behaviours, for which States Parties are required to provide effec-
tive, proportionate, and dissuasive sanctions and measures, including imprisonment. the criminalised activities include:
•	active and passive bribery of domestic and foreign public offi cials;
•	active and passive bribery of national and foreign parliamentarians and members of international parliamentary as-
semblies; 
•	active and passive bribery in the private sector;
•	active and passive bribery of international civil servants;
71 See http://www.oecd.org/document/5/0,3343,en_2649_34859_35430021_1_1_1_1,00.html
box 7: oEcD progress report July 2010—Enforcement of the oEcD anti-bribery convention 
Current Levels of Enforcement are too Low to Enable the Convention to Succeed
With active enforcement in only seven of the thirty-eight parties to the Convention, the Convention’s goal of effectively curbing 
foreign bribery in international business transactions is still far from being achieved. the current situation is unstable because the 
Convention is predicated on the collective commitment of all the parties to end foreign bribery. Unless enforcement is sharply 
increased, existing support could well erode. danger signals include efforts in some countries to limit the role of investigative 
magistrates, shorten statutes of limitations and extend immunities from prosecution. the risk of backsliding is particularly acute 
during a time of recession when competition for limited orders is intense.
Cause of Lagging Enforcement: Lack of Political Will
the principal cause of lagging enforcement is lack of political will. this can take a passive form, such as failure to provide ade-
quate funding and staffi ng for enforcement. It can also take an active form through political obstruction of investigations and 
prosecutions. the lack of political will must be forcefully confronted not only by the Working Group on Bribery but also by the 
active involvement of the OECd Secretary-General as well as high-level pressure on the laggards from governments committed 
to enforcement.
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•	active and passive bribery of domestic, foreign and international judges and officials of international courts;
•	active and passing trading in influence;
•	 Laundering of the proceeds of corruption offences; and
•	accounting offences (invoices and accounting documents) connected with corruption offences. 
Furthermore, the Council of Europe’s Convention is the first attempt to define common international rules in the field of 
civil law and corruption. It requires States Parties to ‘provide in their domestic law for effective remedies for persons who 
have suffered damage as a result of acts of corruption, to enable them to defend their rights and interests, including the 
possibility of obtaining compensation for damage’72. 
the Convention proposes the following remedies:
•	Compensation for damage, including the provision—for persons who have suffered damage—of the right to initiate 
an action to obtain full compensation; 
•	 Liability, including State liability for acts of corruption committed by public officials;
•	Reduction or disallowance of compensation when the plaintiff contributes to the damage;
•	 Invalidity of contracts or clauses of contracts providing for corruption;
•	Protection of employees who report corruption;
•	Enhancement of clarity and accuracy of accounts and audits;
•	acquisition of evidence in corruption related civil proceedings; and
•	Precautionary measures to preserve the rights and interests of the parties during corruption-related civil proceedings.
the Convention does not contain any specific provision on anti-corruption policies, action plans or bodies. However, it 
does require States Parties to adopt the necessary measures to ensure that independent persons or entities are spe-
cialised in the fight against corruption, and that the staff of such entities have adequate training and financial resources.
Part of the Convention focuses specifically on the assets and proceeds of corruption with States Parties required to 
criminalise money laundering. Signatories are also required to take appropriate measures to identify, trace, freeze and 
seize the proceeds of corruption and—with respect to money laundering—to comply with the provisions of the Conven-
tion on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Products from Crime.
the additional Protocol to the Criminal Law Convention on Corruption extends the scope to arbitrators in commercial, 
civil and other matters as well as to jurors, thus complementing the Convention’s provisions aimed at protecting judicial 
authorities from corruption. States Parties to the Protocol must therefore adopt the necessary measures to establish 
the active and passive bribery of domestic and foreign arbitrators and jurors as a criminal offence. 
Following the negotiation process, forty-six Member States, in combination with several observer states, saw the Con-
vention enter into force in 2002. Observers recognise that the Convention represents a regional agreement of a joint 
framework to address corruption.
Implementation of the Council of Europe’s Convention on Corruption is monitored by the Group of States against 
Corruption (GRECO). GRECO monitors the observance of the Guiding Principles in the Fight against Corruption and 
the implementation of the related legal instruments via a process of mutual evaluation and peer pressure. One of its 
strengths, in comparison to the other mechanisms, is that the implementation of its recommendations is examined by 
way of a compliance procedure. In addition, GRECO foresees the need for a special procedure to deal with members 
whose response to its recommendations has been found to be globally unsatisfactory.
the Convention’s shortcomings appear to centre upon its lack of preventative measures, lack of provisions on statutes 
of limitation, and the fact that parties are permitted to make reservations to the Convention across some provisions.
1.3.4 The Council of Europe Civil Law Convention on Corruption
the Council of Europe Civil Law Convention on Corruption is the first attempt to define common international rules in 
the field of civil law and corruption. It requires States Parties to ‘provide in their domestic law for effective remedies for 
persons who have suffered damage as a result of acts of corruption, to enable them to defend their rights and interests, 
including the possibility of obtaining compensation for damage’73. 
72 ‘Civil Law Convention on Corruption’, 1999.
73 Article 1, ‘Civil Law Convention on Corruption’.
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the Convention74 deals with the following remedies:
•	Compensation for damage, including the provision—for persons who have suffered damage—of the right to initiate 
an action to obtain full compensation; 
•	 Liability, including State liability for acts of corruption committed by public officials;
•	Reduction or disallowance of compensation when the plaintiff contributes to the damage;
•	 Invalidity of contracts or clauses of contracts providing for corruption;
•	Protection of employees who report corruption;
•	Enhancement of clarity and accuracy of accounts and audits;
•	acquisition of evidence in corruption related civil proceedings;
•	Precautionary measures to preserve the rights and interests of the parties during corruption-related civil proceedings.
1.3.5 The African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption
adopted by the Second Ordinary Sessions of the assembly of the Union in Maputo, Mozambique in 2003, the african Union 
Convention75 on Preventing and Combating Corruption entered into force on 5 august 2006.76 the Convention set out to es-
tablish an african consensus on african Union (aU) member states’ understandings, responsibilities and obligations regarding 
corruption, and more specifically, areas of corruption offences, notably illicit enrichment, money laundering and concealment 
of property. this consensus appears to be based on efforts to prevent corruption and establish continent wide, consistent 
legal frameworks with particular regard to the public sector.
Significantly the Convention omits a definition of corruption but explicitly recognises particular acts of corruption and 
related offences to which its provisions apply. the convention considers mandatory the treatment of the following acts 
as corruption offences:
•	active and passive bribery of national public officials;
•	active bribery of foreign and international public officials;
•	Embezzlement, misappropriation or other diversion of property by a public official; and
•	 Laundering of the proceeds of corruption.
Interestingly, however, the african Union (aU) Convention differs from UNCaC in that it also includes the following acts 
as mandatory that the UNCaC does not:
•	Passive bribery of foreign and international public officials;
•	active and passive bribery in the private sector;
•	 trading in influence;
•	Embezzlement, misappropriation or other diversion of property in the private sector; and
•	 Illicit enrichment.
Beyond the definitions of corruption-related offences, the level of obligation within the Convention is primarily via man-
datory provisions.
the Convention provides a set of provisos that must be integrated when developing any Codes of Conduct for public 
officials. In addition, the Convention proposes that a special control body be established and charged with developing 
and monitoring the implementation of codes of conduct, as well as serving to raise awareness, and where necessary 
provide training for public officials on ethical good-practice. 
Provisions dedicated to anti-corruption are primarily represented by anti-Corruption Bodies. the Convention provides 
for establishing, maintaining and strengthening independent national anti-corruption authorities or agencies. However, 
it does not prescribe the responsibilities of these bodies in detail.
the Convention’s attention to public procurement and public financial management again echoes the UNCaC, since both 
call for establishment of systems to ensure effectiveness and transparency. While the provisions of the aU Convention 
are succinct, those of the UNCaC are more elaborate and detailed. With regards to public procurement, both Conven-
tions require that preventive measures be taken to ensure that procurement is based on competition and objective 
criteria; that invitations to tender, conditions for participation and award criteria be publicised; that systems of review 
and appeal be instituted; and that the personnel in charge of public procurement be trained and declare their interest.
74 Articles 3-11.
75 It is important to recognise that both the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Protocol against Corruption (2001) 
and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Protocol on the Fight against Corruption (2001) were pioneering 
predecessors to this important regional convention. However, the protocols have had mixed results with the SADC Protocol being 
signed in 2001 as the first sub-regional anti-corruption treaty in Africa, while the ECOWAS Protocol remains yet to be signed.
76 To date, thirty-one Member States have ratified and are state parties to the Convention
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the Convention puts greater emphasis on dealing with the proceeds of corruption and requires that States Parties enact 
laws to empower their courts and other relevant authorities to order the confi scation or seizure of banking, fi nancial or 
commercial documents with a view to implementing the convention. Furthermore, the Convention requires legislative 
and non-legislative measures to establish conversion, transfer and disposal of proceeds of corruption; their concealment 
or disguise; and their acquisition, possession or use, as criminal offences.
the Convention’s scope again overlaps with the UNCaC since both oblige signatories to establish jurisdiction over of-
fences committed in their territories—either by their nationals or foreign residents or against them. In order to eliminate 
safe havens for criminals, both conventions make provision for States Parties to obtain jurisdiction in countries where 
the offences committed are criminalised under domestic laws but where extradition is not allowed by law.
the Convention sets out a framework77 for a follow-up mechanism. the First african Union advisory Board on Cor-
ruption was elected by the 14th Ordinary Session of the Executive Council in January 2009. the main mandate of the 
Board is to promote and encourage the adoption of measures and actions by States Parties to prevent, detect, punish 
and eradicate corruption and related offences in africa as well as to follow-up on the application of those measures.
the Board’s responsibilities include promoting anti-corruption work, collecting information on corruption and on the 
behaviour of multinational corporations working on the african continent, developing methodologies, advising the gov-
ernments of the States Parties on the implementation of the convention, developing codes of conduct for public offi cials 
and building partnerships.
States Parties are required to regularly submit a report detailing progress achieved in compliance with the Convention’s 
provisions to the aU’s Executive Council. Moreover, the national anti-corruption authorities of the States Parties must 
report to the advisory Board on an annual basis with regard to progress made in the implementation of the convention. 
the States Parties are also requested to build partnerships with the african Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 
african civil society, and governmental, intergovernmental and non-governmental organisations in order to facilitate 
dialogue in the fi ght against corruption and related offences.
1.4 Practical guidance on how to use the conventions 
in EU work with partner countries
the following are the steps that lead from the negotiation of a convention and its actual implementation by States Par-
ties78: 
Negotiation 
the negotiation of a convention is usually carried out by States within an institutional framework. this step has been 
completed for all the conventions covered in this chapter. there is, therefore, no role for the EU to play.
Adoption
after the negotiation of the content and form of the convention have been agreed, the States express their consent 
by formally adopting the convention in a formal meeting. this step has also been completed for all the conventions 
presented in this concept paper. there is, therefore, no role for the EU to play.
Signature 
after its adoption, the convention is opened for signature by States. By signing the convention, States indicate their 
intent to become Parties. this is usually the responsibility of the executive branch of government. there is normally a 
time limit to the signature of a convention. after that, States become Parties by accession. While most countries have 
77 Article 22
78 The following explanation of the steps is summarised from Dell, G., 2006. ‘Anti-corruption conventions in Africa: What civil 
society can do to make them work’, Berlin: Tranparency International, available at http://www.tranparency.org
Key points:
•	 the EU should make signing all relevant conventions part of its dialogue with  the governments of partner countries.
•	 the EU should ensure that partner countries understand their responsibilities before and after ‘entry into force’ of the conven-
tion. 
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signed the UNCaC79 and the IaCaC80, a few member countries of the Council of Europe81 and the african Union82 are 
still to sign respectively the relevant Council of Europe and aU Conventions. In a country that has not signed yet the 
relevant conventions, the EU should make this issue part of its dialogue with the government. a joint approach involving 
other donors and the non-state actors should be supported by the European Commission and EU staff in delegations 
to lobby the government. For example, the OECd83 is particularly concerned by the non-participation of China, India 
and Russia to the anti-Bribery Convention, and a joint dialogue with these countries may be promoted on this issue.
Ratification or Accession 
to commit itself to implementing the obligations of a given convention, a State must first ratify or accede to it. Ratifica-
tion and accession procedures vary from country to country and are determined with reference to specific national laws. 
they may involve the enactment of national legislation or publication in the national gazette. Ratification refers to the act 
of accepting to become a party to a convention before it comes into force, while accession is the act of accepting to 
become a party to a convention after it has come into force. through these acts of ratification and accession, a country 
becomes a States Party to the convention and is thereafter bound by its requirements. While most States have ratified 
the UNCaC, a number of african Union members still remain to ratify the aU Convention84. Once it has been established 
that a particular country has not ratified or acceded to a given convention, the EU acting jointly and in coordination with 
other donors should include this issue in their dialogue with the relevant representatives. For the EU and other donors 
to have an impact in this respect it is necessary to undertake an analysis of the ratification or accession process, identify 
possible obstacles and find ways to influence the process. the EU should also give support to the lobbying activities 
of non-state actors.
Deposit of Instruments of Ratification or Accession 
this is the step at which the State deposits an instrument of ratification or accession with the relevant institution designated 
in the convention. as many countries that ratify or accede to a convention take time to deposit the relevant instrument; 
the EU, working with other donors, may include this issue in its dialogue. It should also support the lobbying activities of 
the non-state actors to this end.
Entry into Force 
a convention becomes binding for States Parties only from the time it enters into force. the number of required ratifica-
tions for entry into force is normally specified in the convention. It is important that the EU and other donors discuss 
in detail with partner states what their responsibilities will entail prior to and after the ‘entry into force’ of conventions. 
they should also support the efforts by non-state actors to explain to the public and the relevant institutions what the 
obligations of their countries are under the convention and what needs to be done next.
National Implementation into Law 
It is advisable that States Parties review the consistency of their national legislation with the provisions of a given con-
vention either before or after ratification or accession. In some countries, a ratified convention becomes automatically 
part of domestic law. In others it is normal practice to amend or supplement the existing legislation in order to take into 
account the provisions of the convention without invoking its specific terms. In a further group of countries, the conven-
tion is incorporated or adopted into domestic law but its terms are kept intact. a substantial amount of work is required 
in partner countries to translate the provisions of the various conventions into domestic law and practice. the EU, in 
conjunction with other donors, notably UNOdC, should include in its dialogue the implementation of the convention 
to which the country is party. technical support in the form of legal experts and mentors is needed in support of the 
relevant institutions of the partner countries that lack national expertise in this area. In some african and Latin american 
countries interpretation of the provisions of regional conventions to which the countries are party, as well as those of 
the UNCaC, needs to be undertaken by experts. the relevant experts could be provided by the EU and other donors 
to countries that lack such expertise. Support needs to be given also to non-state actors with a view to enabling them 
to carry out their own research on the consistency and congruence between existing national legislation and the terms 
79 As of November 2009, 140 countries had signed the UNCAC. Up-to-date information on signatures and ratifications 
of the UNCAC is available at http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/signatories.html
80 As of November 2009, the only non-member country in the American Continent is Cuba. Up-to-date information on 
signatures and ratifications of the IACAC is available at http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/Sigs/b-58.html
81 As of November 2009, all Member States of the Council of Europe except Liechtenstein have signed (or ratified) the Criminal 
Law Convention on Corruption. Belarus, Mexico and the United States are the only non-Member signatories. For up-to-date 
information on all signatures and ratifications, see  http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=173&CM=
1&DF=17/11/2009&CL=ENG . Liechtenstein, Monaco, Portugal, Russia, San Marino and Switzerland have not signed the Civil 
Law Convention on Corruption. Belarus is the only non-Member signatory. For up-to-date information on all signatures and 
ratifications, see http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=174&CM=1&DF=17/11/2009&CL=ENG
82 As of November 2009, forty-three out fifty-three members of the AU have signed the AU Convention. For up-to-date 
information on signatures and ratifications of the AU Convention see the website of the organisation at http://www.africa-
union.org/root/au/Documents/Treaties/List/African%20Convention%20on%20Combating%20Corruption.pdf 
83 The OECD Convention has been ratified by thirty-eight States (member and non members of the OECD). For up-
to date information on the status of ratifications, see http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/59/13/40272933.pdf
84 As of November 2009, 141 countries have ratified the UNCAC and only thirty-one out of fifty-
three member countries of the African Union have ratified the AU Convention.
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imposed by the convention to which the country is party. they would thus be able to infl uence the relevant institutions 
to aim for the highest standards in the implementation of the convention(s).
Wider Integration into Institutional Structures, Policy and Practice 
Besides changes to the national legislation, States Parties need to make changes to their institutions, policies and 
practices that would enable them to effectively implement the convention(s). Financial resources will need to be found 
to set up, staff and equip these transformed or new institutions, implement the new policies, and apply the new prac-
tices and policies. the EU, alongside other donors could provide the funding for providing relevant expertise in these 
areas to partner countries. they should also provide the necessary support to non-state actors to do research on the 
appropriate policies, practices and institutions and their lobbying of the relevant institutions.
Monitoring mechanisms 
the participation of partner countries in the monitoring mechanisms of various conventions to which they are party is 
very important, as they ensure that States Parties live up to their commitments. the intergovernmental reviews proposed 
by some of the conventions entail providing material and fi nancial support to the reviewing body and for collecting the 
relevant information and data for the review. as many of the partner countries are parties to more than one convention 
they need to comply with several review mechanisms, which can stretch their resources to the limit. the EU and other 
donors can provide the necessary support to enable these countries to fully participate in, and comply with, these 
monitoring mechanisms. Support is also needed to implement the reforms or changes proposed by the reviews. Non-
state actors also need support in order for them to contribute effectively to the development and implementation of the 
review processes. they also need support to carry out their own independent reviews and to publicise their results.
among other recommendations, it should be highlighted that UNCaC provides concrete area of interventions that are 
considered as entry points for European Commission assistance and policy dialogue. Moreover, it is essential to stress 
that the UNCaC review mechanism will provide useful information for design external assistance programmes in that fi eld.
It needs nevertheless to be stressed that while not existing as mandatory clauses for the UNCaC reviews, the partici-
pation of civil society; the publication of the reports; and the possibility for reviewers to make country visits, are key 
elements that could contribute to effective implementation of the convention. the importance of these further provisions 
is particularly relevant considering their usefulness to other, complementary instruments such as the Kimberley Process 
(See Below).
It will also have to be made clear that, when providing assistance to countries for domesticating or implementing these con-
ventions, a degree of synergy will have to be ensured due to their frequently overlapping content and geographic coverage.
1.5 International initiatives: Indirect instruments 
helping in the fi ght against corruption 
the management of natural resources represents a major challenge since it is particularly prone to corruption. Recent 
research85 suggests that where country elites have access to ‘unearned income’ in the form of natural resources, their 
interest in nation building has been eroded, and corruption, state fragility and confl ict are more likely to occur. Moreo-
ver, since many of the partner countries of the EU are rich in natural resources, natural resource management (and its 
relationship with corruption) is of great importance to the nature of the assistance provided by the EU to these countries 
in the fi ght against corruption.
the risk of corruption pervades the value chains of all sorts of natural resources, particularly the ‘extractive industries’ 
such as oil, gas, minerals and timber. Both the exploitation of natural resources and the management of public revenues 
from the extractive industries are vulnerable to capture by elites from the public and private sector. they have also been 
a key factor in many armed confl icts owing to the many rebel forces fi ghting for control of mining or logging areas as a 
means to generate fi nancial resources to fund their activities. 
85 Moore, M., Schmidt, A. & Unsworth, S., 2009. ‘Assuring our Common Future in a Globalised 
World: the global context of confl ict and state fragility’, unpublished. 
box 8: Implementation of international anti-corruption conventions -
areas needing fi nancial and technical support
•	 awareness-raising—encouraging partner countries to sign, ratify or accede to the instruments;
•	 Integration of the provisions of the international legal instruments into national legislation;
•	 Implementing the necessary institutional reforms to meet the standards set in the legal instruments; and
•	 Establishing monitoring mechanisms by peers and civil society.
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With few exceptions, most resource-rich developing countries experience low or even negative growth and therefore 
high levels of poverty. this paradox of richly endowed but economically under performing countries has been dubbed 
the ‘resource curse’86. at the root of this problem is weak governance and lack of accountability in management of 
revenues accrued by elites from the exploitation of natural resources.
In essence, it is argued that natural resources relate to corruption in two ways. Firstly, the existence of natural resources 
raises the possibility that various competing social and political groups may attempt to gain control over them to facilitate 
rent-seeking. In other words, these groups may take control of the revenues from exploiting local natural resources and 
redistribute them for private benefit. Secondly, the institutional arrangements relating to natural resource management 
may provide opportunities for corrupt activity.
the literature shows that it is not necessarily the presence of natural resources by themselves that leads to the resource 
curse, but the likelihood of such resources being exploited to greater facilitate processes of patronage and rent-seeking 
by opportunistic institutions. Researchers argue that the most important institutions are those responsible for the alloca-
tion of public revenues and those which hold politicians to account for their management of public funds and thus restrict 
the possibilities of state-capture by governments. there is also strong evidence to suggest the importance of institutions 
that facilitate private sector efficiency and thus reduce the attractiveness of private capture. Bearing this in mind, it has 
been observed that in countries where governments alone control considerable revenues from natural resources, they 
are likely to reduce or even ignore pressures for improved governance and accountability. they may also undertake to 
suppress or even prevent the formation of groups capable of challenging their control of power. 
Corruption occurs at all stages of natural resource management, but it manifests itself in ways that vary from one 
resource to the next. Moreover, various actors who are involved in the different stages play an important role in either 
grabbing public revenues or preventing corrupt behaviour. these players include civil servants, domestic and foreign 
based enterprises, commercial and development banks, consultants, export credit agencies, donors and insurance 
companies. the influence that each one of these actors enjoys depends on the type of relationship that they have with 
the government and with each other. Even where robust natural resource management systems are put in place, there 
may be strong incentives for by-passing them if this can be done with impunity and the pay-off is high. 
a number of initiatives have been developed over the last few years to address the problems of governance and cor-
ruption that resource-abundant countries face. Some of the main initiatives are summarised below.
1.5.1 The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative
the Extractive Industries transparency Initiative (EItI) was launched in 2002 by a coalition of governments, companies, 
non-state actors, investors and international organisations87. the EItI is a voluntary initiative aimed at improving gov-
ernance in countries endowed with oil, gas and minerals through the verification and publication of company spending 
and government revenues from the extractive industry sector—with a view to ensuring that natural resources benefit all. 
In order to improve transparency in governance, EItI advocates the publication and verification of company payments 
and government receipts from the natural resource management process within the relevant extractive industries. For 
the first time, this procedure opens the books of both extractive industry companies and states that enter into business 
relationships with them. this newfound transparency has meant that considerable ‘leakages’ of funds that were previ-
ously diverted during the collection of revenues in countries with weak regulations and low levels of accountability are 
now harder to justify. EItI has thus introduced an international standard on transparency and good governance in the 
management of revenues from extractive industries.
86 See Kolstad, I. & Wiig, A., 2008. ’Political economy models of resource curse: implications for policy and research’, CWI 
Working Paper, WP 6, available at http://www.cmi.no/publications/file/?3291=political-economy-models-of-the-resource-
curse ; and Collier, P. & Goderis, B., 2007. ‘Commodity prices, growth, and the natural resource curse: Reconciling a 
conundrum’, Paper 274, The Centre for the Study of African Economies Working Paper Series: Oxford University, available 
at http://www.csae.ox.ac.uk/members/biogs/goderis/pdfs/workingpapers/CommodityPricesGrowth.pdf 
87 See http://www.eitransparency.org
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a great deal of the work of donors and international organisations is carried out within the framework of EItI and its 
related activities. EItI’s transparency activities in countries that have volunteered to join the initiative are supported by 
a Multi-donor trust Fund which has received contributions from the World Bank, the European Commission, and the 
governments of the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Germany, Norway, France, australia, Belgium, Canada, Spain 
and the United States of america.
In terms of coverage, the EItI currently has about thirty candidate countries and two compliant countries; Guinea has 
recently (december, 2009) voluntarily suspended its candidate status due to a non-permissive political environment. 
However, twenty two countries have yet to meet their 2010 deadline for external process verifi cation. 
While broadly considered a successful instrument, EItI has been criticised for focusing primarily on the transparency of 
revenue collection, whereas other areas where transparency is equally important (e.g. procurement) are not addressed. 
although it carefully charts revenues entering state accounts, it does not deal with the allocation and expenditure of 
revenues from extractive industries despite these expenditure streams being vulnerable to capture by powerful groups. 
the EItI appears to have since recognised the importance of transparency on the expenditure side of revenue manage-
ment as crucial to restricting the misallocation of public funds. the EItI+ initiative, launched by the World Bank in 2008, 
recognised the importance of transparency on the ‘downstream’ government expenditure side and goes one step further 
by extending the scrutiny across the entire value-chain of the EItI process.
the second report covering 2005 was released on 11 august 2009. the report identifi ed unprecedented fi nancial 
discrepancies, unpaid taxes and system ineffi ciencies. Over US$800m of unresolved differences between what com-
panies said that they paid in taxes, royalties and signature bonuses, and what the governments said it received were 
identifi ed. Of this amount, US$560m was identifi ed as shortfalls in taxes and royalties owed to the government and 
around US$300m in payment discrepancies relating to signature bonuses, payments of dividends, interest and loan 
repayments. the largest amount owed to the government in the report is an estimated US$4.7bn by the state-owned 
Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) for payments of domestic crude. However, the NNPC claims it is owed 
US$1.7bn in subsidies from the government.
box 9: the EItI process
EItI is a global initiative that aims to increase transparency in transactions between companies operating in the extractive sector 
and governments as a way of ensuring that revenues from the extractive sector contribute to sustainable development and 
poverty reduction. the full publication and verifi cation of company payments and government revenues helps stakeholders 
(including extractive companies, home countries where the extractive companies are resident, and NGOs and other interested 
actors) to address issues of systemic corruption, poor governance, poverty and confl ict.
 
this process of disclosure and independent verifi cation is overseen by a Multi-Stakeholder Group, as illustrated in the diagram. 
this oversight and scrutiny may lead to additional changes outside of the EItI process, such as a review of the award of licences 
and contracts, closer regulation and monitoring of operations or to a change in the distribution and management of revenue 
from the sector.
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1.5.2 The Kimberley Process Certifi cation Scheme (KPCS) 
In the 1990s, the diamond trade was unregulated and with approximately twenty-fi ve per cent of the diamonds traded 
on the international market originating from confl ict-ravaged areas, mainly in africa. these ‘blood diamonds’ were used 
in various illicit and criminal activities, including money laundering, tax evasion, drug traffi cking, arms trading with rebel 
groups, sanctions evasion and the fi nancing of terrorism. the wars sustained by the trade in blood diamonds by rebel 
groups caused a great deal of suffering and the death and displacement of millions of innocent civilians. Furthermore, 
already fragile states were unable to generate legitimate revenues from the industry that could have helped develop their 
economies and bring millions of their citizens out of poverty.88 
Following a landmark UN resolution supporting an international rough diamond certifi cation scheme, southern african 
states met in Kimberley, South africa in May 2000 to refl ect upon ways to put an end to the confl ict diamond trade and 
ensure that the diamond industry did not fund violence and human rights violations. this was followed by the adoption 
of a United Nations General assembly resolution in december 2000 that called for the creation of an international certi-
fi cation scheme for rough diamonds. Following negotiations between governments, the international diamond industry 
and non-state actors, the KPCS was created in November 2002 and entered into force in January 2003. 
the KPCS demands that participating countries meet minimum requirements and set in place a legal and institutional 
framework to effectively control the diamond trade. this framework must include relevant national legislation and institu-
tions and controls on imports, exports and internal diamond trade. Participating countries are also obliged to commit 
to transparency and exchanges of statistical data with other participating countries. 
In trading terms, certifi cated countries can only trade with other participants who fulfi l the requirements of the KPCS. all 
rough diamond exports must be accompanied by a KP certifi cate that guarantees they were not produced in confl ict-
ridden areas. Compliance with the requirements of the scheme is monitored through ‘review visits’, annual reports and 
the regular exchange and analysis of statistical data on diamond production and trade.
to date, the Kimberley Process has forty-nine members who represent seventy-fi ve countries. the EU and its Member 
States actively participate in the KPCS and count as an individual participant89. these countries account for almost all 
rough diamond production in the world (99.8%). In addition, the international diamond industry—represented by the 
World diamond Council—and non-state actors—represented by Global Witness, Fatal transactions and Partnership 
africa-Canada—play an active and important role in this tripartite initiative. the participating countries rotate as chairs of 
the KPCS. the EU chaired the KPCS in 2007 and chairs one of its working groups, the Working Group on Monitoring, 
which is responsible for overseeing the implementation of KPCS requirements.
88 KPCS, 2010.  http://www.kimberleyprocess.com, the website of Partnership Africa Canada at  http://www.
pacweb.org/programs-resources-e.php and that of Fatal Transactions at http://www.fataltransactions.org/
Dossiers/Blood-diamonds-and-the-Kimberley-Process/Introducing-the-Kimberley-Process 
89 Within the EC, the Kimberley Process is implemented by a Council Regulation. The relevant legislation 
may be found at http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/blood_diamonds/index_en.htm
box 10: nigeria EItI
Former President Olusegun Obasanjo committed to EItI in November 2003 and launched Nigeria EItI (NEItI) in February 2004. Under 
this Presidential directive, an inaugural NSWG was constituted, consisting of twenty-eight individuals led by the then Minister of Solid 
Minerals. to give legal backing to the work of NEItI, a bill was introduced to the National assembly in december 2004. the NEItI act, 
which passed in May 2007, institutionalised NEItI and made Nigeria the fi rst EItI implementing country to provide a legally enshrined 
framework for EItI. By virtue of the NEItI act, NEItI became both a formal government agency under the Presidency as well as a country 
chapter of global EItI. the NEItI act combines its international responsibilities under the EItI with its national legal mandate and policy 
agenda. the latter expands the scope of the initiative beyond that of the global EItI framework to include, most notably, physical and 
process audits in addition to fi nancial audits of the extractive sector.
the 2007 NEItI act dissolved the inaugural National Stakeholders Working Group (NSWG) and empowered the President of Nigeria to 
reconstitute the NSWG and appoint new membership of fi fteen individuals and a new NSWG was inaugurated in January 2008. as a 
result of ongoing civil society organisation (CSO) concerns about under representation on the NSWG, a civil society steering committee 
(CSSC) was established. the CSSC includes four members of the NSWG and representatives from different CSO sectors (professional 
organisations, gender, transparency and accountability, environment, physically challenged groups, media and youths). 
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the KPCS has had some success in stemming the fl ow of confl ict diamonds, which has contributed to restoring peace 
and stability in a number of diamond-producing countries. as a result, over the last few years the diamond revenues 
of these countries have grown substantially. However, in the run-up to its latest plenary session in Windhoek, Namibia, 
in November 2009, non-state actors recommended a number of actions to be taken to further strengthen the controls 
and improve the implementation of KPCS standards90. 
Many view the KPCS as an exemplary model of a successful voluntary union of governments, a large international indus-
try and civil society. the Kimberley Process institution claims to have not only ‘stemmed [the] fl ow of confl ict diamonds’ 
but also to have engineered ‘a unique confl ict-prevention instrument to promote peace and security’.
this evaluation of the success of the Kimberley Process is widely shared and has been similarly supported by an external 
review, which described it as, ‘international co-ordination at its best, in the form of a novel voluntary model for multilateral 
agreement and action’. However, future challenges for the KPCS have been identifi ed, particularly with regards to the 
challenging but necessary transition it needs to make from a voluntary system to an enforceable one. 
Given that much of the KPCS success is owed to its voluntary and ad-hoc nature, this could yet prove problematic, since 
compliance issues are likely to require enforcement where chronic underperformers fail to meet standards. Given their volunteer 
status, this is likely to prove challenging.
1.5.3 Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade 
Many partner countries are suffering the effects of the devastation that is visited upon them by illegal logging. Large areas of their 
forests have been destroyed, affecting millions of people whose livelihoods depend on timber and non-timber forest products. 
Confl icts for control of the revenues gained through illegal exploitation of forests often lead to human rights violations and can 
also fuel corruption in the affected countries. as a result, considerable public resources are diverted by corrupt offi cials, criminal 
networks and rebel groups and are thus made unavailable for maintaining the essential functions of the state (infrastructure, social 
protection, health, education, etc.) or for the effort to reduce poverty.
Responding to public concerns on the issue of illegal logging and deforestation, an EU action Plan for Forest Law Enforcement 
Governance and trade (FLEGt) was adopted in 2003. the intended impact of FLEGt was to reduce illegality in the international 
timber sector, improve governance in the forestry sector of timber producing nations and encourage importers to take respon-
sibility for ensuring a credible verifi cation process. 
the key regions and countries targeted, together accounting for nearly sixty per cent of the world’s forest and a large proportion 
of internationally traded timber are Central africa, Russia, tropical South america and Southeast asia. the FLEGt action Plan 
was endorsed by the EU Council of Ministers in November 2003, leading to two key pieces of legislation: the FLEGt Regulation 
of 2005 and the EU timber Regulation of 2010.
FLEGt gave explicit recognition of a number of measures that the EU and its Member States could take to reduce illegal logging 
of the forests of developing countries. the actions are aimed at:
•	Strengthening governance and capacity building in timber-producing countries;
•	Strengthening law enforcement through better coordination and collaboration between forest regulators, police, 
customs and judiciary;
•	 Involving the private sector in efforts aiming at reducing opportunities to trade in illegal timber; and 
•	Providing capacity building support to the development and enforcement of transparent public procurement policies 
90 See their press release ‘Blood diamonds—time to plug the leaks. Civil society groups warn Kimberley Process effectiveness 
compromised’, available at http://www.pacweb.org/Documents/Press_releases/2009/Blood_Diamonds-time-to-plug-the-leaks-
eng-2009-06-19.pdf   Their concerns are summarised in Partnership Africa Canada, Diamonds and Human Security—Annual 
Review 2009, available at http://www.pacweb.org/Documents/annual-reviews-diamonds/Ar_diamonds_2009_eng.pdf
box 11: European commission participation in the Kimberley process
the European Commission is committed to supporting international initiatives, such as the Kimberley Process, to combat the 
role of confl ict resources. to that end, the Commission, representing the EU as a whole, is an active participant in the KPCS and 
chaired the Kimberley Process in 2007. the Commission chairs the Kimberley Process Monitoring Working Group that supervises 
KPCS implementation globally. the Commission has also funded projects to enable statistical analysis, satellite monitoring and 
technical expertise in order to enhance the capacity of the Kimberley Process to respond to crises, for example, the cases of 
Côte d’Ivoire and Zimbabwe. Within the EU, the KPCS is implemented by a Council Regulation adopted on 20 december 2002. 
the Regulation lays down the procedures and criteria to be followed in the import and export of rough diamonds into and from 
the EU and creates a uniform Kimberley Process certifi cate, which is used for all shipments.
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and accurate recording of forest ownership data, concession systems and licences, and legal frameworks91. 
a central element of FLEGt are the bilateral agreements known as Voluntary Partnership agreements (VPas) between the EU 
and tropical timber producing nations that choose to undertake the action Plan.
While the VPas are generally regarded as an effi cient instrument capable of improving governance within forestry sectors and 
reducing illegality within the international timber trade, concerns, such as those raised in a series of Policy Briefs by Global Wit-
ness92, have been raised over their implementation. However, many of these concerns are likely to be addressed by forthcoming 
demand-side measures adopted by EU countries, in combination with the EU due diligence Regulation, which enables operators 
to ascertain the legality of their products, and the ISas Lacey act amendment (2008), which opened the way for prosecution 
in the US for importing illegal timber via a Congressional law banning commerce in illegally sourced plants and their products.
1.5.4 Construction Sector Transparency Initiative
Public sector infrastructure projects contribute to economic growth and poverty reduction. as it is a case for natural resources 
management, corruption during the planning, implementation and monitoring of construction operations is heavily negatively 
impacting their expected societal returns.
Launch in May 2008, the Construction Sector transparency Initiative (CoSt) is an international initiative, designed by the depart-
ment for International development (dFId) and the World Bank, in view of promoting transparency and accountability in publicly 
fi nanced construction operations. It has been piloted over a two year period in Ethiopia, Malawi, Philippines, tanzania, United 
Kingdom, Vietnam and Zambia. 
In the same spirit of the EItI, in each pilot country, multi-stakeholders groups (involving notably procuring bodies, public 
fi nancial management departments and agencies, construction companies and associations, civil society, as well as 
non-governmental providers of fi nance or loan guarantees) have been set up.
CoSt provides a framework for the disclosure of selected project information. the kind of information disclosed include, 
for example, a description of the project; its purpose and location and, at the implementation stage, summary details of 
the original and fi nal: project specifi cation, project cost, contractor and completion dates. It also includes justifi cation for 
any signifi cant differences between the original and fi nal information, as well as project evaluation and completion reports.
91 See EC, ‘Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade: the European Union approach’, EFI Policy Brief 2, 2008.
92 See ‘Global Witness’, available at http://www.globalwitness.org/
box 12: Due Diligence regulation
due diligence regulation has been adopted by the European Parliament and the Council of 20 October 2010, under which timber 
importers who place timber and wood products onto the European market are prohibited from selling illegally harvested timber 
and timber products. they are also obliged to use a due diligence system to ensure the legality of these timber products. this 
system requires them to compile information concerning their timber, including where it was harvested. this regulation requires 
traders selling internally within the EU to also provide information on their suppliers and to ensure the traceability of timber and 
timber products up to the fi rst point of sale within the EU.
box 13: Ec specifi c regulations, licensing and enhancements
In 2005, the Council adopted a Regulation allowing for the control of the entry of timber to the EU from countries entering into 
bilateral FLEGt Voluntary Partnership agreements (VPa) with the EU (Council Regulation (EC) No 2173/2005 of 20 december 
2005 on the establishment of a FLEGt licensing scheme for imports of timber into the European Community). In 2008, a further 
enhancement was presented with a draft legislation which will oblige traders to identify the country of origin of their timber and 
ensure that timber they sell has been harvested according to the relevant laws of that country. 
In reviewing implementation, the fi rst FLEGt VPa was ratifi ed with Ghana in November 2009 and initialled with Congo in May 
2009. Negotiations are ongoing with countries in South East asia, africa and South america. the fi rst FLEGt licences are 
expected in 2011.
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1.6 Conclusion
In situating corruption within a global context, this section has charted the evolution of international efforts to recognise 
and prevent the phenomenon via several key conventions and instruments.
While this exercise underlines an international consensus dedicated to fi ghting corruption via a ‘collective commitment’, 
a brief examination of the scope and implementation of conventions and instruments employed suggests that the impact 
of these efforts are at best mixed.
this section has highlighted the sheer scale of the task involved with fi ghting corruption and has introduced some of 
the challenges faced to this end by the international community. Furthermore, it has emphasised the extent of the vari-
ation in the phenomenon and has indicated the need of being able to take nuanced and accurate measurements for 
the analysis of corruption while simultaneously taking full account of context-specifi c political economy of the country 
involved. Such care is essential in order to apply the most appropriate ‘suite’ of anti-corruption measures. Consider-
ing this need, therefore, Chapter three will examine the contemporary frameworks and tools available to EU staff for 
measuring and analysing corruption. 
Section 2: The EU approach
Corruption is a global phenomenon: it concerns at the same time the local level, the daily life of citizens in their interac-
tions with the public and private spheres as well as the national and global level, as corruption fuels organised crime and 
terrorism. Combating and preventing corruption is an integral part of the EU’s internal and external policies. Internally, 
it is a priority in respect of existing Member States (MS) and also forms a key aspect of the acquis communautaire for 
accession countries. Externally combating and prevention is a priority in respect of the EU’s approach to international 
relations. addressing corruption challenges thus requires a coherent set of policies between internal strategies and 
practises at the EU level and the policies and measures implemented in third countries.
1.1 EU internal anti-corruption policies
despite existing (international) monitoring mechanisms and various legal and non-legal initiatives, research indicates 
that corruption in the EU remains a problem. as an example, in the transparency International’s 2010 CPI index, nine 
MS out of 27 (which is one third) are scoring 5 points out of 10 or less, which is an indication of widespread corruption. 
the economic costs incurred by corruption in the EU possibly amount to EUR 120 billion per year. this is one percent 
of the EU GdP, representing only a little less than the annual budget of the EU.
this confi rms the data from the 2009 Eurobarometer survey. there, more than three quarters of the interviewed Eu-
ropeans agreed that corruption was a major problem for their country (78%). there are proven shortcomings in the 
transposition of relevant international and EU anti-corruption legal instruments. For example, the 2007 implementation 
report on the Council Framework decision of 2003 on combating corruption in the private sector showed that the 
the principles underpinning cost
CoSt is a voluntary initiative applicable to any country and any government department or agency with responsibility for public 
sector construction projects. the principles that underpin CoSt refl ect a shared stakeholder commitment to transparency and 
accountability:
•	 Projects should promote sustainability. Public sector infrastructure projects should support sustainable economic growth that 
contributes to sustainable development and poverty reduction. Mismanagement during construction can undermine potential 
social and economic benefi ts and value for money.
•	 Governments should be accountable. Citizens have a right to know that their money is being used wisely. the procure-
ment and management of public sector construction projects should be suffi ciently transparent for government to be held 
accountable.
•	 transparency can improve effi ciency. Basic project information, disclosed throughout the entire project cycle, can provide 
an effective way to improve value for money in construction by reducing opportunities for corruption and increasing scrutiny. 
•	 transparency promotes investor confi dence. domestic and foreign direct investment is likely to be increased by transparency 
in the management of construction projects.
•	 Multi-stakeholder co-operation is important. Experience shows that multistakeholder working between the public and private 
and sectors and civil society improves transparency and gives greater confi dence to citizens that all points of view are being 
taken into
•	  account. a multistakeholder group (MSG) oversees the implementation of CoSt in each country. It is formed from represen-
tatives of government and procuring agencies, the construction industry, professional associations, fi nancial organisations, 
investors and civil society.
Source: CoST briefi ng note 1 (http://www.constructiontransparency.org/TechnicalFinancialAssistance/CoSTBriefi ngNotes/)
C h a p T e R  T w o :  a d d R e s s i n g  C o R R u p T i o n  i n  a  g l o b a l i s e d  w o R l d
37
transposition of this instrument is not satisfactory. another example - the UN Convention against Corruption has not 
yet been ratified by all EU Member States.
Minimum standards of protection against fraud, corruption and money laundering in relation to EU funds have been 
established. these standards are crystallised in specific legal frameworks such as the 1995 Convention on the Protection 
of the European Communities’ Financial Interests and its protocols of 1996 and 1997, as well as the 1997 EU Conven-
tion on anti-corruption93. these standards aim to protect the funds of the EU budget, both at the level of income and 
expenses. as most of the other international conventions in the field of anti-corruption, they mainly aim to harmonise 
national legislation and practices in terms of criminalisation, sanctions, jurisdictional competence and judicial coopera-
tion in criminal matters. these specific EU legal frameworks explicitly highlight the importance of anti-corruption policies 
and measures in acceding, candidate and other third countries. 
the 2003 Communication on Corruption calls for the detection and punishment of all acts of corruption, the confiscation 
of illicit proceeds and reduces opportunities for corrupt practices through the establishment of transparent and account-
able public administration standards. Furthermore, it promotes anti-corruption clauses within cooperation agreements 
and external aid programmes, against the background of guiding principles centring upon improving the fight against 
corruption ranking from the implementation of dedicated strategies to effective prevention measures and efficient law 
enforcement.
Reducing levels of bribery within the private sector is also an important aspect of the EU anti-corruption strategy. By 
rigorously enforcing laws against the bribery of foreign public officials, the EU believes that Member States will reinforce 
the internal market and strengthen their economies. Furthermore, these measures will have a positive impact on relations 
with external trade partners. In July 2003, the Council Framework decision 2003/568/JHa on combating corruption 
in the private sector was adopted. this instrument is binding upon the Member States, while national authorities can 
chose how to implement it under national law and practice. It aims to ensure that both active and passive corruption in 
the private sector are criminal offences in all EU MS, that legal persons may also be held responsible for such offences, 
and that these offences incur effective, proportionate and dissuasive penalties. at its heart is the requirement that EU MS 
criminalise two types of conduct: promising, offering or giving a bribe to a person in the private sector; and requesting 
or receiving a bribe, or the promise of such, while working in the private.
In September 2005, the European Community, represented by the European Commission signed the 2003 United Na-
tions Convention against Corruption (UNCaC) and ratified it in November 2008. therefore the EU as represented by 
the European Commission is now party to the Convention. 
Priority within the EU’s anti-corruption approach is also given to the establishment of effective mechanisms within EU 
administrations for the recovery of assets, including those stolen through corruption. Four EU legislative instruments 
(Council Framework decisions), binding upon Member States are being implemented at national level. their goal is to 
ensure a common EU approach to confiscation. 
While not their main objective, these instruments have different spheres of responsibility, from establishing the principle 
of mutual recognition for confiscation orders and orders to freeze property or evidence, to focusing upon money laun-
dering. they also aim at ensuring that EU Member States introduce effective rules on confiscation, including rules on 
proof with regards to the source of the assets concerned. 
In November 2008 the European Commission adopted a Communication on the proceeds of organised crime which 
proposes ten strategic priorities on confiscation and asset recovery to strengthen the fight against organised crime. 
the Communication foresees an increased cooperation among EU asset Recovery Offices and new tools related to the 
identification and tracing of assets. It also calls for the development of a common EU training programme for financial 
investigators to be implemented as a priority, as well as for the production of comparable, high quality statistics.
the Stockholm Program establishing priorities for the EU in the field of justice and home affairs for the period 2010 - 
2015 provided the European Commission with a political mandate to measure efforts in the fight against corruption and 
to develop a comprehensive EU anti-corruption policy, as well to propose on the modalities for the Union to accede to 
the Council of Europe Group of States against Corruption (GRECO).
the European Parliament, in its declaration of May 2010 delivered major support for the European Commission’s plan 
to forcefully implement the Stockholm program’s priorities on fighting corruption. Speaking on behalf of the 500 million 
EU citizens, this strong signal has been used by the Commission to develop the 2011 anti-corruption package.
93 http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/fight_against_fraud/protecting_european_communitys_financial_interests/l33019_en.htm
R e f e R e n C e  d o C u m e n T  n ° 1 0  -  s u p p o R T i n g  a n T i - C o R R u p T i o n  R e f o R m  i n  p a R T n e R  C o u n T R i e s :  C o n C e p T s ,  T o o l s  a n d  a R e a s  f o R  a C T i o n
38
the European Commission has therefore conducted a comprehensive study on the best way to take forward this call. It 
provides solid evidence that effective action at EU level is needed. It also gives us a better idea of the impact of possible 
options and – importantly – the obstacles we are likely to face in shaping a genuine EU anti-corruption policy.
to respond to the call and political mandate of the Stockholm Program the European Commission has adopted an 
anti-corruption «package» in June 2011 94, which contains:
1. a Communication on fi ghting corruption in the EU, updating the 2003 Communication), 
2. a review of the progress made for addressing corruption in the private sector (implementation report of the Framework 
decision on corruption in the private sector); 
3. a defi nition of the steps towards the EU’s accession to GRECO (the Council of Europe anti-corruption monitoring 
mechanism); and most probably
4. a reporting mechanism on fi ghting corruption in the 27 EU Member States.
1.2 Addressing corruption and improving governance for the benefi t of development
Governance is necessary for economic growth, investment and trade. development and poverty reduction depend on 
many factors well beyond development aid: economic growth and social justice might be the most effi cient ways of 
pulling poor people out of poverty; trade, and private investment is far exceeding Offi cial development assistance in 
terms of fi nance, with only remittances representing three times as much. 
Corruption is a major impediment to development. Research on this topic suggests that resources intended to address 
the basic development needs of millions of poor people around the world are diverted and misallocated through vari-
ous forms of corrupt practices. tentative estimates, made by a coalition of specialised institutions and bodies, suggest 
that corruption costs more than 5% of global GdP (2.6 trillion USd); with over 1 trillion USd paid in bribes each year95 
(which is equivalent to the total GdP of the african continent), by far exceeding Offi cial development assistance (Oda) 
resources. 
according to the World Bank, corruption can add as much as 20% to 25% to the cost of public procurement; and in 
Sub-Saharan africa, implementation of effi ciency oriented reforms in the road sector could raise a total of 3.8 billion 
USd a year, according to the african Infrastructure Country diagnostic96.
94 http://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/news/intro/docs/110606/308/1_EN_ACT_part1_v12%5B1%5D.pdf
95 International Chamber of Commerce, Transparency International, UN Global Compact, 
World Economic Forum, Clean Business is Good Business, 2009.
96 Africa’s infrastructure: a time for transformation, the World Bank (2010).
communication on fi ghting corruption in the EU (June 2011): key features
the European Commission will set up a new mechanism, the EU anti-Corruption Report, to monitor and assess Member 
States’ efforts against corruption, and consequently encourage more political engagement. Supported by an expert group and a 
network of research correspondents, the Report will be managed by the European Commission and published every two years, 
starting in 2013. It will give a fair refl ection of the achievements, vulnerabilities and commitments of all Member States. It will 
identify trends and weaknesses that need to be addressed, as well as stimulate peer learning and exchange of best practices. 
alongside this mechanism, the EU should participate in the Council of Europe Group of States against Corruption (GRECO).
the EU will also put stronger focus on corruption in all relevant EU policies – internal as well as external. the European Commis-
sion will therefore, in particular, propose modernised EU rules on confi scation of criminal assets in 2011, a strategy to improve 
criminal fi nancial investigations in Member States in 2012, and adopt in 2011 an action Plan for how to improve crime statistics. 
the European Commission will also work with EU agencies (such as Europol, Eurojust and CEPOL), as well as with the Euro-
pean anti-Fraud Offi ce (OLaF) to step up judicial and police cooperation and improve training of law enforcement offi cials. It will 
continue to prepare modernised EU rules on procurement and on accounting standards and statutory audit for EU companies. 
also, the European Commission will adopt a strategy to combat fraud affecting the fi nancial interests of the EU in 2011. In 
parallel, the European Commission will put a stronger focus on anti-corruption issues within the EU enlargement process 
and - together with the High Representative - in the neighbourhood policy area, as well as in cooperation and development 
policies. Business sector initiatives and private-public dialogue at EU level on how to prevent corruption should fi nally be further 
developed.
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as demonstrated in a recent transparency International report released in September 2010 97, corruption in its various 
forms severely curbs development, whereas increased transparency, accountability and integrity translate into better 
Millennium development Goals outcomes. to take a few examples, this analysis suggests that investment on primary 
education is largely hampered by corruption (the increased practice of paying bribes is associated with a lower literacy 
rate among 15 to 24 year olds), while it highlights a signifi cant correlation between widespread bribery and an increased 
maternal mortality ratio, regardless of how wealthy a country is or how much it invests in health. 
development results depend in the fi rst place on domestic policies and domestic actors (government, private sector 
and other Non State actors) and rely, sometimes heavily, on a conducive international environment (subject to interna-
tional and bilateral trade agreements, raw materials prices, and even developed and emerging countries sector policies, 
notably agricultural and industrial support schemes). External assistance has therefore evolved from a purely technical 
approach to a broader support to country owned policies and reform processes, as well as addressing international 
governance challenges. the European Commission recognises the need to focus more on governance and political 
economy analysis to avoid being taken by surprise by reality and having to face unwanted, unintended consequences 
of its support to reform processes and in order to ensure more sustainable results. 
Governance, as a development policy objective has been considerably strengthened in recent years and is a central 
feature of the European Commission external assistance. the European Commission follows two main operational 
strategies for addressing corruption and improving governance in third countries by (i) supporting specifi c interventions 
in key governance areas (justice, security, democratisation, non state actors, public sector reform and decentralisation, 
etc.), and (ii) mainstreaming governance in other areas of cooperation (health, water, education, transport, infrastructure, 
etc.) so as to ensure that all projects and programmes - at every stage of their development – analyse and address 
governance challenges.
97 The Anti-Corruption Catalyst: Realising the MDGs by 2015, Transparency International, 2010. Available 
on: http://www.transparency.org/news_room/in_focus/2010/realising_the_mdgs_by_2015 
the European commission policy framework
the 2005 European Consensus on development invites the European Commission and EU Member States to include corruption 
issues in the political dialogue and in their strategies of support to fragile States. In the 2006 Communication on «Governance in 
the European Consensus on development», it is recalled that «Good governance means more than tackling corruption. though 
the EU takes an extremely fi rm stance on this matter, viewing corruption as a major obstacle to achieving development goals, 
it sees it as a symptom of poor governance and of a lack of transparent, accountable management and control systems». 
there is no internationally-agreed defi nition of governance. the European Commission defi nition presented in its 2003 Communi-
cation on Governance and development and reiterated in the 2006 Communication on Governance in the European Consensus 
on development(a) stresses that governance concerns the state’s ability to serve its citizens. It highlights that governance refers 
to the rules, processes, and behaviours by which interests are articulated, resources are managed, and power is exercised in 
a society. the way public functions are carried out, public resources are managed and public regulatory powers are exercised 
are major issues to be addressed in that context. 
this broad and holistic approach to governance reforms recognises that there is no particular institutional model for democratic 
governance. However this concept is anchored in basic universally-agreed principles (entrenched in UN Human Rights and 
anti Corruption Instruments) such as transparency, accountability, participation, inclusion and anti-corruption; considered as 
essential factors for sustainable development. Such an approach takes into account all the dimensions of governance (political, 
economic, social, cultural, environmental, etc.) and the need to integrate governance into each and every sector programme, 
while considering governance as a dynamic process that grows into good and ultimately democratic governance, as the values 
of democracy and human rights are progressively entrenched into a society.
While recognising that if there is no political will inside the country, outside support is unlikely to deliver results, the European 
Commission considers that donors have an important role to play by developing incentive-based approaches and sustaining 
an adequate level of political and policy dialogue on all dimensions of democratic governance.
In countries in fragile situations (those affected by internal and external confl icts or authoritarian regimes with no space for citi-
zen’s initiatives and civil society voices) a lack of political legitimacy is often compounded by very limited governance capacities. 
addressing governance in these countries demands a step-by-step approach aimed at gradually raising governance standards. 
Many countries must fi rst achieve basic stability and a minimum of institutional development before they can start implementing 
long-term development policies. 
(a)  Communication on Governance and Development, COM (2003) 615, available on http://eur-lex.europa.eu/
LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2003:0615:FIN:EN:PDF and Communication on Governance in the European 
consensus on development: towards an harmonised approach within the European Union, COM (2006) 421, 
available on http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/com/2006/com2006_0421en01.pdf
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Between 2005 and 2009, the European Commission committed around € 9 billion in the field of governance. Out of 
this amount, € 5.6 billion were managed by Europeaid98. this amount covers activities in the areas of legal and judicial 
development, government administration, strengthening civil society, human rights, elections, women’s equality, security 
system management and reform, civilian peace-building, conflict prevention and resolution, post-conflict peace-building 
(in cooperation with relevant United Nation agencies), reintegration and Small arms and Light Weapons control, landmine 
clearance and child soldiers. this support notably contributed to create an enabling environment for improving govern-
ance, addressing corruption challenges and enforcing anti-corruption legislation.
the European Commission also protects its financial assistance from corruption and fraud according to international 
standards in this field. It deals with the fiduciary risk linked to its development assistance by implementing sound pro-
cedures and comprehensive audit framework and systems. Financing agreements with beneficiary states, as well as 
procurement system, include standard clauses clarifying that the Commission may cancel financing and making the 
beneficiary State responsible for taking concrete actions in case of corruption.
the European Commission audit strategy is based on two pillars. the first one consists of mandatory audits and expendi-
ture verifications which are provided for in the Financial Regulations and the programme legal basis and are reflected 
in legal agreements (e.g. Financing agreements with third countries) and standard external aid contracts. the second 
pillar constitutes an additional layer of controls and concerns risk-based audits which are a response to the specific 
risks perceived by the authorising Officer. 
to implement this strategic approach, the European Commission has developed and uses the following main methodo-
logical tools: (i) governance profiles and governance action plans, (ii) programming and policy dialogue at national and 
regional level, (iii) analysing and addressing governance in sector operations.
as for other areas of intervention, support to governance reforms follow the principles of the Paris declaration on aid 
effectiveness and the accra agenda for action 99, which contains a road map with clear mutual commitments on align-
ment to beneficiary countries’ policies, using more and more country systems for channelling the funds, on effective 
coordination between country and donors and harmonisation of donors’ requirements and practices. Furthermore, 
the Paris declaration emphasizes the importance of mutual accountability; implying obligations on both sides of the 
partnership (governance of aid).
at the country level, while taking into account the conditions in specific countries, the European Commission support 
to the fight against corruption through external aid by:
•	Supporting the reform of public administration and to the management of public finances (in particular in the case of 
budgetary support to the partner country); 
•	Supporting the improvement of the business and investment climate and customs reform;
•	Supporting the fight against economic/financial crime (capacity-building for law enforcement and judicial authorities, 
as well as specialised bodies such as anticorruption Commissions), as well as support to Justice and Security reforms 
(including police reform);
•	Supporting the civil society and media as watchdogs, as well as Supreme audit Institutions and Parliaments in exer-
cising their oversight and control functions.
98 See EuropeAid’s annual reports on http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/multimedia/publications/index_en.htm
99 http://www.oecd.org/document/18/0,3746,en_2649_3236398_35401554_1_1_1_1,00.html
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International initiatives have also an important potential to contribute to better governance and to address corruption chal-
lenges in developing countries. at the global level, the European Commission has therefore both established and is supporting 
global frameworks aiming at setting transparent systems for extracting and trading natural resources and raw materials, areas 
characterised by high risks for governance failure, corruption and mismanagement.
Many of the partner developing countries of the EU are suffering the devastation of their forest through illegal logging. their 
forests are destroyed, affecting the millions of people whose livelihood depends on the timber and non-timber products of the 
forests. Confl icts for the control of the illegal exploitation of the forests have not only led to massive human rights violation but 
also fuelled corruption in the affected countries. as a result, considerable amounts of public revenues are grabbed by criminal 
networks and rebel groups and are, therefore, diverted from the efforts aiming at reducing poverty. 
as explained above in more detail, in order to address this issue, the European Commission has adopted the Forest Law 
Enforcement, Governance and trade (FLEGt) action Plan in 2003100. 
Moreover, with the adoption of the 2010 due diligence initiative, timber importers who place timber and wood products onto 
the European market are prohibited from selling illegally harvested timber and timber products. 
the European Commission has endorsed and will continue to support the above-mentioned Extractive Industries transpar-
ency Initiative (EItI), which is a global standard promoting revenue transparency and domestic accountability in countries with 
rich oil, gas and mining sectors. 
the European Commission, representing the EU as a whole, participates to the Kimberley Process Certifi cation Scheme and 
has chaired the Kimberley Process (KP) in 2007. the Commission is part of the KP Monitoring Working Group that supervises 
KPCS implementation globally. 
100 See point 1.5.3 of the Concept Paper
as an example, is the support to the law Enforcement against Economic and Financial crime project in nigeria 
implemented by UNOdC. the project aimed at enhancing good governance and fi nancial accountability, fi ght fraud and economic 
and fi nancial crime by enhancing the technical and operational capacities of the Economic and Financial Crime Commission (EFCC), 
the Nigerian Financial Intelligence Unit (NFIU) and the Judiciary. the project focused on four result areas:
Provision of state of art It Equipment for EFCC and NFIU; 
training of the staff;
awareness campaigns aimed at specifi c groups (banking sector, public, media); 
Support and capacity building of the Judiciary in 10 states in judicial integrity and in the trial of economic and fi nancial crimes.
the project, which was funded under the 9th EdF has contributed signifi cantly to the successes recorded by the Economic and 
Financial Crimes Commission in recent years. Stolen assets worth than more US$10 billion have been recovered and there has 
been a large number of arrests and prosecutions. Nigeria is no longer considered as a «non cooperative nation» by the Financial 
action task Force of the OECd and is now part of the Egmont group. 
Under the 10th EdF, European Commission support is being extended to all other anti-corruption agencies. the objective is to 
contribute to Nigeria’s efforts in enhancing transparency, accountability and combating corruption. agencies such the Economic 
and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), Independent Corrupt Practices (and Other Related Offences) Commission (ICPC) as 
well as the Offi ce of the auditor General will benefi t from these interventions. NGOs working with anti-corruption advocacy will also 
be targeted. Stakeholders involved directly or indirectly in procurement issues will also benefi t from the project. this project is built 
on the successful experience of the previous support under the 9th EdF to the government in the same area. 
another example of one of the areas of intervention consists in the supports provided in several countries to transparency 
International advocacy and legal advise centres (alacs). the purpose of the aLaCs is to empower citizens to make 
and pursue corruption related complaints by providing legal advice and assistance to victims or witnesses of corruption. Using 
information gained from the individual cases and refl ecting the real experiences of people enhances the legitimacy of advocacy 
campaigns: many changes have been initiated by aLaCs, including for example the introduction of whistleblower laws, new admi-
nistrative procedures for inspections and licenses, landmark decisions concerning the application of access to information laws. 
this bottom up approach, aiming at supporting citizens in the daily challenges posed by corruption and leading to systemic changes 
is an effective way of addressing corruption. the Commission notably supports transparency International National Chapters (NCs) 
in Cameroon, Madagascar, Mauritius, Niger and Senegal for creating an aLaC in each of these countries in view of contributing 
to a sustainable socio-economic development in these countries by empowering citizens, civil society and institutions to fi ght 
against corruption.
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the European Commission encourages and supports the effective implementation of the United Nations Convention 
against Corruption (UNCaC) and other regional anti-corruption conventions. the UN convention may provide a promising 
platform for multi-actors dialogue on corruption at country level on concrete set of measures for preventing and criminal-
izing corruption, as well as raising awareness among citizens, notably on the basis of its review mechanism. the European 
Commission promotes a multi-stakeholders dialogue around core issues related to the implementation of UNCaC, starting 
from the country reviews which should include strong Civil Society involvement, country visits and publication of accurate 
review fi ndings. the review mechanism will facilitate effective implementation of the Convention, will identify successes 
and challenges in this implementation, will promote and strengthen international cooperation and will identify technical 
assistance needs of developing countries.
how do we cooperate with other actors?
For performing an effective anti-corruption work, the European Commission is convinced that it cannot work in isolation, but has 
to create strong partnerships with other donors and stakeholders. Several areas of cooperation have been initiated.
1. Analysing corruption and monitoring anti-corruption reforms: 
the GatEway project: analysing corruption is key for identifying clear entry points for the external assistance. In that framework, 
the European Commission is part of a joint initiative with transparency International, the UNdP and other stakeholders (such as the 
London School of Economics) aiming at making a more effi cient use of existing corruption assessment and integrity measurement 
tools (see Chapter 3 for further information).
2. Analysing the effectiveness of Anti-Corruption Agencies (ACAs):
the European Commission has supported several anti-corruption commission/agencies (Nigeria, Uganda, tanzania, Burundi, domi-
nican Republic, Indonesia) sometimes with relatively mixed results. In view of developing clear guidance for improving the design 
and the implementation of forthcoming operations, the European Commission has initiated a cooperation with the anti-Corruption 
thematic Group (aCtG) at the World Bank, the United Nation Offi ce of drugs and Crime (UNOdC) and the US State department, 
by supporting a new initiative aimed at reducing and preventing corruption through institutional strengthening of national anti-cor-
ruption authorities (aCas) and building their capacity. the objective of this activity is to better understand the institutional structure 
of individual aCas in an attempt to support their efforts more effectively in the future. this exercise will also provide important 
information on the form and the structure of aCas in order to help and guide other aCas facing similar challenges, improve their 
effectiveness, and guide other donors and practitioners for supporting their work. 
Following the organization of a global seminar in March 2010 in Washington gathering an important number of anticorruption 
authorities representatives, diagnostic questionnaires have been designed, and disseminated to aCas, they have been analyzed 
and several case studies have been undertaken (Ethiopia).
3. OECD/DAC - Anti-Corruption task Team:
the European Commission is also participating to the task team on anti-corruption set up in the context of the OECd/daC, where 
important discussions are taking place on: (i) joint orientations for providing technical assistance for UNCaC implementation, (ii) 
integrating anti-money laundering in development assistance and the role of donors in monitoring the accra agenda for action 
commitments on asset recovery, and (iii) identifying the ways to address international drivers of corruption at country level. 
4. International Organisation of Supreme Audit Institutions INTOSAI(a) – donor community cooperation:
On 20 October 2009 in Brussels the European Commission, together with austria, Belgium, Canada, Ireland, the Netherlands, 
Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK, the USa, the african development Bank, the Inter-american development Bank, the IMF, 
the WB, and INtOSaI offi cially signed the Memorandum of Understanding launching a new global strategic initiative on capacity 
development of Supreme audit Institutions (SaIs) in aid recipient countries. 
the Memorandum of Understanding is a milestone agreement marking the willingness of all parties to work together in a coordina-
ted manner to support the development of capacities of SaIs. It is consistent with the international principles on aid effectiveness 
expressed by the Paris declaration and the accra agenda for action. 
the new global strategic initiative will allow all the parties to work in a more coordinated way, to avoid overlaps in both action and 
funding, and to make better use of fi nancial and human resources. 
(a) INTOSAI is the International Organisation of Supreme Audit Institutions, an autonomous non-governmental organisation of 189 members. 
Founded in 1953, it provides an institutionalised framework to promote exchange of knowledge and enhance professional capacities of member 
SAIs in their respective countries. INTOSAI enjoys a special consultative status with the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) of the United 
Nations.
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1.3 Concluding remarks:
the European Commission is well aware of the need to go beyond controls and to adopt a larger framework enabling the 
promotion of good governance, to fight corruption in order to achieve sustainable results in terms of poverty reduction. 
Corruption should not be addressed in isolation but integrated in strategies to support democratic governance reform 
processes. Policy documents and concrete tools and financial instruments have been developed in the past five years 
to provide incentives and assist partner countries in advancing on governance reforms.
Improved governance and fight against corruption have to be implemented through the consolidation of State capacities 
to exercise its functions and to ensure effective service delivery to all its citizens. But it also implies the strengthening of 
other governance actors, both from the public sphere and from civil society to ensure better accountability and trans-
parency of the State towards its citizens.
Progress registered in governance reforms over the last years have shown that to be effective governance improvements 
are achievable through a combination of initiatives and actions at local, national and international levels.
at country level, positive results of external assistance are often grounded in initiatives driven by local change agents 
who are able, with some assistance, to sustain a reform agenda and instigate institutional changes for sustainable 
improvements.
a the same time, national governance reforms can be greatly stimulated and facilitated by targeted international initiatives 
where the responsibility for improving governance lays on both the «supplier» and the «consumer» of critical commodities 
and products. these international initiatives must be therefore further strengthened.
Existing regional and international legal instruments on anti corruption also provide a very comprehensive framework 
for effective anti corruption strategies: the challenge lies in their transposition in the national systems. the European 
Commission needs to further increase its efforts to assist willing countries in their implementation.
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cHapTer THree: assessIng corrupTIon 
and MonITorIng anTI-corrupTIon
assessing corruption or monitoring anti-corruption efforts can help mitigate risks inherent in development programmes and 
projects. these are the risk of misuse of funds (fi duciary risk); the risk that corruption will undermine donor country citizen 
support to aid (reputational risk); and the risk that corruption will undermine the development objectives of programmes or 
projects (development risk). assessing corruption and monitoring anti-corruption reforms is therefore a key step and a building 
block for both orienting the European Union political dialogue with partner countries, European Commission’s policy dialogue 
and designing relevant measures to be integrated in EU development cooperation both related to the reform of core govern-
ance systems and to sector level reforms.
Over time the application of corruption assessments has evolved. In the 1990s there was a proliferation of cross-country indices, 
including assessments of corruption such as transparency International’s (tI’s) Corruption Perception Index (CPI) and the World 
Bank’s Governance Indicators (WBGI). the CPI and WGBI have been important for putting corruption on the agenda of global 
policy-makers101. By the early 2000s, the fi ght against corruption was established as a priority for the public and private sectors, 
but this led to a clear need for assessment tools to show changes over time as well as to compare countries with each other. a 
‘second-generation’ of tools was subsequently developed. this includes tools that measure the actual experiences of people 
in addition to their perceptions (e.g. tI’s Global Corruption Barometer102), and other tools that assess anti-corruption systems, 
standards and practices (e.g. the World Bank Public Expenditure and Financial accountability (PEFa) Framework103).
these second generation tools expanded and developed over time to what could be called ‘third generation’ tools. these 
third generation tools go beyond their predecessors to provide a more nuanced assessment of corruption issues in specifi c 
contexts. For example, the World Bank’s actionable Governance Indicators104 assess governance, but are also specifi cally 
designed to give greater clarity regarding the steps governments can take to improve governance and, as a consequence, 
improve their ratings.
as a result of these developments there has been a proliferation of governance tools and indicators (see Figure 2). there are 
many tools for governance assessment but this chapter focuses on corruption tools.  105
101 Heinrich, F. and Hodess, R., 2011, ‘Measuring Corruption’, in Graycar, A. and Smith, R. (eds), 
‘Handbook of Global Research in Corruption’, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
102 http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/gcb
103 http://www.pefa.org
104 http://go.worldbank.org/BN5GB74IV0
105 http://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNCAC/WorkingGroups/workinggroup4/2010-December-13-15/
Presentations/Anga_Timilsina_-_UNDP_AC_measurement_Dec14_2010.pdf
Figure 2: The mushrooming of indicators105 
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to assist governance and development practitioners, as well as sector experts, in their task of public policy reform and 
evidence-based advocacy the European Commission became part of a joint initiative with transparency International, 
the UNdP, the World Bank and other stakeholders (notably research centres in Europe and in developing countries). 
this initiative, known as the GatEway project, aims to make more effi cient use of existing corruption assessment and 
integrity measurement tools that target both global indexes and sector related tools. the GatEway106 project involves 
mapping, codifying and clustering existing tools, and providing tool users with guidance on the strengths and weak-
nesses of the different assessment approaches. this information will be made available through an online web platform 
to be launched in late 2011.
the third chapter of this concept paper provides initial orientations and guidance on the key issues and challenges 
to have in mind when seeking effective assessments of corruption or anti-corruption efforts. It also proposes a set 
of practical steps for organising this kind of analysis, while the GatEway project will provide targeted orientations on 
sector (such as education, health, water and sanitation, justice) and process (such as political parties fi nancing, public 
procurement, budget monitoring) related analysis.
Section 1: Introduction
Measuring corruption is a challenging process. as Chapter One shows, corruption is highly variable and dependent on 
context. It can only be measured indirectly and requires nuanced and tailored measurements. Finding an appropriate 
measure has been diffi cult in the past, but over the last decade there has been a substantial growth of governance 
indicators, some of which are focused explicitly on corruption.
this chapter seeks to guide the EU staff through the range of tools and instruments available for assessing levels of cor-
ruption and monitoring anti-corruption. It highlights the key questions users must ask when designing an assessment:
•	What is the particular purpose of the assessment (e.g. awareness raising, coalition-building, programme failure)?
•	What is the level or focal point of the analysis (e.g. at the sector level, focusing on an organisation, at the national level)?
•	What data is most suited (e.g. desk-studies, interviews, surveys)?
thinking through these questions allows users to fi nd an assessment tool that meets their objectives and is suitable for 
their context. there is currently a wide range of users of corruption and broader governance indicators:
•	Development agencies and practitioners: Used in country strategy documents, supporting analysis (e.g. Gov-
ernance Profi les), to determine aid allocation and to a lesser extent donor accountability, managing for results and 
demonstrating value for money to taxpayers. they have been used as a tool for policy dialogue with governments 
and are increasingly included in budget support performance assessment frameworks, including their use as dis-
bursement triggers.
•	Governments and civil society: Used in monitoring frameworks for national poverty reduction strategies, reform 
programmes, and by some countries to demonstrate reform with a view to improving their international rankings.
•	Academics and researchers: Used to explore the determinants and development consequences of good govern-
ance.
•	 International advocacy and human rights organisations: Used to spur public interest and to apply pressure on 
governments.
•	Media: Used as easily communicable ratings.
•	 International investors: Used to assess political risks and the costs of doing business, including the impacts of 
regulatory measures and corruption.
different users have different objectives based on their organisations, task mandates, and objectives. With this growth 
of users there has also been a growth in the number of purposes for corruption assessments. Over time the application 
of corruption assessments has evolved from using corruption assessments primarily to help promote the fi ght against 
corruption, to using them to compare levels of corruption over time and space, to using them to provide a comprehensive 
and nuanced assessment of corruption issues in a specifi c context107. 
106 http://www.transparency.org/tools/gateway
107 Heinrich, F. and Hodess, R., 2011, ‘Measuring Corruption’, in Graycar, A. and Smith, R. (eds), 
‘Handbook of Global Research in Corruption’, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
Key points:
•	 Each corruption assessment has unique factors. 
•	 there are a variety  of corruption tools, each suited for a different context.
•	 Choose the purpose, focus and the most-suited data sources to identify the appropriate tool for the specifi c context.
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this can notably be demonstrated by the three tools: the transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index 
(CPI), the transparency International Global Corruption Barometer (GCB) and the World Bank actionable Governance 
Indicators (aGI). 
the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) fi rst released in 1995, is arguably the best known corruption tool. It ranks 
countries by their perceived levels of corruption, as determined by (predominately foreign) expert assessments and 
opinion surveys. It has been used to raise awareness of corruption and highlight it as a factor detrimental to develop-
ment. the Global Corruption Barometer (GCB) is a public opinion survey that assesses how corruption is viewed at a 
national level and includes people’s experience of corruption in the past year. this inclusion would allow it to be more 
responsive when used to assess changes in country corruption over time. the actionable Governance Indicators (aGI) 
developed from 2007 aim to provide information on the discrete elements of governance reforms. they provide greater 
clarity regarding the steps governments can take to improve their scores on an indicator, i.e. if the government suc-
cessfully undertakes reforms in certain areas, relevant indicator(s) will respond in a favourable direction. Policy-makers 
increasingly turn to corruption assessments to identify where action can be taken to combat corruption. the actionable 
Governance Indicators (aGI) is an example of a tool that does just this. as opposed to the wider corruption or govern-
ance indicators ‘actionable’ indicators aims to drill down to specifi c governance elements to identify opportunities for 
reform. For example, human development aGIs related to education include absenteeism, time on task, under the table 
payments, and completion rates108. 
It would be better to use indicators which not only highlight opportunities but guide policy-makers towards the most 
worthwhile reforms - what can be termed as ‘action-worthy’ indicators. an example of an actionable but not neces-
sarily action-worthy indicator could be whether or not a country has an independent anti-corruption agency (aCa). If it 
did not, an aCa could be created, but this might not be the best use of resources if the institutional climate is likely to 
hinder the independence of any aCa. although ‘actionable’, this indicator on its own is not guaranteed to help reduce 
corruption109. Whether an indicator is action-worthy would depend very much on the context, something that is more 
likely to come through if used in conjunction with political economy analysis (PEa).
When designing corruption measures it is therefore important that the tools and indicators used are fi t for the purpose 
for which they are intended.
Section 2: Purpose
there are now a large number of tools and indicators available for corruption assessment. though many of them have 
similar names, they often have distinctly different purposes. Clearly identifying the purpose or objective of the assess-
ment is a crucial fi rst step to preparing an assessment. Common purposes include:
•	Diagnosis: to determine the drivers of corruption and the blockages to reform.
•	Early-warning: to identify areas and individuals vulnerable to corruption.
•	awareness-raising: to improve common understanding of the effect of corruption on development and promote 
fi ghting corruption as a priority of development programmes (see Box 14 below).
•	Coalition-building: to build consensus and to strengthen and sustain political will for governance reform.
•	Monitoring: to evaluate progress of anti-corruption programmes and projects.
•	Research guidance: to identify areas to focus on for research.
•	Political and policy dialogue: to promote policy dialogue in relation to corruption and wider governance issues.
•	Fiduciary risk: to assess the risk that funds are not used for the intended purposes; do not achieve value for money; 
and/or are not properly accounted for.
•	Programme failure: to identify whether corruption has been a contributory factor to programme failure.
108 http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTPUBLICSECTORANDGOVERNANCE/Resources/286304-1235411288968/
fULLvERSION.pdf?resourceurlname=fULLvERSION.pdf It should be noted that the AGIs are not the only source of actionable 
indicators, and there is a great deal of information that may already be produced locally that could guide policy.
109 http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWBIGOVANTCOR/
Resources/1740479-1149112210081/2604389-1167941884942/On_Measuring_Governance.pdf .
Key points:
•	 different corruption assessments serve different objectives or purposes. 
•	 Certain tools respond to specifi c purposes better than other.
•	 tools, especially some of the most popular tools, are suited to raising awareness of corruption but not to guiding policy-
makers on suitable reform.
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For EU and other donor staff, likely purposes for this sort of assessment include political reporting, risk analysis linked 
to budget support, specifi c corruption assessment linked to sector reform (including both policy dialogue and design of 
operations) and monitoring trends in democratic and economic governance reforms and so on. 
When defi ning the purpose another aspect to consider is the area of focus (illustrated by Figure 3). In particular, is the 
area ‘corruption’ or ‘anti-corruption’? Measuring corruption is based on perceptions and experiences of the general 
population, public sector, private sector, and/or experts. anti-corruption or integrity assessment is based on compliance 
monitoring of local, national or international policies and conventions, as well as diagnostic assessments of institutions, 
processes, sectors and/or at the local level. there may also be a need to focus on a particular sector, such as the public 
sector, or a specifi c institution. 
box 14: transparency International’s corruption perceptions Index (cpI) 
the transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) was launched in 1995 and aims every year to rank almost 
200 countries by their perceived levels of corruption. It is a ‘survey of surveys’, bringing together expert assessments and opi-
nion surveys from around the world into a composite index. In 2010, denmark, New Zealand and Singapore topped the chart, 
with a score of 9.3 each, while Somalia was ranked the most corrupt country in the world, according to perceptions, at 1.1.
as transparency International point out, the CPI ‘has been widely credited with putting the issue of corruption on the international 
policy agenda’1.  It is an extremely helpful tool for awareness raising, at both national and international levels, and shifts either 
up or down the Index offer real opportunities for opening policy dialogue with partner countries. Put simply, governments do not 
like to see their countries rank badly on the CPI, as they know it will adversely affect their image globally. Businesses, donors, 
neighbours and citizens all pay attention to the CPI.
What the CPI is not, however, is a tool that measures corruption levels. It only measures perceptions, mainly of international 
business people, and so may be subject to signifi cant bias. although it can tell us an interesting story about how countries 
compare in term of perceived corruption levels, it tells us nothing about levels of corruption at the sub-national or sector level. It 
is not ‘hard’ empirical data, and some critics argue against evidential data on which the index is based is often scant for some 
countries, making them problematic to rank2.  Even if one were to see the tI-CPI as ‘hard data’, it does not rigorously analyse 
whether the difference in ranking between countries is statistically signifi cant. 
In short, the CPI is an advocacy tool par excellence, but should not be relied upon as a tool for measuring corruption, certainly 
not in isolation.
1 Transparency International, 2011,  Corruption Perceptions Index, See http://transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi 
2  See Andersson, S. and Heywood, P. (2009) The politics of perception: use and abuse of Transparency International’s approach to 
measuring corruption. I, 57(4): 746-67, and Sampford, C., Shacklock, A., Connors, C. and Galtung, F. (Eds) (2006) Measuring Corruption. 
Aldershot: Ashgate
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Section 3: Level
there are different levels at which the assessment could focus for which different tools would be appropriate. there is 
signifi cant overlap between levels (e.g. Global Integrity can be multi-country, supranational and multi-level). Levels can 
be defi ned as following:
•	Supranational: Extending beyond or transcending national boundaries (e.g. Corruption Monitoring System (CMS) 
of the Center for the Study of democracy110)
•	Multi-country: Covering a number of different countries (e.g. Global Integrity Index111). there are a number of meth-
odologies for multi-country assessments.
•	National: Focusing on aspects within an individual country (e.g. National Integrity System112). In many cases tools 
have been tailored for a specifi c country context. (See section fi ve :National Level tools)
•	Sub-national: Focusing on local governance dynamics (e.g. Good Governance for Local development: GOFOR-
GOLd Index113)
•	Sectoral: Focusing on a specifi c sector such as service delivery sectors (e.g. National Health accounts114). In some 
cases it has been necessary to create new sectoral tool specifi c tot that context. (See section fi ve: Sector and Prob-
lem Level tools)
•	Organisational: Focusing on a particular department, ministry or institution.
110 http://www.csd.bg/artShow.php?id=15531
111 http://report.globalintegrity.org/globalIndex.cfm
112 http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/nis
113 http://www.gaportal.org/tools/good-governance-local-development-%E2%80%93-goforgold-index
114 http://www.who.int/nha/en/
Figure 3: Taxonomy of corruption tools
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Key points:
•	 tools can address different levels: supranational, multi-country, national, sub-national, sectoral, organisational, and multi-level.
•	 Corruption assessments at one level may not be generalisable.
•	 assessments will vary signifi cantly depending on which levels are included in the assessment.
C h a p T e R  T h R e e :  a s s e s s i n g  C o R R u p T i o n  a n d  m o n i T o R i n g  a n T i - C o R R u p T i o n
49
•	Multi-level: Focusing on several levels (e.g. Bertelsmann transformation Index115). this can be, for example, a focus 
at the national, sub-national and supra-national level.
Levels of corruption and perceptions of corruption can vary signifi cantly between levels. a corruption assessment with a 
focus or emphasis on a particular level may not be generalisable. this is especially the case in relation to the public and 
private sector where inclusion or exclusion of the private sector perceptions in an assessment can signifi cantly affect 
the results (see Figure 4 in 2007 below).
Section 4: Data collection method
Good data is essential for a good assessment. However, corruption as an illicit activity is often intentionally obscured 
making it hard to obtain good data. Furthermore in developing countries there may not be the capacity to gather relevant 
data. Corruption assessments are designed to make assessments based on the limited data but the choice of data 
source ultimately affects the outcome.
4.1 How is the information gathered?
assessments on anti-corruption are determined by what data is collected, how it is collected and by whom. the choice 
and method of data collection has profound impacts on the results. Figure 4 demonstrates how three different types of 
assessment of China, thailand and India produced markedly different rankings, attributable to differences in the data 
used. the World Bank Control of Corruption assesses corruption in the public and private sector as perceived by experts 
and opinion polls; the transparency International Corruptions Perception Index (CPI) assesses corruption in the public 
sector as perceived by experts (notably foreign experts); the Global Integrity Index assesses the existence, effectiveness 
and citizen access to anti-corruption mechanisms, assessed by national experts. 
the World Bank Control of Corruption and the transparency International Corruptions Perception Index (CPI) also show differ-
ent trends of corruption over time with China showing improvement between 2004 and 2006 with Control of Corruption and 
worsening with the CPI (see Figure 5).
115 http://www.bertelsmann-transformation-index.de/en/bti/
Key points:
•	 type and source of data collected for assessment profoundly impacts the results. 
•	 It is important to understand what makes up an indicator.
•	 Perception data and tools based on perception data must be interpreted in context.
Figure 4: Comparison between three types of assessments in 2007
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Other factors affect the quality of data collected. Integrity and independence are important criteria for those collecting 
data – those reporting on cases of corruption need to have confi dence and trust in them. those gathering data or the 
organisations they represent may have values and beliefs that bias the way in which data is gathered. there may be 
language, cultural or geographical barriers or resource limitations. those designated experts will have differing opinions 
depending on whether they are from the country in question or foreign experts. It is important that those collecting data 
ensure that it is secure and that there is an appropriate degree of confi dentiality.
Various methods and combinations of methods can be employed to gather information. the main methods are:
•	Desk-study: this method can be used to identify de jure provisions in constitutions or legislation as well as reports 
on observed corrupt practices or anti-corruption measures. this method is ultimately dependent on the quality of the 
information available.
•	 Interviews: Interviewers should be well-trained, have a good understanding of the data and be able to elicit insightful 
responses from interviewees.
•	Focus groups: this is a participatory approach, often involving open questions and free thinking, where a high level 
of trust among participants is desirable.
•	Surveys, either postal survey or Internet: Postal surveys can be effective on areas with a literate target popula-
tion and a working postal system. Internet surveys can be used where there is a literate target population who have 
access and inclination to respond by internet.
•	Expert coding of narrative reports: academics or other experts can be employed to go through narrative reports, 
identify incidents of corruption (or anti-corruption efforts) and code them accordingly.
4.2 What types of data can we get? 
anti-corruption tools and indicators employ one of the following types of data:
•	Objective: these are indisputable facts such as written provisions, policy measures or reports from established bod-
ies such as the auditor General or Public accounts Committee.
•	Perception: these are based on the views and opinions of people either resident in the area or outside of it. they 
are usually collected through surveys, but can also be collected through interviews and focus group discussions. 
•	Composite indicators: this is a mixture of objective and/or perception measures to produce a single measure.
the different types of data have varying advantages and disadvantages. In relation to perception data, those outside of the area 
may have strongly differing views to those in within it. this can be due to differing norms and standards of conduct. Indicators, 
and especially anti-corruption indicators, have underlying normative assumptions that are important to take into account. 
Perception data may be most valuable where objective measures are weak or non-existent. However perception data 
is prone to bias and will not necessarily be a true refl ection of reality. there are time lags, with perceptions often slow to 
change following improvements in (or worsening of) governance. Some environments stifl e dissent or contain a culture 
reluctant to air criticisms or negative opinions. alternatively an increased awareness of corruption following a recent or 
well-publicised series of incidents of corruption may mean more acts are classifi ed as corruption, building a strong but 
false sense of corruption. Better enforcement of anti-corruption measures means that more cases of corruption are 
Figure 5: Comparison between two different assessments over time
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disclosed, and can therefore lead to perceptions that corruption has increased. a high-profi le anti-corruption drive may 
increase the perception of corruption just when corruption is actually starting to be effectively combated. Other social 
factors not related to corruption, per see, can also affect perceptions. For example, when measuring victimisation due 
to corruption, respondents to surveys are more likely to perceive corruption when they tend to feel unsafe and have 
been victims of other offences. Perception data must thus be interpreted in respect to the context.
Some indicators are effectively proxy measures for aspects of corruption diffi cult or impossible to measure. Proxy 
measures use much more indirect ‘signals’ of corruption or measure anti-corruption processes or institutions. the link 
between proxy measures and what they purport to measure can be contestable. For example, the number of corruption 
cases brought to trial over a given period is a common proxy indicator. an increase in this number may indicate progress 
in combating corruption or it could instead indicate the opposite – a greater incidence of corruption. Proxies may not 
behave in a similar fashion to the target issue and respond differently to anti-corruption programming.
a growing area of research that may help us in better understanding why some anti-corruption efforts fail while others 
succeed focuses on attitudes towards corruption. attitudes are different from perceptions; attitudes are internal to a 
respondent (e.g., ‘this is how I feel about corruption’), whereas perceptions are external (e.g., ‘this is how I feel about 
everyone else’s corruption’). as such, attitudes have the potential to tell us a great deal about where societal pressure 
for anti-corruption is likely to come from, or why there is not the societal pressure we might expect. 116
Methods used in analysis on attitudes towards corruption tend to be qualitative, involving one-on-one interviews and 
focus group discussions. these can be done at any level – national, local, sectoral and so on – and can be designed 
in a way that allows for cross-national comparison. 
116 Not only are attitudes not the same thing as perceptions, respondents’ own attitudes affect the way they respond to 
survey questions regarding perceptions. This should be taken into account when looking at survey data.
box 15: attitudes towards corruption at the country level: some examples  
two examples are provided here to demonstrate how this research can be used to inform better programme or project design. the 
fi rst is by Giorgio Blundo and Jean-Pierre Olivier de Sardan, who undertook an ethnographic study in Francophone West africa 
looking at the interaction between service providers and users. although the participants were not asked directly about corruption, 
the issue came up very strongly through the analysis and relates to the degrees of legitimacy for particular corrupt acts. these vary 
from ‘tributes or tolls’, such as extortion or police road blocks, for example, which are widely seen as illegitimate, to ‘commission’ 
for illicit services, where participants were highly ambivalent, to ‘string-pulling’, favours and nepotism, which participants felt were 
legitimate acts.  
One policy implication of this is that programmes and projects that seek to eliminate corrupt activities that a majority of citizens 
feel are legitimate or are ambivalent towards are very likely to be hard to push through. Using citizen intolerance as an entry point 
could prove to be much more effective; in other words, focusing resources on combating an activity that everyone condemns 
– police roadblocks, for example – is likely to fi nd more support and thus be more successful. It is possible that winning an 
easier success may also build greater support for combating other types of corrupt activities, moving up to behaviours that 
may be largely tolerated and then fi nally move on to those that are seen by society as being legitimate (e.g., non-meritocratic 
recruitment in the public sector).   
the second is by Heather Marquette, Vinod Pavarala and antonia Simbine, who used interviews and focus group discussions to 
assess the relationship between religion and attitudes towards corruption in India and Nigeria. Both countries rank very high in 
the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) and also rank very high in measures of religiosity, and it has been suggested that religion 
and religious organisations may have a role to play in anti-corruption work in both countries. However, evidence from their study 
suggests that although participants without exception strongly condemned the corruption they saw around them, there was a 
strong tendency to explain away their own behaviour. In both countries, participants saw religious organisations as being part of 
the problem, rather than the solution, due to high levels of corruption within organisations. Indeed, one participant said that, ‘We 
make God a stakeholder in corruption’. However, most participants also believed that religious organisations should play a role. 
One policy implication from this study is that religious organisations can only play this role if they are trusted; however, trust 
is low in both countries, including trust in religious leaders and organisations. Even if religious leaders and organisations are 
trusted (and some are, of course), religion is typically understood to be good at building inter-group trust, not intra-group trust. 
In countries like India and Nigeria, where religious confl ict is a signifi cant problem, care must be taken that religious messages 
on corruption do not create (further) divisions between adherents of different religions. Rather than encouraging or supporting 
individual leaders or religious organisations, support would be best targeted at inter-faith initiatives where the risks of unintended 
consequences (i.e., creating even more religious confl ict) are lower.
1 Blundo, G. & Olivier de Sardan, J-P. 2006. Everyday Corruption and the State: Citizens and Public Offi cials in Africa, London: Zed Books. 
2  Marquette, H. 2011 (forthcoming). Religion and Attitudes towards Corruption in India and Nigeria, RaD Working Paper, available at www.rad.
bham.ac.uk (see the website for further working papers and policy briefs). 
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4.3 Data sources
anti-corruption tools and indicators are based on four types of data, which themselves are based upon first-hand 
knowledge or direct experience. these are:
•	Written de jure provisions: these include standards, codes and treaties such as the UNCaC, IMF codes on fiscal 
transparency and national legislation.
•	Event reports: these are reports or recordings of events which account incidents of corruption or demonstrations of 
system integrity. these can be from media sources, non-governmental organisations, as well as watchdog organisa-
tions such as anti-corruption agencies or supreme audit institutions.
•	Narrative reports: these are reports produced by observers and researchers such as international organisations, 
government departments or companies.
•	Surveys: these can be disseminated via the internet, the post or through interviewers. 
In addition to these first-hand or primary sources there are other secondary sources such as:
•	National Audit / Auditor-General reports: analyses of the financial conduct of other government departments, 
agencies or public bodies usually carried out by a notionally autonomous government body. 
•	Public Anti-Corruption Agency/Commission reports: Reports by bodies established to investigate incidents of 
corruption.
•	Political economy analyses: analyses of country context to identify factors and dynamics that influence governance 
and would impact upon governance reform.
•	 Integrity assessments: Evaluations of a country’s safeguards against corruption based, in part, through a review of 
laws, policies and existing research studies.
•	Academic studies: Work undertaken by academic researchers, often synthesising primary sources. 
•	External risk assessments: assessments produced primarily for foreign actors, such as investors and companies, 
usually based on written material, media reports and local informants.
the choice of data source can have an impact on relations between the assessor and the assessed. Engaging with 
the country under review and incorporating locally-produced documentation can help build capacity and support local 
review processes. In fact, analysing national legislation and using auditor general and anti-corruption agency reports 
might provide more legitimacy as a basis of dialogue with partner country authorities than externally produced reports. 
Results of widely available and well known surveys (even if done by external actors) might also represent very good 
entry points for discussions, notably if they are used by local media. again, this highlights the need to think about how 
different data sources, including political economy analysis (PEa), can be combined in order to produce the best result.
4.4 Challenges of anti-corruption tools and indicators 
though governance indicators are widely used, in many cases it seems users do not grasp their strengths, limitations, 
and possible alternatives. No single source of data or tool will offer a definitive measurement and an accurate and valu-
able assessment depends on an understanding of the various tools and indicators and tailoring them to the context. 
Users should be aware of the areas of confusion and the limitations and pitfalls of tools and indicators.
Avoid only using the popular but inappropriate indicators (especially to guide reform): Following the launch of 
the UN’s Human development Index in 1990 there was a proliferation of cross-country indices on a range of political, 
social and economic issues. the transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index, which started in 1994, and 
the World Bank’s Governance Indicators (WBGI), which started in 1996, became the most noted indices on corrup-
tion. these two indicators are based on perception data and though such data correlates well with experience data 
from newer indices117, the CPI and WBGI are less useful in programmes and projects than newer, more focused tools. 
Perception data, being slow to change, will not be sufficiently responsive to efforts to fight corruption. the CPI and WGI 
can tell us very little about corruption within a country. as such, they may be useful in political dialogue or in advocacy 
but do not provide appropriate data for national or sectoral level planning. appropriate assessment tools for program-
ming should provide a comprehensive and nuanced assessment of a specific corruption issue in that specific context. 
despite this, there continues to be an over-reliance on a small number of the available indicators such as the CPI and 
WBGI118, most likely due to lack of user familiarity with other tools. 
Be aware what makes up an indicator: Some contend that governance indicators do not, in fact, measure the 
governance aspects they claim to119. Some120 criticise the widely-used World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators, 
117 Heinrich, F. and Hodess, R., 2011, ‘Measuring Corruption’, in Graycar, A. and Smith, R. (eds), 
‘Handbook of Global Research in Corruption’, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
118 Arndt C., 2008, ‘The Politics of Governance Ratings’, International Public Management Journal, vol. 11, no. 3, pp 275 – 297.
119 Thomas, M.A. 2007. “What do the Worldwide Governance Indicators measure?”, Working Paper, Johns Hopkins University.
120 Iqbal, K. and Shah, A., 2008, ‘How Do Worldwide Governance Indicators Measure Up?’, World Bank
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arguing that it lacks a conceptual framework of governance, are biased towards Western business perspectives, ignore 
citizens’ evaluations and should not be used for comparisons between countries and over time. Many tools are based on 
aggregates of large datasets which when aggregated can produce markedly different conclusions than based on more 
specific data or differing methodologies. Margins of error in assessment must be taken into account; countries that seem 
to have progressed or worsened in rankings in comparison to other countries may not have done upon closer inspection.
Do not try to reduce the unquantifiable to numbers: as albert Einstein put it ‘Not everything that can be counted 
counts, and not everything that counts can be counted’. Essentially, not everything can be reduced to numerical val-
ues and that which can be measured numerically may not be the most crucial information. Contextual and qualitative 
information is often necessary to supplement quantitative assessment data and provide a true picture of corruption or 
progress of anti-corruption reforms. 
When required choose indicators that are designed to guide policy: assessments may identify weaknesses in 
governance systems that give rise to corruption but do not give any indication for what can or should be done to resolve 
these weaknesses. the most effective assessments would provide information that would guide policy-makers as to 
where to act – i.e., ‘actionable’ indicators – and to suggest which changes would most improve governance weak-
nesses – i.e., ‘action-worthy’.
Ensure input and output indicators complement each other: Input indicators relate to the existence and quality of 
institutions, rules and procedures. Output or outcome indicators are the results or behaviour of these institutions, rules 
and procedures. In an assessment these should complement each other. For example, if the output indicator is transpar-
ency in local government operations a corresponding input indicator would be the existence of public fora for citizens 
to discuss their view with locally elected officials (UNdP, 2008121). another example would be an output indicator of 
perception of equal participation of women in all aspects of social and political life, and the corresponding input indicator 
could be percentage of journalists or civil servants who are women (ibid). By ensuring that input and output indicators 
assess the same issue and work in complement, the assessment conclusions would be more actionable and valid. 
Ensure you pay attention to the impact of corruption on disadvantaged and the most affected groups: Cor-
ruption affects different individuals in society in varying degrees. In particular the poor suffer disproportionately through 
forgoing income for bribes and through worsening service quality. also, women more often than men tend to be the 
victims of corruption. assessments need to be sensitive to the impacts on different groups and in particular be pro-
poor and gender sensitive. the indicators in the previous paragraph on complementary input and output indicators are 
examples of pro-poor and gender sensitive indicators selected from UNdP’s Framework for Selecting Pro-Poor and 
Gender Sensitive Indicators122.
When appropriate measure integrity rather than measuring corruption: as opposed to measuring corruption 
there are indicators that instead focus on the effectiveness of existing corruption safeguard mechanisms. For example, 
Global Integrity’s Integrity Indicators assess the strengths and weaknesses of countries’ public sector anti-corruption 
mechanisms by collecting data on the legal anti-corruption framework, as well as on its practical implementation. Integrity 
assessments are often more ‘actionable’ than corruption assessments as they identify weaknesses or opportunities for 
improvement within the existing mechanisms.
Take into account differences between de jure and de facto: a law may be established but this means little un-
less it is implemented. there are often discrepancies between formal policy statements and legislation, and observed 
practices. Changes in law or organisational reform, including the establishment of anti-corruption agencies, may not 
translate into impact on the ground. Consequently corruption assessments based excessively on formal statements 
may not capture real levels of anti-corruption efforts. Such discrepancies between reforms and reality can be due to the 
reforms being inappropriate, there being incentives that are perverse, lack of political will or a general lack of capacity 
to enact changes. Effective political economy analysis could provide useful insight to identify whether legal and organi-
sational reforms (de jure) are likely to lead to actual changes in behaviour (de facto).
Do not assume causation where there is only correlation: It is often difficult to attribute changes in corruption 
indicators to individual events or drivers. Various events or drivers may only be one of several factors which precipitate 
change in corruption and in corresponding indicators.
Be aware of data limitation: In many cases data may be lacking or unreliable. this is especially so in fragile or 
conflict-affected states. data insufficiency is an important constraint when undertaking assessments. data collection 
processes may have to be started from scratch and it may take time to produce comprehensive and reliable data from 
which conclusions can be drawn.
121 UNDP, 2008, ‘A User’s Guide to Measuring Corruption Guide’, UNDP Oslo Governance Centre.
122 UNDP, 2006, ‘Measuring Democratic Governance: A framework for selecting pro-poor and gender sensitive indicators’, UNDP.
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Section 5: Practical Steps
Corruption assessments can be quite straightforward. It is often not necessary to take extensive measures to undertake 
a corruption assessment since a wide range of resources may already be available. the following section proposes key 
steps, some of which users may have already carried out (i.e. Step 1) or will have been carried out (i.e. Step 3). these 
suggested steps are proposed for EU staff for programming and operation implementation as well as for facilitating 
reporting requirements and dialogue with partner countries.
Step 1: Understand the country political economy
assessments should take place with a sound understanding of the country’s political economy. a robust political 
economy analysis would help identify scope for change and to ensure that the areas assessed would be in control of 
policy-makers. Ultimately, assessments would be most valuable where intervention is possible. 
Essentially, political economy analysis is concerned with the interaction of political and economic processes in a society: 
the distribution of power and wealth between different groups and individuals, and the processes that create, sustain 
and transform these relationships over time. the idea behind this approach is that by basing country and sector strate-
gies, and programme design, implementation and monitoring on a clearer understanding of the political realities should 
result in greater development effectiveness. 
donors have developed a range of analytical tools to assess the political economy, including the department for In-
ternational development’s drivers of Change approach and the Strategic Governance and Corruption assessment 
(SGaCa), development by the Netherlands. the European Union has also developed an assessment framework, within 
their Programme and Project Cycle Management (PPCM) guidelines. 
the European Commission’s Programme and Project Cycle Management (PPCM) assessing the Country Context is 
designed to help EU delegations better understand the underlying factors that are shaping the incentives and behaviour 
of key stakeholders in partner countries. the aim is to make better-informed judgements about what kind of external 
interventions could best contribute to strengthening local incentives and capacity to improve development outcomes.
the methodology draws signifi cantly on the SGaCa approach (see Box 15), with some updating and a more operational 
focus. as with the SGaCa, the framework prompts the analyst to consider the dynamic interaction between three sets 
of factors through consideration of a number of broad questions on:
•	 Foundational Factors that fundamentally shape the broad characteristics of the state and political system, including 
the history of state formation, sources of revenue, the country’s geostrategic position, and embedded social and 
economic structures. Many will have very long-term origins, and will tend to change only slowly.
•	Rules of the game including formal and informal institutions of the state, civil society and the private sector that shape 
how power is shared and how relationships are managed. these institutions can be «sticky» (resistant to change), 
but can also change signifi cantly over the medium term, either through direct changes to formal rules or in response 
to more indirect pressures (for example, changes in global or regional markets) that change incentives and power 
relationships.
•	Here and Now covers both how political processes are playing out on a day-to-day basis («games within the rules»), 
and ways in which the current context and specifi c «events» shape these processes (for example an impending elec-
tion, an external security threat, a fi nancial crisis, or perhaps a natural disaster).
Following this analysis, the Framework guides thinking about the underlying factors supporting or impeding development 
in a particular country context; what local pressures exist to improve development outcomes; and the scope for effective 
external intervention. there is no direct read-across from analysis to programming: the development challenges revealed 
by political economy analysis may not be amenable to short-term, aid funded solutions. to be effective, delegations 
Key points:
step 1: Understand the country political economy by utilising existing analysis carried out by other donor partners or by com-
missioning a study.
step 2: Identify purpose, level and suitable data beforehand. different corruption assessments can serve different purposes or 
aide understanding of issues relevant to a specifi c sector or issue.  
step 3: Explore the range of tools and identify and adapt the most appropriate tools, if available.
It is important to try to ensure, where possible, consultation with stakeholders and policy dialogue to build informed, responsive, 
constructive and sustained relationships between European Union staff, government offi cials, development partners and non-
state actors.
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need to fi nd strategic ways to engage with the political economy factors at work in a specifi c country context over the 
medium term, with a view to supporting a progressive direction of change. Such strategies may involve indirect ways 
of shifting incentives of key actors, and encompass trade and diplomatic policies as well as aid.
Step 2: Identify purpose, level and suitable data
think through what the purpose of the assessment is and identify which level will be targeted. Choose the most ap-
propriate data sources, keeping in mind the environment in which the assessment will take place. the overall purpose 
of the assessment will help in identifying the level of analysis and type of data required (see Section 2). 
the purpose of the assessment may, for example, be to form the basis of decisions on budget support. as the Green 
Paper (2010) on EU Budget Support to third Countries suggests, following an analysis of the political economy, including 
government efforts to address identifi ed weaknesses and available domestic resources, the objectives of the coopera-
tion and the most appropriate aid can be decided accordingly123. 
a number of tools have been developed specifi cally to assess budget transparency and corruption reforms in order 
to give more confi dence to donors contributing funds to budget support. the Open Budget Survey (OBS) is one such 
tool and is based on a detailed questionnaire to collect data on the public availability of budget information and other 
accountable budgeting practices. this framework aims to: (i) assess and document the state of budget transparency 
and accountability; (ii) provide standards that governments can use as guides for improving their budget systems and 
processes, and (iii) establish benchmarks against which governments can measure their progress.
123 See: (http://ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/repository/green_paper_budget_support_third_countries_en.pdf)
box 16: the strategic corruption and governance assessment (sgaca)
this Framework was developed by the Clingendael Institute for the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign affairs and its Embassies. 
It was designed as a tool to build on and enhance previous efforts at analysing the governance climate in partner countries by 
facilitating a more strategic approach. the purpose of this work is to provide a basis on which Embassies can critically review 
country-level strategies and priorities, to see whether things could or should be done differently, or whether different things 
could or should be done. the key part of the framework is the Power and Change analysis, which is the heart of the framework 
and focuses on non-formal practices and relationships and links between formal and informal institutions. It seeks to explain 
the basis for state-society relationships and high levels of corruption, low legitimacy of state institutions, weak commitment to 
human rights and poverty reduction. three sets of factors are addressed: the major characteristics of a political system, which 
change slowly; state-society interaction, which change in the medium term and the interaction of actors in the current context, 
which change quickly. the fi ndings from this analysis are discussed in a two-day workshop and a Strategic Choices document 
is developed, which presents the outcomes. 
http://www.clingendael.nl/publications/2007/20071000_cru_occ_unsworth.pdf 
box 17: combating corruption through performance
assessment Frameworks (paF) for budget support
Budget support has become an increasingly important modality for the provision of aid. Evidence suggests that countries 
that have received large amounts of budget support tend to perform better against several MdG indicators than those who 
have received little or no budget support, irrespective of policy environment, income status and aid dependency1. there are, 
however, concerns that budget support enables corrupt offi cials to have greater discretion to direct fungible aid to serve their 
own personal interests. 
In response, ‘corruption related indicators’ have been integrated by donors into the Performance assessment Frameworks (PaFs) 
used to monitor the result of budget support. However it is unclear how effective these are. For example, NORad’s Malawi PaF 
includes the average number of months for corruption cases to be completed and the percentage of corruption cases completed 
within 12 months. this indicator only covers those cases of corruption which are prosecuted in the courts and there may be 
other reported instances of corruption where those involved are not punished through the courts. 
Forthcoming work by the U4 anti-Corruption Centre (late 2011) will explore the ways in which anti-corruption and public integrity 
have been addressed through the selection of PaF indicators. It aims to identify the stronger indicators and ways in which global 
standards on corruption such as the United Nations Convention against Corruption can better be integrated.
Beynon, J. and Dasu, A., 2010, ‘Budget Support and MDG Performance’, Development Paper No. 2010/01, European Commission 
http://ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/fi les/europa_only/budget_support_MDG_performance_development_paper_en.pdf
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Many of the questions in the OBS focus on the contents and timeliness of the key budget documents that all countries 
should issue, according to generally accepted good practice criteria for public sector financial management. the ques-
tionnaire also covers additional topics of importance to civil society, including factors related to legislative oversight, 
such as whether or not the legislature holds public hearings on the budget, and on the role of the country’s independent 
national audit office, also known as the supreme audit institution (Performance assessment Frameworks are also used 
in this context, as outlined in Box 16 above).
Corruption and poor governance manifest themselves differently according to the nature of service delivery and the 
country specificities. It is therefore of key importance to take into account the country and sector contexts and specifi-
cities to identify the right entry points and drivers in order to have the most effective responses in prioritising interven-
tions both in terms of policy dialogue and programmes and project design. the European Commission should look 
at a sequenced approach aiming at identifying risks and leakages in sectors, setting priorities, supporting targeted 
anti-corruption measures and monitoring the progress made, notably in terms of the influence they would have on the 
achievements of the most off-track MdGs.
a key starting point is to analyse the political economy at sector level. Various tools have been developed to understand 
the sector context, including the World Bank’s Problem driven Governance and Political Economy analysis (PdGPEa). 
Box 17 below briefly outlines examples where sector level analysis, including the PdGPEa, has been used. this frame-
work addresses governance and political economy analysis relating to particular problems, challenges, or opportunities. 
Importantly, ‘problem-driven’ does not mean focusing exclusively on areas of difficulty but rather on specific questions 
and challenges. Broadly speaking, the PdGPE has three main steps: (i) identifying the problem, issue or vulnerability to 
be addressed, (ii) mapping out the institutional and governance arrangements and weaknesses, and; (iii) drilling down to 
the political economy drivers, both in terms of identifying obstacles to progressive change, and in terms of understanding 
where potentially a ‘drive’ for positive change could be emerging from. this basic approach can be applied to analysis 
at country, sector or project levels – with appropriate adaptation and tailoring to each level.
the European Commission has also developed a framework for ‘analysing and addressing Governance in Sector 
Operations’. this framework focuses on three core elements of governance in a particular sector: context, actors as 
well as governance and accountability relations. analysing the context of sector governance: draws on many general 
context analyses that are available from domestic and other sources. Mapping the actors – their interests, power and 
incentives aims to identify organisations and individuals which are main stakeholders in the sector and those presently 
playing an important role in governance and accountability relations in the sector. the framework proposes six clusters 
of actors (non-state actors; checks and balance organisations; political system/government; core public agencies; 
frontline service providers; and, donors, regional and international organisations). Some of the actors play different roles 
and, thus, belong to more than one cluster. 
the third step helps to analyse the governance and accountability relations between key actors in sector governance. 
When looking at governance relations, the first task is to analyse the ‘mix’ of governance mechanisms that determine 
the functioning of a sector. Four governance mechanisms, through which authority and power can be exercised, are 
identified. the final step synthesises the findings from the previous three steps into a summary matrix. the matrix in-
cludes key features shaping and describing existing governance relations in the sector and key strengths, opportunities, 
weaknesses and threats for change in governance and accountability on the demand and supply sides, respectively.
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another useful tool to help understand corruption risks at different levels is Value Chain analysis. this tool helps in iden-
tifying risks and leakages by taking into account specifi c sector structures, relevant stakeholders, production processes 
and market structures. a value chain analysis124 looking at the various processes undertaken and actors involved for 
delivering services could help to identify the main vulnerabilities and related corruption risks at each stage of the chain 
and to some extend provide information on the probabilities for risks occurring. 
124 Notably used by the World Bank and the GTZ.
box 18: sector political Economy Examples: Zambian agriculture and Dhaka Urban transport
In 2002, dFId commissioned a study on the ‘drivers for change in Zambian agriculture’. this study built on the fi rst so-called drivers 
of Change study conducted in Bangladesh in 2002. at that point in time, dFId’s drivers of Change approach had not yet developed 
a framework that could be applied to analysis at sector level. therefore, the study applied some of the lessons learned from country-
level drivers of Change study in Bangladesh to the Zambian agriculture sector. the design of the sector-level drivers for Change 
study centres on sector policy environments, policy making processes in the agricultural sector and main political and other actors 
that operate within the sector.
http://www.odi.org.uk/work/projects/03-food-security-forum/docs/d4c1.pdf 
the Work Bank has undertaken a study applying the PdGPEa to the urban transport sector in dhaka, Bangladesh. the purpose 
of the exercise was to increase the World Bank’s understanding of the reasons why unsafe, polluting buses continue to operate 
in dhaka’s roads, despite efforts to regulate and reform bus operations. It utilises methods outlined in the World Bank’s PdGPE 
and Political Economy assessments of Sector and Project Levels. the assessment was therefore operationally focused and 
linked to the design of the Bank’s support of the Clean air and Sustainable Environment (CaSE) project in Bangladesh.
See http://api.ning.com/fi les/-HcEeNyYj-JoRNIX7J-UF8VIy1RFc3K4D1HAopdQGmAZnkqtPipv6ZPZ5lJh2c2pkPgNzTWgllVVEbOCegrVRTUzPf
*yNH6G/PoliticalEconomyAnalysisofDhakaUrbanBusOperations.pdf
box 19: value chain analysis 
Value Chain analysis is a tool used predominantly by the private sector to break down the chain of activity when producing and 
distributing a good and identifying the key activities which add value. through this analysis, it is possible to identify weaknesses 
in supply chains and distribution networks. 
Figure: Value Chain Analysis in the Health Sector.
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the World Bank has applied the value chain approach to analyse process fl ows in projects and sectors. through Value Chain 
analysis, analysts can assess risks and identify elements vulnerable to fraud and corruption. It can also be used to develop 
strategies for combating corruption and improving governance. 
this analysis can be done either simply, through a more formal approach, or through a resource intensive approach. the simple 
approach uses anecdotal information from government offi cials, end-use consumers and others who work in the sector. the more 
formal and comprehensive approach involves interviewing government offi cials, holding discussions with experts, consulting with 
stakeholders and the involvement of local consultants with experience in the sector. the most resource intensive approach draws 
information from international consultants with an extensive technical background as well as from local consultants who are familiar 
with the political and economic conditions in the sector. there is no ‘right’ approach to Value Chain analysis and even the simplest 
approach can identify eighty per cent of the risk.
the Value Chain analysis is a useful tool for fl agging up hotspots but has limitations. For example, there is rarely the degree 
of control in the process fl ows of projects and sectors in developing countries as there would be in product development in 
developed countries. 
Source: GAC-in-Projects How-To Notes: Value Chain Analysis 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTGOVANTICORR/Resources/3035863-1285875404494/100501_GACIP_ValueChainAnalysis.pdf
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Step 3: Explore the range of tools and identify and adapt the most appropriate tools, if available
It is important to have a comprehensive understanding of the available tools and their indicators. the transparency 
International GatEway Project aims to undertake this and provide a database of tools accessible to users. When using 
GatEway, users need to breakdown the indicators and identify what each indicator is measuring, their conceptual focus, 
measurement methodology and other strengths and weaknesses. 
Keeping purpose, level and data suitability in mind, users must identify tools and indicators that most suit those. If the 
assessment is to guide policy, it is important that the indicators are actionable, action-worthy and complementary. In 
some cases, it may be necessary to generate unique research to produce tools and indicators suitable to the objectives 
in that situation. It is important to invest in proper design, which is easier to do if the purpose, level and data suitability 
have already been established.
Section 6: What are the best written resources 
to help choose tools and indicators?
 
there is a wide (and often confusing) range of literature available relating to the available tools and indicators on assess-
ing corruption. as a starting point, the following resources are recommended:
GATEway Project
http://www.transparency.org/tools/gateway
the GatEway project, funded by Europeaid and implemented by transparency International, is a stock-taking exercise 
to compile, map and categorise existing corruption and anti-corruption assessment tools. It will produce a web platform 
and online database of corruption tools; an accompanying manual; an analytical paper on strengths and weaknesses of 
tools, gaps and best practices; and help develop a new tool responding to ‘gaps’ in corruption indicators. the project 
aims to assist users of corruption assessment tools to better differentiate between the tools and to identify appropriate 
tools for their situation.
Governance and Social Development Resource Centre (GSDRC)
http://www.gsdrc.org/
the GSdRC houses a searchable document library, a research helpdesk and various topic guides and introductory 
guides on issues of governance, including corruption. Of particular relevance are:
•	Political Economy analysis topic Guide: Governance assessment
http://www.gsdrc.org/go/topic-guides/political-economy-analysis/governance-assessment
this section of the GSdRC Political Economy analysis topic Guide provides an overview of assessing governance in 
complement to political economy analysis and provides links to other resources.
U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre
http://www.u4.no/
the U4 anti-Corruption Resource Centre assists donor practitioners in more effectively addressing corruption challenges 
through their development support. Like the GSdRC, U4 operates a helpdesk with searchable queries relating to cor-
ruption, including measuring and assessing corruption.
UNDP, 2008, ‘A User’s Guide to Measuring Corruption Guide’, UNDP Oslo Governance Centre
English: 
http://www.undp.org/oslocentre/docs08/users_guide_measuring_corruption.pdf
French: 
http://www.undp.org/oslocentre/docs08/users_guide_measuring_corruption_french.pdf
Spanish: 
http://www.undp.org/oslocentre/docs08/users_guide_measuring_corruption_spanish.pdf 
this guide, jointly produced by UNdP and Global Integrity, provides practical guidance as to how best to measure 
corruption and how to use the data generated by measurement tools to inform policy formulation and further reform 
agendas. It is composed of a literature review, a summary of findings from expert interviews and country case studies.
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World Bank Governance & Corruption (GAC) in Projects Database
http://go.worldbank.org/C4SVHWdd00
this site provides a range of tools, practice notes and examples designed to help development practitioners improve 
outcomes by promoting good practice in integrating governance and corruption issues into programme and project 
planning and evaluation. It includes, for example, Guidance Notes on value chain analysis, political economy analysis 
and other risk analysis tools.
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conclusIon
this concept note has set out to provide relevant insights into the current thinking on anti-corruption in developing 
countries. It aims to provide the EU staff in head quarters and delegations with useful tools to analyse corruption vis-
à-vis partner countries; to become better equipped to support the implementation of anti-corruption strategies and 
policies; and to better identify relevant anti-corruption measures so as to improve the mainstreaming of anti-corruption 
issues in the EU development assistance.
Indeed, the above chapters do not attempt to provide a general or broad-spectrum remedy for corruption; there is no 
‘one size fits all’ process for dealing with corruption but appropriate solutions must always be local and context-specific.
Main Concepts
How corruption is defined affects how it is viewed, which policy approaches are adopted, and which approaches are deemed 
to be legitimate. Corruption – because of its multidimensional nature – cannot be understood through only one category of 
definition. Policy-makers, seeking to improve the design of anti-corruption programmes, should incorporate an understanding 
of the legal, socio-economic and anthropological definitions of corruption. Rather than seeking a definitive definition, policy-
makers should understand that each definition provides unique insights.
there are a number of useful forms and typologies of corruption such as grand versus petty corruption, and active versus 
passive corruption. For the public sector, the United Nations Office for drugs and Crime (UNOdC) has developed a taxonomy 
of forms of corruption forms such as bribery, embezzlement, and abuse of discretion. these are useful for understanding 
various corrupt transactions in terms of their level and impact.
there are several domestic and external mechanisms underlying the emergence and development of corruption. an absence 
of economic development can encourage corruption, which in turn restricts development and compounds poverty but there 
is no firm, fixed correlation between any particular level of economic development and the incidence of corruption. Economic 
liberalisation, state intervention and foreign investment can have unintended consequences including encouraging corrup-
tion. Weak institutions, inequality and external drivers such as international crime and offshore banking can also play a part.
the consequences of corruption are not limited to economic inefficiencies; it also reduces the provision of welfare in society, 
undermines democracy and political institutions, contributes to social inequalities and conflict, constitutes a violation of human 
rights and can have a potentially devastating impact upon the environment.
Addressing Corruption in a Globalised World
International efforts to recognise and prevent corruption have only gained popularity since the 1970s. the US Foreign 
Corrupt Practices act (FCPa) of 1977 was introduced following a number of corruption scandals involving Western-
owned multinationals abroad. In 1997, OECd member countries decided to curb bribe-giving in international business 
with the creation and ratification of the 1997 OECd Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in 
International Business transactions. Following this, a number of multilateral conventions have since been negotiated, 
adopted and ratified, setting standards for the prevention, detection and sanctioning of corrupt behaviour.
the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCaC), which represents one of the most recent and extensive 
Conventions to specifically recognise and tackle corruption, was adopted in 2003. UNCaC sets out to define and 
criminalise the actions of corruption and requires States Parties to put in place effective anti-corruption policies. It aims 
to provide a comprehensive, universally accepted legal instrument to prevent and combat corruption. In September 
2005, the European Community, represented by the European Commission, signed the 2003 UNCaC and ratified it in 
November 2008.
a number of regional anti-corruption conventions have also been adopted. this includes the Inter-american Convention 
against Corruption of the Organisation of american States (OaS), the Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention on 
Corruption, and the african Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption. 
a number of initiatives have also been developed over the last few years to address the problems that resource-abundant 
countries can face. this includes the Extractive Industries transparency Initiative, the Kimberley Process Certification 
Scheme (for diamonds) and the Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and trade.
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the EU staff particularly in delegations can support the use of conventions through their work. they can support lob-
bying for the signature and ratification of the conventions, as well as providing technical support and funding for their 
implementation and monitoring.
Assessing Corruption and Monitoring Anti-Corruption
assessing corruption or monitoring anti-corruption efforts can help mitigate risks inherent in development programmes 
and projects. However, corruption is highly variable and dependent on context. It can only be measured indirectly and 
requires nuanced and tailored measurements. 
When designing a corruption assessment, users must ask themselves what is the particular purpose of their assessment; 
what is the level or focal point of their analysis; and what data is most suited for it. thinking through these questions 
allows users to find an assessment tool that better meets their objectives and is suitable for their context.
the purpose of corruption assessments has evolved from being used primarily to help promote the fight against cor-
ruption, to using them to compare levels of corruption over time and space, to using them to provide a comprehensive 
and nuanced assessment of corruption issues in a specific context. Purposes for corruption assessments now include 
diagnosis, early-warning, awareness-raising, coalition-building, monitoring, research guidance, policy dialogue, fiduci-
ary risk and programme failure. For policy-makers designing corruption assessments, clearly identifying the purpose or 
objective of the assessment is a crucial first step to preparing an assessment.
another aspect that is essential is to consider the area of focus. In particular, is the area ‘corruption’ or ‘anti-corruption’? 
Measuring corruption is based on perceptions and experiences of the general population, public sector, private sector 
and/or experts. anti-corruption or integrity assessment is based on compliance monitoring of local, national or inter-
national policies and conventions as well as diagnostic assessments of institutions, processes and/or sectors at the 
local level. 
there are different levels at which the assessment could focus for which different tools would be appropriate. there is 
significant overlap between levels (e.g. Global Integrity can be multi-country, supranational and multi-level). Levels can 
be defined as supranational, multi-country, national, sub-national, sectoral, organisational and multi-level. the extent of 
corruption and perceptions of corruption can vary significantly between levels. a corruption assessment with a focus or 
emphasis on a particular level may not be generalisable. this is especially the case in relation to the public and private 
sectors where inclusion or exclusion of the private sector perceptions in an assessment can significantly affect the results.
Good data is essential for a good assessment; however, corruption as an illicit activity is often intentionally obscured, 
making it hard to obtain good data. Furthermore, in developing countries there may not be the capacity to gather relevant 
data. Corruption assessments are designed to make assessments based on limited data, but assessments are ultimately 
determined by what data is collected, how it is collected and by whom. the choice and method of data collection has 
profound impact on the results. Various methods and combinations of methods can be employed to gather informa-
tion. the main methods are: desk-study, interviews, focus group, postal surveys, internet surveys and expert coding 
of narrative reports. data can either be objective—indisputable facts, such as policy measures; perception—based on 
people’s opinions; or composite —a mixture of objective and perception measures.
Perception data may be most valuable where objective measures are weak or non-existent, but it is prone to bias. there 
are time lags, with perceptions often slow to change. Some environments stifle dissent or contain a culture reluctant 
to air criticisms or negative opinions. those outside of the area may have strongly differing views to those within it. an 
increased awareness of corruption following a recent or well-publicised series of incidents of corruption may mean more 
acts are classified as corruption, building a strong but false sense of corruption. a high-profile anti-corruption drive may 
increase the perception of corruption just when corruption is actually starting to be effectively combated. Perception 
data must thus be interpreted in respect to the context. 
anti-corruption tools and indicators are based on four types of data, which are based upon first-hand knowledge or 
direct experience: written de jure provisions, event reports, narrative reports and surveys. In addition to these first-hand 
or primary sources, there are other secondary sources, such as national audit / auditor-General reports, and public 
anti-Corruption agency/Commission reports or academic studies.
No single source of data or tool will offer a definitive measurement, and an accurate and valuable assessment depends 
on an understanding of the various tools and indicators and tailoring them to the context. One should be aware of the 
areas of confusion and the limitations and pitfalls of tools and indicators. this includes an over-reliance on popular but 
often inappropriate indicators, such as transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index and the World Bank’s 
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Governance Indicators. When designing corruption measures, it is important that the tools and indicators used are fit 
for the purpose for which they are intended. 
One should also be aware what makes up an indicator and should not try to reduce the unquantifiable to numbers. 
Indicators, and especially anti-corruption indicators, have underlying normative assumptions that are important to take 
into account. 
When required, users should choose tools and indicators that are designed to guide policy – so-called ‘actionable’ 
indicators. tools, especially some of the most popular tools, are suited to raising awareness of corruption but not to 
guiding policy-makers on suitable reform.
Input and output indicators should complement each other and attention is to be paid to the impact of corruption on 
disadvantaged and the most affected groups. When appropriate, measure integrity (i.e. the effectiveness of existing 
corruption safeguard mechanisms) rather than measuring corruption. take into account differences between de jure 
(i.e. written provisions) and de facto (i.e. the day-to-day implementation of such provisions). Finally, be aware of data 
limitation and do not assume causation where there is only correlation.
Corruption assessments can be quite straightforward. It is often not necessary to take extensive measures to undertake 
a corruption assessment. the key steps are: (1) understand the political economy (making use of existing analyses when-
ever possible); (2) identify purpose, level and suitable data; (3) explore the range of tools (with help from the GatEway 
Project) and identify and adapt the most appropriate tools, if available; and (4) ensure monitoring.
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Useful websites
•	 transparency International—www.transparency.org
Includes a wide range of resources, including their annual reports, corruption perception and bribery lists and a number 
of working papers covering everything from procurement to nation-building to youth and much more 
•	U4 anti-Corruption Resource Centre—www.U4.no 
Includes a number of their own publications as well as summaries of, and links to, a large number of corruption 
resources, grouped by theme for ease of use. U4 also has a number of resources, including a corruption glossary, 
FaQs and tool kits
•	Governance & Social development Resource Centre—www.gsdrc.org 
Includes an ‘anti-Corruption Gateway’, as well as wide-ranging coverage of governance topics, such as civil service 
reform, institutional development and service delivery
•	OECd Bribery & Corruption— http://www.oecd.org/topic/0,3373,en_2649_37447_1_1_1_1_37447,00.html 
Includes resources particularly on bribery and the OECd convention, best practice guides and more.
•	United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCaC)— http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CaC/index.html 
Includes the full text of the convention as well as a range of tools, technical guides and listing of related events 
•	World Bank anti-Corruption site—http://go.worldbank.org/QyRWVXVH40
Includes access to tools and data, annotated bibliographies and a range of other resources
•	anti-Corruption Research Network—http://corruptionresearchnetwork.org/ 
Contains access to corruption-related research, notification of events and so on.
•	Global Integrity—http://www.globalintegrity.org/ 
Independent think-tank providing reports and toolkits on governance and corruption
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annex 1: InTernaTIonal convenTIons 
agaInsT corrupTIon 
name Year reach Measures advantages weaknesses offences
UNCAC 2003 Global Prevention, 
criminalization, 
international 
cooperation
Innovation - asset recovery, 
broadest range
Monitoring
Not all art. binding
Public/private 
recognized
UNTOC 2001 Global Prevention, 
criminalization, asset 
recovery, international 
cooperation
Joint investigations, special 
investigative techniques
Reservation possible Public
ECOWAS  
Protocol on the 
Fight against 
Corruption
2001
Not in 
force
Sub-
regional
Prevention, 
criminalization, 
international 
cooperation
Wide scope Not in force active and passive 
bribery in the public 
and private sectors; 
illicit enrichment, 
false accounting
OAS  
Inter-American 
Convention 
against 
Corruption
1996 Regional/
inter-
regional
Prevention, 
criminalization, 
international 
cooperation
First instrument in this 
field which recognizes 
the international reach of 
corruption and the need 
to promote and facilitate 
cooperation
Public
ADB-OECD  
Action Plan
2001 Regional 
asia-
Pacific
Prevention, 
criminalization, 
international 
cooperation 
measures, extradition, 
recovery of assets, 
3 pillars (integrity of 
public service, private 
sector,involvement of 
civil society)
Provides a regional 
cooperation framework 
providing improved 
mutual law enforcement 
assistance, including 
extradition,investigations, 
as well as confiscation, 
seizure and repatriation of 
proceeds of corruption
all principles are 
legally non-binding 
creating risk of failure 
to develop common 
standards. 
Preventive provisions 
drafted very broadly, 
allowing for wide 
interpretation 
and discretionary 
practice.
Limited 
interpretation of 
corruption offences, 
only including 
bribery and money 
laundering, non-
binding
OECD 1997 Global/
inter-
regional
Criminalisation 
and mutual 
legal assistance 
measures, as well 
as requirements 
regarding company 
accounting
addresses supply side of 
international corruption 
with regard to the main 
exporting nations. Provides 
for extensive and rigorous 
monitoring of countries´ 
compliance with the 
Convention
Unresolved: foreign 
political parties, 
role of off-shore 
centers in bribery 
transactions.
Bribery - foreign 
public officials
SADC Protocol 
against 
Corruption
2001 Regional/
sub-
regional
Prevention and 
enforcement, judicial 
cooperation (MLa, 
extradition)
First sub-regional anti-
corruption treaty in africa, 
broad range of preventive 
measures, confiscation
Public
AU Convention 
on Prevention 
and Combating 
Corruption
2003 Regional Prevention, 
criminalization, 
regional cooperation, 
mutual legal 
assistance and 
recovery of assets
Comprehensive approach, 
mandatory provisions 
on transparency in 
political party funding, on 
declaration of assets by 
public officials, restrictions 
on immunity 
Not in force bribery (domestic or 
foreign), diversion of 
property by public 
officials, trading 
in influence, illicit 
enrichment, money 
laundering and 
concealment of 
property 
Public and private
CoE Civil Law 
Convention
1999 Inter-
regional
Civil law remedies,  
compensation 
for damage from 
corruption; invalidity 
of corrupt contracts 
(null and void); 
whistleblower 
protection.
broad definition, wide 
scope, monitoring
No restriction on 
the use of banking 
secrecy
Public and private 
sector
CoE 
Criminal Law 
Convention
1999 Inter-
regional
Criminalization, 
regional cooperation, 
asset recovery
Broad range of offences, 
strong monitoring
Few preventive 
measures
Parties may make 
reservations
Public and private, 
including bribery, 
trading in influence, 
money laundering, 
accounting offences
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annex 2: oecd-adb anTI-corrupTIon 
InITIaTIve In asIa-pacIfIc
In 1999, governments in asia-Pacific affirmed their resolve to cooperate in their activities to fight corruption via the 
launching of the anti-Corruption Initiative for asia and the Pacific. the initiative, jointly led by the asia development Bank 
(adB) and the OECd, ‘sets out the goals and standards for sustainable safeguards against corruption in the economic, 
political and social spheres of countries in the region’125.
the anti-Corruption action Plan, developed within the framework of the Initiative, is structured under the following three 
pillars: 
•	developing effective and transparent systems for public service;
•	Strengthening anti-bribery actions and prompting integrity in business operations; and
•	Supporting active public involvement126.
Membership is open to any economy within the region that both recognize the threat of corruption and is actively taking 
a stance against it. to date, twenty-eight countries and jurisdictions in the asia-Pacific region have endorsed the Plan 
and accepted its implementation mechanism. 
In reviewing the Initiative’s implementation, it appears well structured with a steering group that defines priorities and 
activities, while an advisory Group is available with provision for technical advice. the three implementation mechanism 
contains three components: fostering policy dialogue and measuring progress, providing analysis to support the policy 
dialogue, and capacity building to enable members to thoroughly implement the reforms127.
In the year of the initiative’s tenth birthday an independent review was commissioned128. Garnet and Kwok (2009)129 
found members to be very positive about the initiative but that the rate of progress could be accelerated. Particular 
attention was drawn to members’ ownership of the initiatives representing a unique and positive characteristic in com-
parison to other initiatives and conventions. this characteristic was deemed to enable the free and informal exchange 
of experiences and the arrangement of mutual support. While the demand side of anti-corruption efforts is involved in 
the initiative, the review highlighted the absence of the private sector as an area for improvement.
125 http://www.oecd.org/document/23/0,3343,en_34982156_35315367_35030743_1_1_1_1,00.html
126 Ibid.
127 Ibid.
128 Ibid.
129 Garnet, H. & Kwok, T., 2009, ‘Independent Review of the ADB/OECD Initiative Final Report’, 
available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/55/30/44084819.pdf.
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